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Abstract
This dissertation amends the Crisis Renewal Model of corporate rhetoric based on
analyses of two multinational organizational crises in Nigeria and Cameroon. The
Renewal model revises the dominant apologia model of corporate crisis rhetoric to focus
on strengthening relationships with stakeholders following a crisis rather than solely on
repairing or restoring reputation. Yet while the renewal model redresses the classic
Aristotelian premises of apologia, the Nigerian and Cameroonian situations call for a
significant reframing of rhetorical strategies in response to the colonialist legacies,
cultural traditions, political volatilities, and socioeconomic particularities of these
contexts. The research questions driving the dissertation are: What are the limitations of
the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating in West African countries? How
can this model be amended based on African communication principles? Data about the
cases came from newspapers, company documents, and local and international NGO
reports, and radio texts generated from LexisNexis. The data for Shell in Nigeria spans
1993-2016 while the data for Herakles Farms in Cameroon spans 2009-2016. The
analyses found that both apologia and renewal were evident in corporate rhetoric
produced by Shell and Herakles Farms; nonetheless, their respective crises damaged
corporate reputation and stakeholder relationships. Drawing from lessons learned in these
cases in West Africa, I turn to African communication concepts of communality and
hybridity to rethink the Western premises of the Crisis Renewal model, particularly
dimensions of ethical leadership, prospective vision, and organizational learning and
build on Spivak’s arguments in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” and Kraidy’s notion of
hybridity. I propose a concept I call responsive hybridity to modify the Crisis Renewal
model. Responsive hybridity reframes renewal as a creative self-reflexive process
producing hybrid forms, relationships, and practices.

Key words: Crisis renewal model, responsive hybridity, self-reflexivity, multinational
corporations, crisis context.
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1 Introduction
1.1

Background

For contemporary organizations, crises can come in many guises: natural
disasters, financial meltdowns, political upheavals, social media outbreaks, management
mistakes, product failures, or brand hijacking. The list is long and ever-expanding.
Whereas the prevailing sense used to be that crises threatening a corporation’s brand
(Mitroff, 1986), image, or reputation were rare, today these threats are all too common.
The field of corporate crisis communication has emerged in the past two decades in
response to this changing actuality.
Corporate crisis communication has developed through case descriptions of the
communication strategies used by corporate leaders and spokespeople in reaction to
image threats. Based on post-hoc rhetorical analyses, crisis scholars have categorized
these strategies. The schemas drew on classical Aristotelian conceptions of apologia, a
speaker-centered approach that mitigates the threat to corporate image through various
strategies of apology or denial. A later schema is informed by psychological theories of
attribution to offer schemas based in stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and blame.
Yet the emphasis on corporate leaders, defensive strategies, and the goal of protecting or
reinstating corporate image remained. More recently, a proactive and positive approach
to corporate crisis communication has been advanced that shifts from post-hoc analyses
and defensive strategies to ethical communicative relationships: the Crisis Renewal
Model. This dissertation focuses on this renewal theory and seeks to amend it to address
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the stakeholder relationships and local-global complexities in crises faced by
multinational corporations operating beyond the U.S.
The renewal model shifts the focus from protecting organizational image and
reputation against threats to making the most of opportunities for reducing uncertainties
and creating mutually beneficial solutions. The model recommends communication
practices that, according to Robert Ulmer, a founder of this perspective, “emphasize
collaboration with stakeholders, open communication processes, and honesty and
timeliness in providing information about the crisis” (p. 529). Collaboration, honesty, and
openness are contrasted to “practices of deception, secrecy, and values of upholding the
reputation of [an organization] over human life.” The focus is on what leaders value
precrisis and the key communication values they should develop in order to build their
crisis communication skills.
Ulmer holds that an ethic of significant choice frames the ethicality of crisis
communication best practices: This is best facilitated by “providing stakeholders with
complete known information about the crisis, avoiding incomplete information, avoiding
biased information, avoiding statistics that are inadequately defined or incomplete,
avoiding vague or ambiguous communication designed to create erroneous meaning, or
using emotional language designed to distort meaning” (p. 532). Whereas reactive crisis
responses tend to be utilitarian (doing what is best for the greatest number while ignoring
the damage done to the rest), proactive and ethically responsive approaches adopt
strategies based in principles of stakeholder equity and corporate transparency, thereby
seeking more expansive and lasting solutions to crisis situations.
2

This dissertation addresses Ulmer’s call for thought leadership in crisis
communication not only by contributing to a normative model based on principles of
ethical communication but also by redressing the parochial limits of crisis
communication scholarship. Crisis communication scholarship has been developed
almost exclusively in the U.S. through studies of U.S. corporate crises. Further, the most
well-established models are based in classical rhetorical traditions, particularly
Aristotelian traditions, that have been canonized in the history of Western rhetoric and
particularly in the development of American pedagogies of speaking and writing. For
example, one of the premier survey textbooks in the field, The Rhetoric of Western
Thought, in continuous production since 1976, extols the Aristotelian and Greco-Roman
foundations of philosophical, literary, and oratorical practices and philosophies (Golden,
Berquist, & Coleman, 1976). These models prioritize the corporate rhetor and corporate
image, promoting strategies intended to deflect or deny criticism and blame in order to
minimize threats.
In contrast, the goal of this dissertation is to consider corporate crisis
communication in the context of globalization, specifically, the operations of
multinational corporations on the African continent. Prevailing neoliberal management
and financial logics exacerbate the impact of crisis reactions for stakeholder relationships.
Indeed, the emphasis on short-term profits, efficiency measures, and cost reductions in
the tightly-coupled and globalized relations of production, distribution, and consumption
especially in such critical and multinational-dominated industries as resource extraction
and agribusiness invite proliferating crises and tremendous crisis scalability. In addition,
3

the model of communication on which crisis communication models have been founded
is itself suspect in the context of African cultures and communicative practices.
Developing collaborative sense-making with local stakeholders most subject to the fallout of corporate crisis management requires attunement to sense-making logics-in-use
rather than the imposition of a transcultural model of rhetoric.

1.2.

Rationale for Amendment
I should immediately point out here that “amendment” in this dissertation means

the research is adding to the model so that organizational leaders and spokespersons are
able to apply the components that constitute the model in a more responsive manner. But
why amend the crisis renewal model through its encounter with multinational crises in
sub-Saharan Africa? First, while the presence of multinational enterprises on the African
continent is long-standing, financial incentives to exploit resources, labor, and land on the
continent have intensified even as conditions of crisis increase--political instabilities,
climate disasters, human disasters of famine and disease, the prevalence of violence by
both state and disenfranchised actors, widespread civil and state corruption. Clearly,
crisis response is requisite to doing business in this region. Second, the contemporary
African conjuncture is complex, bringing together a plethora of antagonisms within
configurations of neoliberal financialization and post-colonial governance and cultures.
The politics of representation are at the heart of relations of global capital, state stability,
sustainable production, and political subjectivities. Thus, amending the renewal model
entails confronting relations of power that complicate the model’s goals of equity,

4

transparency, and ethicality. Note here Bhabba’s notion of mimicry: rather than
respecting the differences and otherness of local cultures, the renewal model implies the
idea of “colonial mimicry” or “the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject
of a difference that is almost the same but not quite” (Bhabba, 1994, p. 86). Given that
there is always ambivalence and slippage between the dominant and the mimic, the
renewal model is doomed to inadequacy.
Finally, and critically, the crisis renewal model fails to address its inherent
assumptions about power relations. Most troublingly, the model assumes its own
universality: values of corporate/paternalistic leadership, ethicality, a certain kind of
organizational learning/sense-making, and effective (reality-constructing) rhetoric are
assumed to apply everywhere to everyone with no translation needed. Instead of being
transcultural, these dimensions are meaningful in situ and as enacted. Hence, they do not
offer a one-size-fits-all guarantee of renewal. In addition, a corporate bias unreflectively
advances corporate dominance, paternalism, and monologic rhetoric. Despite the ethical
injunction to respect stakeholder perspectives and seek equitable participation, the model
emphasizes the dominance of corporate leaders over collaborative goals and processes.
Hence, a conception of inequitable power relations is inherent to this model. Critical
perspectives on organizational communication counter corporate bias and promote
systemic change in organization-societal relations (Mumby & Stohl). Such critical
perspectives often champion the enactment of democratic or dialogic relations through
resistance to the dominance of corporate interests. However, the African context
complicates such goals. For example, the colonialist legacies that permeate histories and
5

practices in many African societies lend themselves to a superior/inferior epistemological
dynamic that can be readily taken up in crisis responses to dismiss indigenous meanings,
perspectives, and moral relations.
In considering the role of multinational corporations in Africa, a critical
perspective on crisis rhetoric and renewal must engage two interpenetrating contexts:
colonialism and neoliberalism. Colonialism is an economic, political, material, and
historical model of power, the legacies of which continue to impact the development of
African societies. In the wake of colonialism, Spivak posed a critical discursive question:
“Can the subaltern speak?” It is a question that the renewal model of corporate crisis
management must address because it is central to the goals of stakeholder equity and
ethicality. Yet given the failure to directly question the assumptions about power in this
model, renewal remains in thrall to corporatist interests and economic-political
exploitations. In her essay, Spivak cautions against taking up conceptions of power
developed by Western intellectuals – specifically, Foucault and Deleuze – because such
conceptions abet colonialist economic exploitation by marginalizing, erasing, or silencing
subaltern others, that is, those who are most marginalized and subjugated in relation to
both colonizers and indigenous elites. She points out that her question entails a
complicated politics of recognition and representation involving both political proxy (the
representation of interests) and re-presentation (existential and ontological presence).
Importantly, Spivak’s analysis rests on the complications of otherness that are requisite to
political and existential self-representation. She shows how otherness can enact a
hierarchy of subjugations and silences. Yet, as Hall presciently pointed out, “Our lives
6

have been transformed by the struggle of the margins to come into representation—not
just to be placed by a dominant, imperializing regime but to reclaim some form of
representation for themselves” (p.183).
In the crises considered in the two dissertation case studies, villagers who live the
consequences of crisis management by multinational agribusiness or extraction
corporations are spoken for in complex articulations issued by chiefs, NGOs, local and
national politicians, courts and legal relations, multinational agreements and statements,
and local and transnational journalists. Yet these are representations of otherness that
depend on the continued marginalization of the villagers themselves. For example,
villagers affected by the development of multinational palm oil plantations in Cameroon
are disempowered in the very representations advanced in their interests: by local chiefs
bribed to consent to negotiations over labor and land; by environmentalist and
conservationist NGOs both local and transnational concerned about deforestation,
logging, and bushmeat consumption; by a complicated tangle of land-ownership
regulations, fees, boards, and courts; by non-profit multinational philanthropic
associations like All for Africa seeking to lift them from poverty; by logging and
plantation managers making promises about work and pay; by government ministers
negotiating “sweetheart deals” with palm oil multinational CEOs and nationalized palm
oil companies; by President Biya’s vision “Cameroon 2035” in which agricultural
“smallholders” figure prominently with little regard for the lived conditions.
In similar ways, African communities continue to be articulated by neoliberalism.
Tangled in the politics of representation, neoliberalism frames the global environment as
7

a “free market” that encourages competition, efficiency, and economic growth.
International financial institutions including the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other transnational organizations push the logic of expanding
free markets; and speak for African states concerning what social, economic and even
political realities need to be pursued to ensure growth. Neoliberal policies are touted as
the remedy that will save Africans from poverty, ensure economic growth, and reduce
dependency on foreign aid. The African states/government on the other hand translate
and articulate these neoliberal discourses to local communities. Cameroon’s Vison 2035
is a succinct example of how the country’s government is articulating the neoliberal
agenda for ordinary Cameroonians neglecting the lived experiences of ordinary citizens.
Vision 2035 has articulated the ‘prosperity’ of the country in similar ways that
neoliberalism framed its “free market” agenda. Cameroon’s vision 2035 has as
overarching objective: (1) tying the country’s economy to the industrialized West such
that; (2) the country’s economy is mainstreamed into the “global economy” by opening
up local financial markets to foreign trade so that the country attains an “emerging
economy” status in the world (see “Platform2035”). Looking at this vision from a more
critical perspective, the vision clearly regurgitates neoliberal ideals – by being active in
international trade and selling farm products and minerals, Cameroon will be able to
acquire enough revenue to develop its own economies and increase production of goods
for both national and international consumption. It is thus evident how Vision 2035
frames the Cameroonian experience from the lenses of neoliberal ideologies that continue
to foster the paternalistic relationship in which local people must look up to the
government and allied Western financial and economic institutions to survive. The
8

government discourse of making Cameroon become a “newly industrialized country” (a
period when the country moves from primary agricultural production to a manufacturing
industry) neglects the lived experiences of local people who must first struggle with
multinational corporations over such issues as land ownership, subsistence wages, and
civil protection.
Neoliberal policies continue to contribute to the expanding crises plaguing the
African continent in the MNCs’ scramble for African markets and resources. Even when
local NGOs oppose foreign interference in the economic and social life of local
communities, the villagers who are most affected by these widening neoliberal policies
do not get to speak for themselves. In this situation, we notice international organizations,
home government, foreign activists, as well as local NGOs speaking for and about the
ordinary people.

1.3.

Research Questions
Amending the renewal model proceeds in two parts. First, two cases of corporate

crisis communication in sub-Saharan African countries will be analyzed. The research
questions motivating these case analyses are the following:

RQ1: What are the limitations of the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating
in West African countries?

9

The second part of the amendment project addresses African communication philosophy
and how it is a resource for amending the dimensions of the renewal model. Along with
explicating this communication philosophy the research question focuses on the salience
of this African perspective for the renewal model:
RQ2: How can the Crisis Renewal model be amended based on African communication
principles?

1.4

Brief Overview of Remaining Chapters

Chapters 2 and 3 establish the analytic framework. Chapter 2 explicates the
models of corporate crisis communication and the dimensions of the renewal model. It
also frames the larger contexts for the operation of multinational corporations on the
African continent including dynamics of globalization, neoliberalism and colonialism.
Chapter 3 details the data, coding, and thematic analysis that informs each case. The
chapter clearly identifies and describes the analytic frameworks and coding categories
and procedures.
Chapters 4 and 5 narrate the cases of Shell Oil in Nigeria and Herakles Farms in
Cameroon, respectively. Chapters 4 and 5 also present lessons learned from the cases
analyzed; as well as a discussion of what these lessons mean for amending the Renewal
Model. Each of these two chapters describes the history of the case and examines
evidence of crisis communication strategies by the MNC. In both cases, the MNC shifted
strategies, from a defensive apologia to a strategy incorporating dimensions of the
renewal model. This is not to claim that either MNC knowingly adopted the renewal
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model; nonetheless, there is convincing evidence that both adopted more stakeholderresponsive strategies at particular moments in their prolonged crises.
Chapter 6 turns to the question of African communication principles and practices
as resources for amending the Renewal Model. Chapter 7 draws together both the lessons
from chapters 4 and 5 and the African communication principles to propose an
amendment to the crisis Renewal Model. Chapter 8 summarizes the findings on the
research questions, discusses limitations, future research and draws conclusions.

11

2 Review of Crisis Rhetoric Models

2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses models of corporate crisis rhetoric that are current in the
crisis communication literature. In discussing these models, I lay emphasis on the
Discourse of Renewal (also referred to as Organizational Renewal theory and Crisis
Renewal Model) for an obvious reason: my research has as its main objective to amend
this model. The literature on globalization, and multinational corporations (MNCs) in this
chapter further provide relevant complex contexts within which analyses of the MNCs’
crisis communication occurs in sub-Saharan Africa.
With the widening interconnectedness in social, cultural, economic, and political
relations that the world is experiencing, the local and the global are only separated by
blurred lines (Appadurai, 2010; Tomlinson, 2007; Braman, 1996); yet this means that
local patterns in social and cultural relations have not been completely erased and cannot
be coopted into a model of rhetoric that fails to respond to otherness. Accordingly, this
chapter’s goal is to examine the theoretical dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal,
discuss the foundational conceptual critique framing the amendment that I offer in
Chapter 7, and situate the crisis renewal model within the complex contexts of
postcolonialism and corporate globalization in order to justify an amendment to the
model.

12

I begin with a review of crisis communication models, arguing that most models
rely too heavily on a neo-Aristotelian framework with a heavy focus on issues of blame
and reputation. The Discourse of Renewal, in contrast, draws on contemporary
conceptions of corporate rhetoric and ethics. However, this model has not as yet been
adequately reframed by relations of globalization, neoliberalism and postcolonialism. I
draw attention to the complexities of global politics and multinational corruption as I
consider these larger frameworks and their implications for the Discourse of Renewal.

2.2. Crisis Models
Crisis communication has been theorized through five major approaches – (1)
Corporate Apologia (Hearit, 2006a); (2) Image Repair (Benoit, 1997); (3) Situational
Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007a; Coombs, 1995); Discourse of Renewal
(Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011, 2013); and (5) Rhetorical Approach (Heath & Millars,
2004). These approaches have guided case studies on organizational crisis (e.g., Hearit,
2006e; Blaney, 2002; Harlow, et al, 2011; Sisco & Zoch, 2010; Seeger, Ulmer, &
Sellnow, 2005). I begin with apologia given that this has been the foundational model in
the area of corporate crisis communication.
2.2.1. Apologia
Ware and Linkugel (1973) first established Apologia in the communication
discipline as a framework for analyzing public discourses. Apologia according to Ware
and Linkugel, is primarily a response of “self-defense” (p. 274). They stated that when
speakers engage in self-defense (of their reputation) one of four strategies are applied:
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absolution, vindication, explanation, or justification (p. 282). In these instances speakers
seek acquittal or absolution from guilt; the “preservation of the accused’s reputation and
the recognition of his (sic) greater worth as a human being relative to the worth of his
accusers” and “approval” (p. 283). Communication scholars have built on these
typologies by Ware and Linkugel to develop extended versions of apologia. Hearit
(2006a) referred to Ware and Linkugel (1973) when he explained apologia as originating
from classical Greek rhetoric meaning “defense” or “speech in defense” (Hearit, 2006a,
p. 4).
While early use of apologia was “concerned with individuals accused of wrong
doing who seek to clear their names” (Hearit, 2006a, p. 3), contemporary crisis
communication scholars have extended the apologia framework to organizations by
investigating how companies or institutions respond to accusations of wrongdoing. Hearit
(2006) is one of the scholars who has produced extensive work on corporate apologia to
analyze how organizations manage crises (see Hearit, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, &
2006f) and I will rely on his publications to explain corporate apologia. Image Repair
theory (Benoit, 1997), and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (2007) are
extensions of the work of Ware and Linkugel (1973) and will be discussed separately
because of the widely applied nature of their models in crisis cases.
The main premise of corporate apologia is that organizations will take a defensive
position to counter accusations of wrongdoing in order to allay guilt. Several strategic
rhetorical responses are advanced: denial, e.g. it did not happen, we are not guilty;
counterattack, e.g. “directly attacking the accuser and claiming that the charges are false
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or come from malicious intent” (Hearit, 2006f, p. 124); differentiation, e.g., redefining
the context of the misdeed, explaining the wrongdoing, or justifying the event or
occurrence; apology, e.g., admitting guilt, and confessing involvement; and legal
strategy, e.g., the organization says nothing at all in public, but instead engages in legal
actions to “seek legal absolution of their guilt and ignore public concerns” (Hearit, 2006a,
p. 125). Overall, the focus of corporate apologia is the denial of wrongdoing by not
admitting guilt.
2.2.2. Image Repair
Developed by Benoit (1995/1997), Image Repair is an extension of Ware and
Linkugel’s (1973) apologia discourse. Benoit claims to have “developed a more
complete” approach to apologia (p. 265). The main premises of Benoit’s theorization are
(1) an organization is accused and held responsible for an action or event; and (2) that act
or event is considered offensive (Benoit, 1997, p. 178). It is important to note that “unless
that company is believed to be responsible for the act” and because “perceptions are
more important than reality” (emphasis is original), it is not about whether the company
actually committed the act or not. It suffices for the organization’s “salient audience”
(Benoit, 1997, p. 178) to feel that the act is offensive and believe the organization is
responsible for the act. Both conditions must be “thought to be true” by the company’s
salient audiences for the organization’s reputation “to be at risk” (Benoit, 2004, p. 264).
The image repair strategies modify the apologia strategies. These strategies include denial
(simple denial, and shifting blame); evasion of responsibility (e.g., we were provoked,
defeasibility, i.e. lack of information, accident, etc.); offensiveness reduction (e.g.
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bolstering, minimization, differentiation); corrective action (e.g., promises to correct
problem); and mortification (e.g., confessing and ask for forgiveness) (Benoit, 1997, pp.
265-269).
Image repair, just as apologia, focuses on how individuals and organizations can
choose to correct negative public perceptions directed on them following a crisis. The
focus is more on strategic responses or tactics aimed at “clearing” the names of
individuals and organizations. Image repair and apologia are crucially denial and blame
discourses. Image repair continues to be a dominant model informing crisis
communication research that focuses on image management during crisis (Harlow,
Brantley, & Harlow, 2011).
2.2.3. Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT)
Coombs (2007) has popularized this approach in crisis communication. While
traces of apologia could be seen in this model, the SCCT draws from the attribution
theory framework which holds that people make judgements and/or search for the causes
of events and “attribute responsibility for an event and will experience emotional reaction
to that event” (Coombs, 2007, p. 165). It emphasizes the need for organizational crisis
communicators and/or managers to have robust knowledge on the “crisis situation” (i.e.,
type of crisis and performance history), in order to determine which crisis response “will
maximize reputational protection” (Coombs, 2007, p. 166). Understanding the type of
crisis and the organization’s performance history is vital if the crisis manager is to
effectively match response strategies to crisis situations. The crisis type is an important
component because stakeholders will be more likely to attribute crisis responsibility to
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the organization in some situations than in others. For instance, having categorized crises
into clusters (victim, accidental, and preventable), Coombs explains that crises in the
victim cluster, for example, will attract sympathy, hence low crisis responsibility
attribution on the organization, while preventable cluster crises will attract anger, and so,
high crisis responsibility on the organization. Understanding this allows the crisis
manager to better match responses to specific crisis events.
Meanwhile, organizations can choose to use either primary or secondary
responses or a mix of both. Primary response strategies include denial strategies (e.g.
attack, shifting blame, clarification), diminish responses (e.g. excuse, justification), and
rebuild strategies (e.g., apology, compensation). The secondary strategy is bolstering
(e.g., ingratiation, victimage, and reminder) (see Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Coombs,
2007). Using bolstering as a secondary response strategy requires that organizations do
one or all of the following during crises: praise stakeholders so stakeholders remain
attracted to the organization (ingratiation); play the victim card by telling stakeholders
that the organization is also a victim to the crisis (victimage); tell stakeholders of all
previous good works of the organization (remind). SCCT as an approach to crisis
communication also falls into the category of image management discourses.
2.2.4. The Rhetorical Approach
This approach perceives crisis as inherently “rhetorical,” that is, as a “rhetorical
problem” (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 5). The rhetorical problem frames organizational
crisis situations as exigencies and argues for the importance of precrisis image
management (Crable & Vibbert, 1983). Heath and Millar (2004) hold that a rhetorical
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problem occurs when situations “call for a statement from one or more persons or
organizations” (p. 6). Depending on their locations and “role” in the crisis, organizations,
“are looked to for a statement that is a wise, ethical, and strategic response to a rhetorical
problem” (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 6). This approach holds that there is an “actual
dimension” and “perceived dimension” to crises in organization. These dimensions are
important because some crises are perceived to be more severe or threatening than they
might actually be. And of course, many factors could be behind these perceptions
including sabotage.
The rhetorical approach “explicitly acknowledges that the responsibility for the
crisis, its magnitude, and its duration are contestable [and] stresses the message
development and presentation part of the response” (Heath & Millar, p. 5). It is about
meaning creation and meaning (re)construction, and the need for crisis managers to
reflect on the role interpretation plays in crisis responses (Theus, 2004). This perspective
points to “what needs to be said before, during, and after a crisis” (Heath & Millar, 2004,
p. 6) and seeks to answer the question, “What can be and must be said to react in a
reasonable, responsible, and ethical way to the concerns of the stakeholders affected by
the crisis?” (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 7).
Using a rhetorical approach, Huxman (2004) classifies crisis communication
response strategies following three Aristotelian genres of rhetoric – epideictic,
deliberative, and forensic (pp. 292-293). Huxman categorizes the denial strategies as
forensic; apology/mortification responses (admitting guilt, and asking for forgiveness),
and bolstering as epideictic; and transcendence, corrective action, minimization, as
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deliberative (pp. 292-293). Conceiving a crisis as a “rhetorical problem” has strong
implications for communicative responses during crises. A crisis might never be a crisis
until so conceived by the organization. In turn, responses are crafted to address how an
organization perceives the crisis. Crisis can indeed be manipulated using premeditated
communication aimed at denying the existence of a crisis and reconstructing meanings
that emerge from the situation.
These four models – (Corporate) apologia, image repair, SCCT, and the rhetorical
approach—are tied to the neo-Aristotelian tradition and place considerable emphasis on
the corporate rhetor who appears to have insurmountable power in determining the topoi,
content, and structure of all communication for dissemination to an audience at the
opportune moment. Communication becomes reactive (strategic or tactical) directed by
the intentions of the rhetor. It is a defensive approach to communication that we find in
these models with an overarching focus being image management and absolution from
guilt. But crises are themselves complexities which a defensive, linear, speaker-centered
discourse is hardly sufficient to adequately address. Responses to multinational corporate
crises cannot be preoccupied with concerns of image or reputation management. Crises
reveal centers of power and complex interests in today’s global environment. There is
therefore a need to address these complexities by moving beyond issues of image and a
reactive, defensive rhetorical approach.
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2.3. Discourse of Renewal
Introduced by Ulmer, Seeger, and Sellnow in 2007, the Discourse of Renewal
(also called organizational renewal theory) shifts from reactive image repair and
reputation management accounts to a proactive relational perspective (Seeger & Ulmer,
2001, 2002; Ulmer, Novak, & Sellnow, 2005; Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow, 2007). Early
formulations of the Discourse of Renewal (Seeger and Ulmer, 2001, 2002) raised
concerns about the absence of a critical perspective in crisis rhetoric. Ulmer et al., (2017)
argued for ethical, optimistic, provisional, and prospective communication. This
perspective is evidenced in the cases of “virtuous responses” by CEO Aaron Feuerstein
of Malden Mills, and Milt Cole, owner of Cole Hardwoods during the fire disasters that
razed their firms. Seeger, Ulmer, Novak, and Sellnow (2005) further invoked the notion
of “change” that accompanies crises, grounding their argument in a study of a “post-crisis
discourse of renewal” in the response of executives in the firm Cantor Fitzgerald to the
September 11, 2001 World Trade center attacks in which the firm is reported to have lost
658 of its 960 employees.
In the model’s early development, the proponents pointed to the following as
important characteristics in the Discourse of Renewal: (1) provisional as opposed to
strategic responses; (2) prospective rather than retrospective vision; (3) capitalizing on
the opportunities embedded in the crisis; and (4) effective leadership (Ulmer et al., 2007).
Further, certain conditions were considered to be more conducive for renewal discourse.
First, crisis type: the scholars argued that natural disasters such as floods and fires
were more conducive for the application of the discourse of renewal. Second, private
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corporations as opposed to public corporations: private corporations are more conducive
for engaging with the discourse of renewal because “there is often more of an
entrepreneurial spirit and greater autonomy exercised by private owners of companies”
(Ulmer et al., 2007). Also, Ulmer et al., suggested that because owners of private
companies are “willing to spend resources” on “rebuilding and moving beyond” crises (p.
133), the discourse of renewal is better conditioned to succeed within privately held
companies. Third, corrective action and change: renewal is based on an organization’s
willingness to correct mistakes and move on. Finally, fourth, stakeholder relationships:
sustaining good relationships with stakeholders prior to crisis occurrence is necessary for
renewal (Ulmer et al., 2007, p. 130).
Subsequently, Ulmer et al. (2011) developed theoretical dimensions of the
discourse of renewal to include: (1) organizational learning; (2) ethical communication;
(3) prospective rather than retrospective vision; and (4) effective organizational rhetoric.
The ethical communication component includes the need to maintain positive stakeholder
relationships prior to crisis and an instinctive or provisional response to crisis. A
prospective rather than retrospective vision includes optimism and emphasizes the need
to focus on future opportunities. The last component, effective organizational rhetoric,
has to do with organizational leaders constructing or “structuring a particular reality for
organizational stakeholders and publics” (Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 219). The goal is to make
use of opportunities for renewal inherent in crises. The following section elaborates the
four theoretical dimensions that inform the discourse of renewal model.
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2.4. Theoretical Components of Discourse of Renewal
2.4.1. Ethical Communication
This component focuses on a leader-centric, positive, and ethical approach to
communication during a crisis, as opposed to a strategic, defensive position. Discourse of
Renewal typically “is an immediate and instinctive response based upon the positive
values and virtues of a leader rather than a strategic response that emphasizes issues of
responsibility or blame” (Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 216; see Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). In fact,
Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2011) asserted that: “renewal is often based on a leader’s
established ethical character” (p. 216; also see Sellnow & Seeger, 2013); ethical
communication response to crisis must be “based upon the positive values and virtues of
a leader” (p. 216). They maintain that: “Organizations that institute strong, positive value
positions with key stakeholders, such as honesty, responsibility, accountability, and
trustworthiness, before a crisis happens are best able to create renewal following the
crisis” (Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger, 2011, p. 215).
Stakeholder relationships are key: to be successful in ethical communication,
organizations are called upon to sustain “strong stakeholder relationships,” be
“provisional rather than strategic” when responding to crisis situations, as well as keeping
the standards for “significant choice” (p. 215). Ulmer, et al. suggest organizations “must
invest in true equal partnerships” with stakeholders before crisis hits, if the organization
is to benefit from stakeholders’ “goodwill” during crisis moments (p. 216). Provisional
response is spontaneous and/or “instinctive” rather than strategic such as “employing spin
to deflect blame from the organization” (p. 216). Talking about “significant choice” as
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an ethical aspect, Ulmer et al. insist on the need for organizational leadership to
communicate about “what is best for the stakeholders” (p. 217). This requires
disseminating information that allows stakeholders to make rational choices in their
decision-making processes.
2.4.2. Prospective versus Retrospective vision
Prospective vision is one that looks beyond the actual crisis and focuses on what
the future holds for the organization (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2011; Sellnow & Seeger,
2013). In contrast, in a retrospective vision, organizations engage in blame tactics – there
is a general tendency for communication to be more about looking back into what might
have sparked the crisis with the intention of deflecting blame from the organization. The
proponents of discourse of renewal point to the need for a “future-oriented’
communication with the ultimate goal being to “rebuild rather than on issues of blame or
fault” (Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 218). To communicate prospectively, organizational leaders
are called upon to be “optimistic” about the future of the company in their
communication. Optimism according to the proponents is an inevitable aspect of the
discourse of renewal if communication that is prospective in nature must make sense
during a crisis. As Ulmer et al., have argued, “[t]he discourse of renewal is inherently an
optimistic form of communication and focuses on the ability of the organization to
reconstitute itself by capitalizing on the opportunities embedded in a crisis” (p. 218).
Sellnow and Seeger (2013) note that instead of focusing on the past and apportioning
blame, “organizations committed to renewal direct their messages toward the ultimate
goal of rebuilding the organization so that it is resilient to crisis” (p. 98). A reactive
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image and reputation restoration strategies clearly make way for a proactive and
prospective communication.
2.4.3. Organizational Learning
Opportunities for learning following a crisis are also central to the renewal
process (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007; Ulmer, et al, 2011; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
Proponents argue that when a crisis occurs, an organization’s deficiencies, weaknesses,
and strengths are exposed. Organizations are thus advised to communicate what they
have learned in the aftermath of a crisis to increase the confidence level of stakeholders
concerning the organization’s ability to overcome future crises. In the renewal spirit, if
stakeholders are to be aware that learning is happening, organizational leaders “should
illustrate how the organization is learning from the crisis and what they are doing to
ensure the crisis does not happen again” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2011, p. 215).
Types of organizational learning include “behavioral”, “systemic”, and
“paradigmatic” (Simon & Pauchant, 2000, cited in Ulmer et al., p. 214). In behavioral
learning, changes are not willingly enacted by the organization but come because of
external forces and are therefore not “internalized” by the organization, but are rather
“maintained through external control, through rules, regulations or technological
systems” (Simon & Pauchant, 2000, cited in Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 214). Behavioral
learning is monitored and enforced by an external agency. Systemic learning occurs when
an organization learns proactively or preemptively to avoid crisis. Paradigmatic learning
involves changes integrated at all levels of the organization such that they offset previous
basic business routine management and operational practices. These changes require
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consistent training of all employees. The changes are not a result of external agency
intervention and must be enacted by the organization itself. Ulmer, et al. suggest
organizations should aim at systemic learning because changes that emerge from this
learning focus on preventing a crisis from occurring or reoccurring and are derived from
organizational leadership commitment. The proactive or preemptive nature of these
changes not only effectively shifts organizational focus from reactive image management
concerns but offers long term benefits for the organization including opportunities for
renewal.
2.4.4. Effective Organizational Rhetoric
Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2011) explicitly state that the renewal model is
“grounded in a larger framework of effective organizational rhetoric” (p. 219). As such,
the renewal process “involves leaders structuring a particular reality for organizational
stakeholders and publics” (p. 219). The purpose is to have stakeholders aligned with the
organization’s crisis response and increase their support for the organization during the
crisis. To ensure that this happens, Sellnow and Seeger (2013) call on organizational
leaders to “frame the crisis in a way that inspires, empowers and motivates” (p. 98). This
advice draws on a social construction view of rhetoric; whereas a classical Aristotelian
view holds that a rhetor must work within a pre-given reality, this view holds that rhetoric
constructs reality.
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2.5. Implication of renewal components for Crisis Communication
The implication of the elements in the renewal model for the communication
process can be perceived at several levels: (1) the organization is constituted as rhetor –
the organization is entitized. (2) The leader or crisis communication professional acts as a
corporate rhetor oriented towards the values, virtues, and goals of the organization which
in turn determine the communication response to the crisis. (3) A leader-centric focus
dominates the communication process during crisis response. I am aware that some
organizations might have a decentralized/participatory management structure that
routinely disseminates information and tasks, but it is the leader or the organizational
crisis rhetor who is in-charge with “structuring” and “modeling” communication to
achieve the behavior they “seek” from stakeholders during crisis (Sellnow & Seeger,
2013, p. 98). (4) We clearly see a strong reference to classical Greco-Roman rhetoric
where teachers of rhetoric such as Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian insisted on
the potentials of the rhetor’s character influencing the message’s reception. A brief
digression is warranted to explain this allusion.
In the ethical communication component of the discourse of renewal model, the
overall focus on “positive values” of the organization as enacted by the crisis
communicator/leader echoes the tensions and debates that gripped Classical GrecoRoman rhetoric about virtue especially concerning the rhetor’s credibility as enacted
through notions of “good sense”, “good will” and/or “good moral character”. According
to Isocrates, “the technique of speech is neither morally good nor bad; only individuals
are good and bad” (Kennedy, 1999, p. 41). Cicero and Quintilian later built on these
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ethical concerns to advance the image of the vir bona persona as a speaker’s moral
character and insisted that “only a good man can be a good orator” (Kennedy, 1999, p.
41). For Quintilian, “moral goodness” should remain the guiding principle for every
orator. He argued that “the perfect orator should be a good man” (Book 2.15, 39-42).
Kennedy (2007) has noted that “Aristotle shows a greater sense of urgency toward
knowing and doing what is morally right” (p. 61). Concerns for ethical behavior are
articulated in one of his three means of persuasion – ethos. The argument is that the
credibility of the orator will facilitate whatever tasks she/he has set out to accomplish.
This credibility is built partly on moral character; but Aristotle also claims that “the
virtuous person makes a DECISION to do the virtuous action for its own sake” (Irwin,
1999, p. xviii). The bottom line is that communication was situated within the ability of
the individual to influence her/his community, and this is heavily reflected in models of
crisis communication.
However, in contemporary situations, a rhetor might merely just sound or look
like a good person to influence public perception during crisis. Sellnow and Seeger
sidestepped this argument when they noted that organizations that apply the discourse of
renewal following a crisis “direct their messages toward the ultimate goal of rebuilding
the organization so that it is resilient to crisis” (p. 98). It should be noted that it is the
organization in the capacity of rhetor that designs its message while perhaps drawing
from public or stakeholders’ perceptions during a crisis with an obsessive focus on
“rebuilding” – a key organizational goal necessary for organizational survival in times of
crisis.
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In addition, worthy of note is the fact that when discussing ethical communication
as a theoretical element, Ulmer et al. mentioned the need for the organizational rhetor to
communicate in a provisional manner during a crisis. This conditional and at times
spontaneous or improvisational communication is still heavily tied to the entity
communicating. Provisional or improvisational communication is a product of the rhetor.
It is the individual’s uncanny ability to improvise under unusual circumstances that
makes improvisation or provisional communication work – a clear reference to the
classical Greek rhetorical concept of kairos or seizing the opportune moment or right
timing. But kairos is particularly popular in relation to crisis as a rhetorical situation. The
rhetorical situation according to Bitzer (1966) is a complex mix of “persons, events,
objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely
or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human
decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence" (p. 6). It
is within this mix of inter-relations that kairos lends its strength to the rhetor allowing
she/he to seize the “opportune moment” or “right timing” which Boer (2013) notes
“appears unexpectedly” (p. 116). Kairos empowers the provisional rhetor as a leader
responding to the opportunity of a crisis situation to frame realities, rework stakeholder
relationships, and claim moral rectitude. Hence, even as the Discourse of Renewal
redresses the reactive, defensive posture of earlier crisis rhetoric models and adopts a
social constructionist metatheoretical frame, there remains a debt to classical GrecoRoman rhetorical concepts, particularly the vir bona tradition and the privileging of a
corporate rhetor who embodies and extols values and virtues favored by targeted
stakeholders.
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To counter these ideas about speaking and situation, I turn to postcolonial
feminist theorist Gayatari Spivak.

2.6. Spivak “Can the Subaltern speak?”
Spivak’s (1988) question “can the subaltern speak?” demonstrates the unequal
power relations that define the struggle for the survival of indigenous epistemologies in a
colonized context. While the colonized has always had to struggle to survive
epistemologically, economically, politically, psychologically and materially, there is a
level of paternalistic dependency that has been forced on the colonized by the colonizer.
To break free from this domination, these power relations must be checked. There is need
for the valorization of indigenous epistemologies, and the paternalistic dependency by the
colonized on the colonizer has to be disrupted, if the subaltern must have agency in these
power relations. The “epistemic violence” which Spivak clearly alludes to, is the outcome
of repeating the circle of domination by postcolonial epistemologies that seek to “free”
indigenous knowledge.
Spivak thus warns postcolonial scholars and other elite who have made it a
project to counter imperialist discourses on marginalized communities to guard against
creating reality for these silenced communities as this spirals back to the same imperialist
discourses. This warning is not only for postcolonial critics and elites, but also to NGOs
and groups spearheading campaigns to “protect” local or community interests or the
interests of marginalized segments of that community. Speaking for marginalized people
simply repeats the same silencing that oppresses and marginalizes these
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communities/segments. Instead, “speaking for” must be abandoned in favor of what she
calls “unlearning”: Spivak argued that “in seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen
to or speak for) the historically muted subject of the subaltern…[we] systematically
unlearn [the subaltern]” (p. 295). In other words, to speak for the Other(s) draws on what
we have learned about those who have been historically marginalized, ignored, and
oppressed. Spivak warns against attempts from the outside to grant a form of collective
speech to marginalized people, groups or communities as this often results in a
logocentric suspension in favor of a certain unity or solidarity among diverse people,
community, interests or goals.

2.7. Globalization and Multinationals
In this section of the chapter, I take a critical look at globalization with a greater
focus on economic globalization and how multinational corporations are situated in
global networks because the context of globalization provides a purview within which we
could better understand the complex relations when applying the Discourse of Renewal. I
pay particular attention to the manifestations of the global economic process in a bid to
contextualize the multinationals within global relations through which we can better
capture the drive behind multinational corporations’ communication practices in
developing countries – sub-Saharan Africa, in particular.
2.7.1. Globalization
Globalization is a contentious term. Critics see globalization as synonymous to
imperialism – conquering, exploitation, and full-blown domination of developing, less
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powerful nations by imperialists like the US and the UK (e.g., Ikenberry, 2007;
Callinicos, 2007). But globalists have argued from the perspectives of the convergence
thesis, which holds that interconnections among nations especially in economic terms
lead to efficiency – hence economic growth for all nations involved in the process.
Proponents agree that nations benefit from trade and financial openness (Mosley, 2007).
For the globalists, this convergence is noticeable and applicable not only to the country’s
national policies, but also benefits the “lowest common denominator” (Mosley, 2007, p.
110), a result of an open-market competitiveness. Mosley (2007) argues that
“competition reduces government’s abilities to provide goods and services to their
citizens, and it renders governments more accountable to external economic agents than
to citizens of the polity” (p. 111). This is where divergent thesis theorists come in.
Divergent theorists argue that “the global economy has placed governments, particularly
in the developing world, in a ‘golden straightjacket’ [so they] must compete in order to
survive, and the only means of competing is reducing government intervention, lowering
taxes, and steadfastly pruning environmental, health and safety, and labor regulations”
(Mosley, 2007, pp. 116-117). Mosley concludes that despite widespread support for the
convergence thesis, “a cross-national, downward convergence of national policies has not
occurred” (p. 121), meaning nation states have not witnessed widespread economic
growth despite tying local economies to policies that favor global integration.
Neo-liberalism is also an important concept in discussions of globalization. Many
scholars infer that economic globalization has simply been a transportation of neoliberalism to developing countries and that these poor nations have been significantly
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impacted (e.g. Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili, 2006; Held & McGrew, 2002). Critical
approaches to neo-liberalism identify it with expanding opportunities for profitable
capital accumulation (Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili & Hayden, 2006) involving global flows of
corporate capital, finance, and trade, and subsequent stratifications and the
commodification of the environment.
For Harvey (2006), neoliberalism emerged as a globalizing force to counter the
“threats” which the structural crisis of the 1970s had on the “power of the upper classes”;
as such neo-liberalism from the outset is understood to be a design to protect and restore
“class power to the richest strata in the population” (Harvey, 2006, p. 13). To be clear,
even though neo-liberalism, as Harvey (2006) puts it, “had long been lurking in the wings
of public policy … it was only during the troubled years of the 1970s that it began to
move center stage, particularly in the US and Britain” (p. 15). Built along the lines of
“free market, privatization of public assets, opening up natural resources to private
exploitation and facilitating foreign direct investment and free trade” (Harvey, 2006, p.
12), neo-liberalism is perceived by critics as a machinery for the exploitation and
widening of inequalities in relations between developed and developing countries. Tied to
this neo-liberal agenda was a set of assumptions: privatization of state enterprises will
lead to efficient management and improved performance; foreign direct investment
should be promoted; deregulation of the economy is indispensable as is trade and
financial liberalization, with interest rates determined by the market. But by insisting on
reducing or removing barriers to international trade and minimal state control of the
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economy, globalization was paving the way for economic downturn of developing
countries.
2.7.2. Sub-Saharan Africa
To substantiate these criticisms (economic) globalization, critics have looked at
the impacts which international financial institutions, international trade organizations,
and multinational corporations have on developing countries (e.g., Held, 2004; Anderson
& Cavanagh, 2000; Frynas, 2003, Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili & Hayden, 2006). I focus here
on Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, El-Ojeili and Hayden (2006) argue that economic
globalization (often tied to political and cultural global processes) has led to global
inequalities among nations of the North and those of the South, among multinational
corporations and citizens of developing countries – with heavy impact on Sub-Saharan
Africa – involving expansive exploitation of developing countries by corporate and
investment actors of richer economies including the US and Britain. These scholars see in
globalization, “clear winners and drivers of corporate-led globalization” and they contest
the notion of globalization as put forth by globalists “as a set of processes that move by
themselves” (p. 88). This to El-Ojeili and Hayden is an ideology that secures the power
and wealth of the industrialized world.
Many globalists think that globalization is unstoppable, and that any attempts to
resist the movement will lead to devastating economic consequences, or as El-Ojeili &
Hayden put it, “economic woes” (p. 70). The global interconnectedness that has emerged
from the global movement according to globalists has opened up opportunities for growth
to every country. There are financial opportunities for everyone involved in the process,
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communication barriers reduced, technology transfer and more democratic governance,
and free market systems that all add up to both private and public wealth of nations and
citizens (see Friedman, 2005). The competitiveness of the free market is in fact a major
justification for economic globalization. However, critics examine relations between
international financial institutions – the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization –
and developing countries, as well as global financial flows, multinational operations,
global inequalities, and the craze for profits on a global scale.
Critics argue that “the speed and uncontrollability of global financial flows is an
urgent problem…” potentially displacing national economic and social sovereignty (ElOjeili & Hayden, 2006). A telling case is the 1997 financial crisis that swept across
Southeast Asia impacting countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. There was
general fright among investors who quickly withdrew over $100 billion and this led to
currency depreciation in these countries. Turning to Sub-Saharan Africa following the
1970s worldwide financial crises, the IMF became a supervisory body for developing
each country’s economies, gauging performance, and insisting on the adoption of a free
market system as a stringent condition for loans (see El-Ojeili and Hayden, 2006).
While neo-liberalists continue pushing for free and open market economies
between developed and developing nations on grounds that competition and innovation
are fostered under these conditions, Harvey (2006) insists that in practice free market
ideology proved “to be the great vehicle for the consolidation of monopoly corporate and
multinational powers as the nexus for class rule” (p. 18). This is especially the case given
the hegemonic economic relations among the U.S. and Britain and developing countries
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despite the neo-liberal argument that poorer countries all have global opportunities to
advance. For example, neo-liberal apologist Thomas Friedman (2005) argues that
globalization incentivizes individuals to work ever harder in a “flat world” full of
opportunities for all. Friedman not only noted how globalization is “empowering
individuals,” but asserted that the next stage of globalization, “globalization 3.0,” was
“not only going to be driven more by individuals but also by a much more diverse – nonWestern, nonwhite – group of individuals” (p. 34).
Critics however see disturbing inequalities in the manner in which the
globalization movement has stratified the globe. About thirteen years ago scholars
indicated the growing inequalities among people in the developed world and those in
developing countries by pointing to disparate distribution of poverty. Perrons (2004, in
El-Ojeili &Hayden, 2006) explained that about 1.2 billion people survived on less than
$1 a day while 2.8 billion others lived on less than $2 a day. Not much has changed as the
World Bank’s 2016 global poverty statistics show that 12.7 percent of the world’s
population lived at or below $1.90 a day in 2012. The World Bank’s statistics also
indicate that developing countries are worst hit by poverty as over 2.1 billion people in
the developing world lived on less than US $ 3.10 a day in 2012. The number of people
living in “extreme” poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased by 100 million more
than the 284 million in 1990 -- that’s 384 million people (Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalen,
& Gaddis 2016). It is to be noted that Sub-Saharan Africa is just a region of the continent.
Malnutrition is widespread in developing countries. Between 2014 and 2016, the
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that 795 million people
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suffer chronic undernourishment in the world, and nearly all of these chronic
undernourished cases – 780 million – live in developing countries. This means that most
chronically undernourished people in the world are in developing countries. Moreover,
the current available statistics for the Gross National Income per capita for the whole of
Sub-Saharan Africa is $1,638 billion, for a sub-continent of 973.4 million people,
compared to the GNI per capita for countries in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) which stands at $44,311 billion (World Bank,
2016).
It can be argued that fundamental programs of neoliberal development have
contributed to if not created the ongoing imbalances troubling world populations. In
particular, the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF and World Bank
as conditions for substantial national loans are suspect. These programs demand that
recipient countries institute a move toward privatization of public assets and
liberalization of all sectors of the economy. These conditions were imposed on
developing African economies; when their loans became debts, these countries’ most
prized natural resources became open to capital appropriation by foreign companies
including the extractive industries and agriculture sector. This brings me to the role of
multinational corporations in the global neoliberal economy.
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2.7.3. Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
In discussing MNCs, my goal is to critique the activities of these corporations by
highlighting the power (influence) they wield in the global economy, with a particular
focus on developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The overall focus will be to show
how profits obsession drives the activities of these organizations (see Frynas, 2003; Pegg,
2003) and how this mode of conducting operations impacts MNCs’ communication with
stakeholders during crises.
The following characteristics define an MNC according to Cohen and Kennedy
(2000, p. 121, cited in El-Ojeili & Hayden, 2006): (1) control of economic activities in
two or more countries, (2) ability to maximize the comparative advantage between
countries, (3) benefits from endowments, wage rates, market conditions and political and
fiscal regimes, (4) has geographical flexibility, that is an ability to shift resources and
operations between different locations on a global scale, (5) operate through financial and
operational flows among different segments of the MNC that are greater than the flows
within a particular country, (6) has significant economic and social effects at a global
level.
2.7.3.1. MNCs’ Dominance – Economic and Social
Statistics from a World Bank blog post by Duncan Green (2016) show an increase
in the number of corporations whose revenue is larger than most countries in the world
(from 63 corporations in 2014 to 69 in 2015). Among these big companies are Walmart,
Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, Volkswagen, Toyota Motor, Apple, and BP. The
Guardian newspaper correspondent Phillip Inman (2016), reporting on these findings,
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indicated that Walmart, Shell, and Apple “make more money than most countries in the
world combined” (para. 4). The report added that 153 corporations are above many
nations from Africa, Asia and South America. The annual revenue of many
multinationals is larger than that of most African countries. For example, Royal Dutch
Shell’s revenue as reported in 2016 stands at $272 billion compared to Nigeria’s $54.48
billion and Cameroon’s $24.204 billion. Shell has a GDP of $556 – larger than that of
any one country in Africa – including that of the two largest economies in Africa –
Nigeria (GDP is $405 billion) and South Africa (GDP $294.8). Other than the top 9
countries with the largest economies in the world – namely United States, China,
Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Brazil, and Canada – it is corporations
that dominate the world’s economy. This dominance is reflected in the paternalistic
relationships sustained by these corporations with most countries. Phillip Inman (2016)
cited a report by the charity Global Justice Now that highlighted this dominance. The
report stated: “vast wealth and power of corporations is at the heart of so many of the
world’s problems – like inequality…” adding that “drive for short-term profits today
seems to trump basic human rights for millions of people on the planet” (paras. 10-11).
Clearly, what this means is that not only is the global economy effectively controlled by
multinationals, but the enormous power they wield around the globe is often oppressive.
2.7.3.2. Foreign Investment
MNCs expand their influence through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) –
overseas investments by companies. These investments could involve purchasing or
establishing income-generating assets in a foreign country that entails the control of the
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operation or organization. This can mean setting up subsidiaries or acquiring tangible
assets in an overseas company. FDI is strategic in that it is not a passive form of
investment like owning shares in another company, instead it actually offers “control” to
the foreign company setting up the investment overseas (see World Bank; Financial
Times Lexicon). In the case of sub-Saharan African countries, multinational corporations
are able to wield economic and political power which often influences policy decisions of
host governments in these countries, especially as many countries in Africa see these
foreign investments as sources of revenue.
For decades, economic growth in Africa has “depended” on foreign direct
investment (Bobo, 2005, p.15). As such, proponents of global trade see MNCs as
indispensable for the provision of goods, services, and technical skills, plus their ability
to provide revenue in company taxes, making the corporations necessary partners in
economic growth and employment. The argument for globalists has been that
development in Africa “can be best orchestrated through relations with the developed
countries” (Bobo, 2005, pp. 13-14). A particular emphasis by globalists has been the
notion that “through the diffusion of the developed world’s capital, technology, values,
and institutions to developing countries, a spawning of economic development will
result” (Bobo, 2005, p. 14). But critics argue that the relations between developed and
developing countries have been that of the usurper and usurped. Other critics (e.g., Bobo,
2005) have taken a somewhat middle-ground by arguing that relations between
developed and developing countries is rather a “give-and-take” – that’s the relationship
benefits both parties, although the argument holds that the benefits are
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“disproportionately” shared such that much of the gains realized in economic operations
are “skewed” (p. 14) into the developed countries. At the center of this practice are
multinational corporations (Bobo, 2005). In fact, it appears impossible to talk of
development in economic terms by trying to separate developed countries from MNCs,
because multinationals are the drivers of these same countries’ economic growth.

2.8. Colonialism and Neocolonialism
2.8.1. Legacies of Colonialism
Scholars have explained colonial experiences as forces that transformed ethnic
groups in Africa, although they also argue that contemporary ethnic groups in Africa
have further been modified by processes beyond the colonial era. Pelican (2015) has
argued that “many aspects of traditional organization, history and legal arrangements in
contemporary Africa are not based on locally developed customs, but were the outcome
of colonial subjects” (p. 49). But Pelican suggested it would be a misconception to
completely wipe out the influence which early traditions in Africa still have on current
organizing practices in African communities. For example, in his analysis of “tradition”
and “custom” in Cameroon, Pelican (2015) found that tradition commonly referred to as
“country fashion,” to Cameroonians, denotes “practices inherited from previous
generations and still relevant in everyday life, and therefore variable and adaptable to
contemporary situations” (p. 49); whereas custom refers to “practices and procedures
introduced or fixed by colonial authorities” (p. 49). The bottom line is that contemporary
characterizations of African societies cannot neglect colonialism and neocolonial
experiences as forces that transform organizing (i.e., ways of doing) in Africa, but at the
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same time, such characterizations must not ignore those practices inherited from earlier
practices that are still relevant and adaptable to contemporary circumstances in African
communities.
Colonialism according to Mudimbe (1988) was an implantation of a “colonizing
structure” that was at once “the domination of physical space, the reformation of natives'
minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective” (p.
15). Mudimbe insists this colonizing structure was responsible for “producing marginal
societies, cultures, and human beings” (p. 4) through its “policies of domesticating
natives” (p. 2). No aspect of native life was left unaffected by the colonial encounter.
Even the local economic practices of the natives were assimilated into the colonialists’
capitalist economic systems. The African traditional religion was permeated by the
colonizing experience. New spiritual values were transmitted through churches that were
established by missionaries. The colonial educational system and the colonial press were
also effective mediums for reforming the minds of natives: “new attitudes” considered
“contradictory” to so-called African traditional ways of life were transmitted to the local
people (Mudimbe, 1988). The short and long-term impact of this experience, according to
Mudimbe, was the trivialization of those core values that appeared to define native life
and personhood including mode of worship and organizing.
The “new culture” that emerged from the colonial “transformations” led to the
“rejection [by the colonial structure] of unadapted persons and confused minds”
(Mudimbe, 1988, p. 4). To survive and remain useful in the new environment created by
the colonial experience, the natives had to integrate themselves into what Mudimbe calls
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“intermediate space between” (p. 5). The “intermediate space between” is a marginal
space in which interaction occurred between the African tradition and the implanted
colonial culture. To survive in this space was to live at a borderline, a life that adapts to
emergent cultural and social environments in a non-totalizing manner in order to be
useful to therein. Colonial experiences are succinct examples of how the “subaltern” was
deliberately silenced through representations that created new realities for communities.
Indirect rule was a policy in which the British colonialists used local chiefs “to
implement colonial policies” (Jua, 1995, p. 39). This policy was very active in the
Southern Cameroons also referred to as British Cameroon and in Nigeria. Jua (1995)
notes that in Cameroon, while the policy of indirect rule “served to create the requisite
enabling environment” for “maximum economic exploitation” (p. 39), the policy seen as
“cultural imperialism” (p. 39) also led to the “redefinition of power relations” and the
“invention of tradition” (p. 41) by the British. African traditional institutions were
weakened, indigenous modes of organizing disrupted, and power now flowed through a
centrifugal structure. Indirect rule also saw the British blending the colonial
administration with local chiefs and other elites schooled in the colonial education
system, even though this blending didn’t reflect a robust participatory process capable of
empowering the natives. In Cameroon and Nigeria, chiefs were appointed as Native
Authorities, while Africans who emerged from the colonial education establishment were
integrated into the British colonial administration. This process has been described by
some African scholars as “Africanization” (e.g., Jua, 1995; Chilver, 1963). This form of
Africanization emerged in 1948 for the Southern Cameroons as a policy within the
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indirect rule framework. By Africanization, the British were transforming the already
established colonial administration into an “improved system of Native Administration
and local government” (Chilver, 1963, p. 129).
French African colonies for their part saw an implementation of the policy of
assimilation. Assimilation was a French ideology set out to expand the French culture and
language as Africans in French colonies were taught that by “adopting the French culture
and language” they could “become French” which from the perspectives of colonialists
was a privilege (Sesan, 2014, p. 2). The outcome of this policy in these colonies was
“high disregard” for African religious orientation and beliefs, natives’ culture, traditional
institutions, and power structures. The chiefs’ power was weakened through this tactic to
disempower what was indigenous African authority (Sessan, 2014, p. 6). For the
disruption of native institutions, belief systems and power relations to be effective, a
colonial structure in which communication was initiated, produced, and disseminated by
the colonialists was established. Local chiefs and other African elites carried the
information from colonialist administrative agencies to the local people and from
communities to the colonialists. The colonial administration then tailored the information
to the exact goals and impact desired by the colonial government and then, retransmitted
to the local people through this network of chiefs or “extension officers” (AnsuKyeremeh, 1997).
As mentioned already, this colonial history relating to the British and French
policies of indirect rule and assimilation is important because it allows us to see how the
colonial encounter heavily contributed to the production of hybridized experiences. Jua
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(1995) has consistently argued that indirect rule was actually the creation of new ways of
life that contradicted what appeared to be the norms in African traditions. In so doing, the
policies of indirect rule, and assimilation transformed the social space within which
cultures met, and in which the local people, and arguably, the colonialists too, had to
negotiate new ways of being if they were to remain relevant to the new social space that
emerged.
2.8.2. Contexts of Neocolonialism
The post-colonial African states that emerged sustained the legacy of colonialism
(Jua, 1995). The African elites who served the colonial administration and were now in
top government positions remained determined to reproduce colonial structures to protect
their political, social, and economic power. For these elites, it was not necessarily a
question to return to the celebrated precolonial past but to rather fortify the colonial
legacy. In Cameroon, for example, chiefs continue to serve as “auxiliaries” acting as
“intermediaries” between the administration and the people by carrying out government
directives (Jua, 1995, pp. 42-43). The top-down colonial communication structures were
also vigorously maintained.
The Shell crisis in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, and the Herakles Farms
crisis in the Southwest region of Cameroon cannot be separated from these neoliberal
relations and free market concepts. In both crises, the companies, host governments, and
local elites were charged with capitalistic corruption. Permeated by corrupt practices,
these companies’ relations with communities resulted in a divide among local
populations and their elites, as well as traditional rulers. Personal economic gains took
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precedence in negotiations between leaders of these communities and the corporations.
As a result of this situation in the sub-Saharan region, Fomin and Forje (2005) have
argued that after many years of colonialist and neocolonialist exploitation of these riches
[minerals, crude oil reserves, land], little or nothing is there in terms of development, to
attest to the tremendous wealth that foreign imperialists and their African collaborators
have looted from the whole sub-region.
Critics of multinationals have noted that their presence in many developing
countries exerts too much power in their relations with developing nations, and most
especially with local communities. In addition, MNCs too often evade taxes, exploit local
communities, and can relocate to other lands if they think it will serve their best interests.
Optimists (as indicated in Cameroon’s Vision 2035) argue that by being active in
international markets that foster strong relationships with multinational corporations,
African nations will be able to acquire sufficient revenue to develop their own economies
and increase production of goods for both national and international consumption.
However, Lanning and Mueller (1979) examined the mining industry in Africa and
insisted that development in African countries has been undermined noting that “Africa’s
mineral resources are being depleted without generating economic development” (p.
485). These scholars noted that “control of the mineral exports is firmly in the hands of
the mining companies, who exploit the mineral resources at a rate and in a manner
consistent with their interests and not with those of the host nation” (pp. 485-486). As
mentioned already, this trend of doing business in Sub-Saharan Africa has been affecting
all sectors of economic operations in which MNCs are also major partners.
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The main argument in this chapter has been that the Discourse of Renewal must
be responsive to complex contexts that frame rhetoric. These contexts are enmeshed in
differential patterns of communication, exigencies, and complex relations. The discussion
on globalization, neoliberalism, colonialism and MNCs provided a purview into the
interpenetrating contexts that complicate crisis rhetoric in transcultural settings.
The following chapter explains the data, coding, and thematic analysis that inform
my case studies.
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3 Methodology

3.1. Introduction
This dissertation compares two cases to illuminate the limitations and need for the
amendment of the renewal model of crisis communication. These cases can suggest how
the management of crisis by MNCs in non-Western contexts are shaped by specific
African cultures and histories. So, bringing together lessons from these cases can in turn
inform the amendment of the renewal model. Further, these cases are used in this
research as a way to organize data and findings. This chapter details the data, coding, and
thematic analysis that informs each case.
Data and analyses in this research aimed at answering the research questions I
introduced in Chapter 1:
RQ1: What are the limitations of the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating
in West African countries?
RQ2: How can this model be amended based on African communication principles?

3.2. Rationale for Cases
Cases are widely applied in crisis communication research. The current renewal
model developed through case analyses (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001, 2002; Seeger et al.,
2005; Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). The method of case analysis that examines
contemporary complex phenomenon in real-world contexts makes case analysis a suitable
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research method (Yin, 1994, 2004, 2009). However, crisis communication scholars do
not develop cases as a method of analysis but rather employ modes of rhetorical analysis
that apply concepts of classical rhetoric (apologia) or psychological processes
(attribution) to the exigencies of a corporate crisis. Theoretical components of a crisis
communication model are applied to ongoing or post crisis communicative processes of
organizations, institutions, or entities as ways of investigating the salient issues.
The case development in crisis communication is descriptive and the analysis
proceeds deductively by fitting the rhetorical model to the description of the case.
However, these models were developed inductively by examining cases of corporate
crises to identify rhetorical strategies. Thus, the image repair model has been expanded
by examining particular cases for additional elements of classical apologia. Similarly, the
discourse of renewal model was developed by identifying affirmative, responsive
strategies in particular exemplars of corporate crisis response.

3.3. Data and Procedure
3.3.1. Data Sources
There were two sets of data. The first set was data about the Shell oil crisis in
Nigeria and the second set was data about the Herakles’ Farms crisis in Cameroon. For
the Nigerian case data sources included newspaper reports and radio texts, company
documents (e.g., environmental impact assessment reports, mission and value statements,
ethical code of conduct statements, press releases, and statements on Shell’s website as
well as news releases and reports from NGOs and Civil Society Organizations directly
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involved in the crises). The reports came from local Nigerian and international
newspapers and wire services. The radio texts were specifically from the BBC World
Service. Three hundred and ninety-one (391) documents were collected on the Nigerian
case. The time frame for the crisis in Nigeria runs from 1993 through 2016. The Niger
Delta oil crisis involving Shell, the Nigerian government, and local communities has a
long history. However, this study is limited to documents between 1993 and 2016. This
timeframe reflects the most intense moments in the crisis cycle; international attention
was drawn to the crisis during these years. The crisis is ongoing.
Data sources for Herakles Farms crisis in Cameroon include Open Letters
published by the company in direct response to accusations. These letters were found on
the websites of Oakland Institute, Business and Human Rights Resource Center, Herakles
Farms, and Greenpeace. Other documents include a letter to investors, Investment
Opportunity document; Herakles Farms’ Value Drivers document also accessed via the
website of Oakland Institute; Herakles Farms’ Environmental Social Impact Assessment
Report downloaded from the NGO Center for the Environment and Development; letters
of opposition from communities; and newspaper reports (downloaded from LexisNexis).
There were reports published by the international NGOs mentioned in this case. There
were also five news videos accessed via YouTube and Facebook page of the journalist
who produced the report. I later transcribed these news feeds. Herakles Farms crisis time
frame is 2009 to 2016. A total of 91 documents were found to be relevant for the analysis
in the Herakles Farms case.
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3.3.2. Data Collection Strategies and Organization
For both cases, newspaper reports and radio texts were downloaded from the
online database LexisNexis. Online searches were also made on Google Search Engine.
Preliminary searches using words relating to the crises in Nigeria and Cameroon resulted
in massive search results. For the crisis in Nigeria, terms such as Ogoni crisis, Ogoni oil,
Ken Saro-Wiwa, Ogoni shell protests, Ijaw oil crisis, Itsekiri oil, MOSOP, Niger Delta
killings, Niger Delta crisis, Shell Nigeria crisis, Nigeria oil spills, and Nigerian
government oil protests, appeared to generate the most data. Following are search results
when these terms are entered on LexisNexis: Ogoni crisis (705 items), Ogoni oil (996
items), Ogoniland (995 items), Niger Delta crisis (991 items), Nigerian oil spill (996
items found), MOSOP (998 items), Shell Nigeria crisis (998 items), Ken Saro Wiwa (997
items), Nigerian government oil protests (996 items), Ijaw oil crisis (731 items), Itsekiri
oil (718 items). Repeated searches found that many of these items were duplicates as
different newspapers simply republished reports that other reporters already published.
This was a particular trend noticed with some local Nigerian Newspapers. Relevant
documents were also downloaded from the websites of Shell Global, SPDC, Ministry of
Niger Delta Affairs, and Niger Delta Development Commission, and NGOs involved in
the crisis.
This same search strategy was applied to the Herakles Farms case in Cameroon.
Some key terms used include: Herakles farms, Palm oil crisis Cameroon, Cameroon palm
plantation, Herakles crisis. Since the website of Herakles farms was no longer available
at the time of data collection, most search results came from local and international
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including NGOs Center for the Environment and Development, Struggle to Economize
Future Environmnet (SEFE), Oakland Institute, Green Peace International, Human Rights
Watch as well as online Google searches that provided links to some newspaper reports
not found on LexisNexis.
The next step was to organize the data. For the Nigerian case data types include:
(a) Newspaper reports, (b) Government documents, (c) Royal Dutch Shell documents, (d)
NGO reports. Data types for the case in Cameroon include: (a) Cameroon Government
dossier, (b) Communities opposition, (c) NGO reports, (d) News reports.
Once organized into types, data was collected based on the characteristic
communicative organization of each type. For example, a preliminary scan of ‘headlines’
for the newspaper reports proved to be effective. Headlines are important parts of every
news story and headlines effectively provide hints on the most important content of the
story. I also read the “lead”, “graph” or opening paragraph of the news reports to further
ascertain the focus of the news item. The lead is an important part of every news report as
it summarizes the most important information in a news story. News stories normally
follow an inverted pyramid approach widely taught in journalism. According to this
approach, a news story begins with the most important information to the least – but this
rule might not always be the case in every news story – a direct consequence of news
organization’s or journalist’s judgement (including organizational and personal bias).
Aware of this, the first two paragraphs of each news story was scanned through before
the item was selected. The first paragraph in a newspaper story called “lead” or “graph”
is considered the most important portion of the entire news story because that is where
51

the reporter highlights the most important aspects of the story. A similar process was
applied to company and NGO documents, and government documents. I then read the
whole article for coding.

3.4. Coding approach
In this dissertation, both focused coding and first cycle coding methods are
applied. Focused coding was most appropriate when coding statements made by
organizational leaders and spokespersons since coding categories were already known to
be the four theoretical dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal. Focused coding is most
appropriate at the level of organizing data into categories (Saldana, 2009; Tracy, 2013;
Boyatzis, 1998); and since the four theoretical components are the frames of analysis in
the amendments I offer to the model, it was logical to begin coding at this level.
However, when coding statements made by villagers, community leaders and/or
representatives of local communities as they responded to the two multinationals’
messages, the process began with initial coding and then progressed to focused coding
(see Tracy, 2013). The rationale for this was that I was looking for themes from the point
of view of local communities and these had to emerge from the data.
3.4.1. Coding process
Coding corporate crisis communication was based on the dimensions of either the
apologia model or the discourse of renewal. I was looking for words, phrases, or
sentences in statements made by organizational leaders and spokespersons about the
crisis that were closest to the theoretical premises provided in the model. Categorizing
52

these codes required making judgements not just on the use of these words, phrases or
sentences, but also in relation to the context in which these codes are used. Meanwhile,
when coding statements by local communities in response to corporate crisis
communication or to other stakeholders in the crisis, emphasis was on identifying themes
specific to these responses.
The overall coding process proceeded as such: I read the statements line-by-line
repeatedly and coded them by identifying either those words, phrases, or sentences that
addressed the four theoretical dimensions or the words, phrases, and sentences that were
recurrent, given emphasis, and/or phrased forcefully in communities’ response (Owen,
1984). The purpose for doing this was for me to be able to identify potential data
belonging to a particular theme or category. The next step was to critically examine the
codes identified and then to organize them into themes or categories. Codes that reflected
each of the four theoretical dimensions of the discourse of renewal were pattern-matched
to the premises of the model. Codes that emerged out of my examination of responses to
corporate rhetoric were later reframed in terms of Africentric communication concepts.
3.4.2. Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Categories
The conceptual explanations of each of the categories are based on the theoretical
explications provided in the model. I then inductively provided operational definitions for
each of the categories. In doing so, I provided examples of what is included and what is
not included in each category (See Table 1) For communities’ response, the focus was on
themes. I discuss themes in the “thematic analysis” section in this chapter.
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Table 1. Coding Categories (Discourse of Renewal)
Categories

Ethical
Communication

Prospective vs.
retrospective
vision

Conceptual
Definitions
Organizational
leaders and
spokespersons
communicate in
ways that show
the organization
aligns with
strong, positive
value positions
with
stakeholders,
such as honesty,
responsibility,
accountability,
and
trustworthiness.
This category
suggests that by
doing so, an
organization is
able to attain
renewal.

Organizational
leaders and
spokespersons
focus
communication
on looking
“beyond” the
crisis, moving
away from
issues of blame

Operational
Definition

Example of
what is
included

Example of
what is not
included

Word, phrase,
or sentence
that alluded or
directly
referred to
ethical
components
discussed in
the conceptual
explication of
the category.
Attention to
the context in
which these
statements
appear is
necessary.

Shells “seeks
to increase
transparency
and
accountability
around project
delivery and
give
communities
greater
ownership of
projects from
their
inception.”

Any word,
phrase or
sentence used
by leaders
and
spokesperson
s NOT
directly
related to this
category.

Herakles:
“Going
forward, we
want to foster
greater
openness,
transparency
and
collaboration
in our
activities”

Word, phrase,
or sentence
evoking a
future-oriented
communicatio
n i.e., focusing
on a future of
growth,
renewal, and
progress.
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“Shell remains
in the forefront
of converting
Nigeria's oil
and gas
resources to
more jobs and
opportunities
for Nigerians.”

Any word,
phrase or
sentence used
by leaders
and
spokesperson
s NOT
directly
related to this
category.

and fault, into an
optimistic future.

Herakles: “in
the future we
plan to spend
about 29
billion”
efforts to
developing the
plantations in
a sustainable
manner

Effective
Organizational
Rhetoric

Organizational
Learning

Organizational
leaders and
spokespersons
communicativel
y frame the
crisis in a way
that inspires,
empowers and
motivates, such
that stakeholders
can make
informed
decisions. It
involves
structuring
reality for
stakeholders.

Word, phrase,
or sentence
used by leaders
and
spokesperson
that focuses on
transcendence,
and with a
motivational
appeal.

Organizational
leaders and
spokespersons
communicate
lessons learned

Word, phrase,
or sentence
used by leaders
and
spokesperson

Gas and Oil
project is
“good news for
Nigeria”; the
project
“strengthens
Nigeria’s deepwater
expertise” and
is a “key driver
of economic
development.”

Any word,
phrase or
sentence used
by leaders
and
spokesperson
s NOT
directly
related to this
category.

Herakles:
“encouraging
small scale
holders to
develop
individual
farms to
become an
integral part of
the palm
project”
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“The overall
purpose [of the
GMOU] was to
eliminate the
inherent

Any word,
phrase or
sentence used
by leaders
and

from the crisis
and how they are
implementing
these lessons.

suggesting or
indicating how
the
organization
was learning
and
implementing
changes.

weakness in
previous social
performance
strategies and
to involve
communities in
project
identification,
implementatio
n and
management.”

spokesperson
s NOT
directly
related to this
category.

Herakles:
“environmental
considerations
are now given
due attention to
right the
wrongs of the
past”

“revamped
impetus”

“about 30
percent of the
concession
area would be
preserved”

3.5. Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis was specific statements made during and about the crisis
drawn from data sources. The four theoretical dimensions that inform the Discourse of
Renewal model served as frames of analysis. However, this dissertation also analyzed the
early communication of the two multinationals to provide a comparative frame regarding
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the shift in communication strategies – from defensive/reactive to proactive/renewal. To
do this, Benoit’s (1995/1997) five typologies informed by Apologia were the frames of
analysis. The unit of analysis constituted direct statements from company leaders and
spokespersons about the crisis.

3.6. Thematic analysis
This section focuses on communities’ response to the Discourse of Renewal
applied by the two multinationals. It was important to code themes because from these
themes, it would be possible to fully understand the concerns of local communities and
point to possible areas of amendments in the Discourse of Renewal.
Boyatzis (1998, p. 31) identified five elements that constitute a rigorously coded
theme:
(1) a label, that is, a name; (2) explanation of what constitutes the theme; (3) description
of how to know when the theme occurs; (4) description of what is not included in the
theme; (5) examples of what is included and what is excluded from the theme. Following
the second cycle coding in which the focus was to regroup recurrent codes for thematic
analysis, I was able to identify major themes that emerged from communities’ response to
Shell’s and Herakles’ communication (see table 2).
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Table 2. Themes in Communities’ Response to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal
Themes

What was
constituted the
theme

Identifying the
theme

What is not
included in
theme

Examples of
what is
included

Ancestral
Ownership of
oil and land

Statements
invoking,
suggesting, or
mentioning
ownership of
oil or land by
local
communities,
ancestors

Specific words,
phrases,
sentences
mentioning oil
or land rights
by local
communities,
and through
inheritance

Statements that
do not
mention,
suggest or
invoke
ownership of
oil or land by
local
communities

"Shell is taking
our oil”

We were told
that gas Shell
is taking from
our land is the
largest”

"Sale of our
wealth by shell
is theft against
mankind"
Negotiation

Statements
suggesting,
mentioning,
invoking the
lack of, or
absence of
talks with local
communities

Specific words,
phrases,
sentences
mentioning,
invoking, or
suggesting the
lack of, or
absence of
talks with local
communities

Specific words,
phrases,
sentences that
do not
mention,
invoke or
suggest the
lack of, or
absence of
talks with local
communities

“the company
did not enter
into any
agreement with
the people”

“unless SPDC
commence
negotiation”

“we were made
to understand
through the
media”
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“should Shell
fail to
commence
negotiation”
Leadership

Statements
invoking
mentioning, or
suggesting
local
communities
not properly
represented;
statements
suggesting the
company
leaders
handpick locals
on behalf of
communities

Specific words,
phrases,
sentences that
suggest,
invoke, or
mention local
communities
not properly
represented;
statements
suggesting the
company
leaders
handpick locals
on behalf of
communities

Specific words,
phrases,
sentences that
do not suggest,
invoke, or
mention local
communities
not properly
represented;
statements not
suggesting the
company
leaders
handpick locals
on behalf of
communities

“Shell invited
some few
unauthorized
members of
affected
communities”

“our said
representative”

SPDC has
refused to give
opportunities
to our
contractors

“initiate a
process to
bring in proper
executives”
Illegal
partnership

Statements
invoking,
suggesting or
mentioning oil
company not
signing legal or
binding
agreements
with local
communities

Specific words,
phrases,
sentences that
suggest,
invoke, or
mention oil
company not
signing legal or
binding
agreements
with local
communities
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Words,
phrases,
sentences that
do not suggest,
invoke, or
mention oil
company not
signing legal or
binding
agreements
with local
communities

“Shell has not
shown any
interest to have
a GMoU with
Uzere
kingdom”

“refusal by
SPDC to sign
the agreement

with the cluster
communities”
Shortchanging
communities

Statements
invoking,
suggesting or
mentioning oil
companies not
providing
valuable social
amenities for
local
communities

Words,
phrases,
sentences
invoking,
suggesting or
mentioning oil
companies not
providing
valuable social
amenities for
local
communities

Statements not
invoking,
suggesting or
mentioning oil
companies not
providing
valuable social
amenities for
local
communities

“deny the
community
potable water,
health centre,
light, and
adequate intra
community
roads"
“requests for
construction of
streets/roads
fell on deaf
ears"
“refusal of
SPDC to
provide road
and power
generating
projects”

Table 3. Themes in Communities’ Response to Herakles Farms’ Discourse of
Renewal
Themes

What
constitutes the
theme

Identifying the
theme

What is not
included in the
theme

Examples of
what is
included

Ancestral land
rights

Statements
invoking,
suggesting, or
mentioning
ownership of
land by local
communities
based on
ancestral past.

Words,
phrases,
sentences
mentioning,
suggesting, or
invoking land
ownership by
local
communities
based on
ancestral past.

Words,
phrases,
sentences that
do not
mention,
suggest or
invoke
ownership of
land by local
communities

I knew I was
going to
develop this
place
[farmland] to
earn my living
and when I die,
my children
would remain
there.
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based on
ancestral past.
“all lands
presently
owned and
occupied by
the Batanga”

“we find this
current move
to deforest our
lands”

“grabbing
communal
land”
Negotiation

Statements
suggesting,
mentioning,
invoking the
lack of, or
absence of
talks with local
communities
on project
sites.

Words,
phrases,
sentences
mentioning,
invoking, or
suggesting the
lack of, or
absence of
talks with local
communities
on project
sites.

Words,
phrases,
sentences that
do not
mention,
invoke or
suggest the
lack of, or
absence of
talks with local
communities
on project
sites.

“One day, I
came to my
farm and I
found that they
had bulldozed
everything”

“without local
communities’
knowledge”

“informed
consent of
local
communities
was not sought
at all”
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“developing
land without
the consent of
the
communities
that surround
and depend on
it”
Loss of
livelihood

Environmental
damage

Statements
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking the
loss of
livelihood
because of the
project.

Words,
phrases, or
sentences
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking the
loss of
livelihood
because of the
project.

Words,
phrases, or
sentences that
do not suggest,
mention, or
invoke the loss
of livelihood
because of the
project.

“the
destruction of
livelihoods for
thousands of
Cameroonians”

Statements
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking
environmental
degradation as
a consequence
of the project.

Words,
phrases,
sentences
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking
environmental
degradation as
a consequence
of the project.

Words,
phrases,
sentences not
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking
environmental
degradation as
a consequence
of the project.

“the proposed
plantation is
located
between five
protected areas
and any
attempt to open
it up will have
catastrophic
effects on the
environment”

“traditional
livelihood
activities inside
the
Concession”

“contrary to the
preservation of
the biosphere”

“irreversible
environmental
impact”
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“an important
area for high
biodiversity”
Community
Leadership

Statements
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking the
sidelining of
communities in
favor of titular
leaders.

Words,
phrases,
sentences
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking the
sidelining of
communities in
favor of titular
leaders.

Words,
phrases,
sentences not
suggesting,
mentioning, or
invoking the
sidelining of
communities in
favor of titular
leaders.

“land
negotiations
were done…
targeting the
chiefs and
some few
influential
decisionmaking
members of the
communities”

“promise of
future benefits
to certain
individuals”

“obtain local
authorities’
favor”

Table 4. Benoit’s (1997) Five Typologies Applied in Cases
Strategy

Conceptual
Definition

Denial (simple The accused
denial, shift the may simply
blame)
deny did not
perform act;
act performed
by another.

Operational
Definition

Example of
what is
included from
cases

Example of
what is not
included

Word, phrase,
or sentence
that alluded or
directly
referred to
denial
discussed in

“It is totally
unjustified to
suggest that
Shell, by virtue
of endeavoring
to carry out its
legitimate

Word, phrase,
or sentence that
does not allude
to or directly
refer to denial.

63

the conceptual
explication of
the category.

business of oil
exploration is
in some way
responsible for
such conflict or
the level of the
Nigerian
government's
response to
them . . .
private
companies
have neither the
right nor the
competence to
become
involved”

Evasion of
responsibility
(provocation,
defeasibility,
accident, good
intentions)

Act was in
response to act
of another;
lack of
information
ability to take
action; Act was
a mishap;
meant well in
act.

Word, phrase,
or sentence
that alluded or
directly
referred to
components of
the strategy of
Evasion of
responsibility

“Inspired by a
desire to ‘do
something’ for
Africa after a
visit to wartorn West
Africa in 1999,
our CEO,
Bruce Wrobel,
quit his job to
start Herakles
Capital with a
commitment to
using his skills
in large-scale
project
development
for the benefit
of sustainable
economic
development in
Africa”

Word, phrase,
or sentence that
does not allude
to or directly
refer to
components of
the strategy of
Evasion of
Responsibility.

Reducing
Offensiveness
of Event
(bolstering,

Stress good
traits; act not
serious, act
less offensive,

Word, phrase,
or sentence
that alluded or
directly

Herakles
officials told
investors “the
Cameroon

Word, phrase,
or sentence that
does not allude
to or directly
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minimization,
differentiation,
transcendence,
attack accuser,
compensation)

act is placed in
a broader
context, reduce
credibility of
accuser,
reimburse
victim

referred to
components of
the strategy of
Evasion of
responsibility

Plantation
providing an
economically
underdeveloped
region of
Cameroon with
decades of
large scale
employment
and needed
infrastructure
including
roads, schools
and hospitals”

refer to
components of
the strategy of
Reducing
Offensive of
Event

Corrective
Action

Plan to solve
or prevent
problem

Word, phrase,
or sentence
that alluded or
directly
referred to
components of
the strategy of
Corrective
Action.

Herakles
officials said
“environmental
considerations
are now given
due attention to
right the
wrongs of the
past”

Word, phrase,
or sentence that
does not allude
to or directly
refer to
components of
the strategy of
Corrective
Action

Mortification

Apologize for
act

Word, phrase,
or sentence
that alluded or
directly
referred to
components of
the strategy of
Mortification

Word, phrase,
or sentence that
does not allude
to or directly
refer to
components of
the strategy of
Mortification

Note: while there was no direct apology from either of two companies analyzed, the
notion of “revamped impetus” mentioned by Herakles Officials explaining the renewal
approach they took in the second phase of the crisis could be seen as alluding to an
apology. The same applies to Shell in which they described their new approach to the
crisis as a result of the mistakes of the past.
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Summary
This chapter is a description of my methods in data collection, coding procedure,
and thematic analysis. Conceptual and operational definitions of the categories are
explained as well as the frames of analysis in this research.
In the following two chapters, I analyze two cases of transnational crisis rhetoric
in African contexts using the model of communication. My effort is to inductively
identify communicative dynamics and contexts that challenge the assumptions of these
models in order to modify the renewal model as appropriate. In doing so, I intend to add
to the current model and to contribute to the development of a more culturally grounded
understanding of multinational crisis communication in Nigeria and Cameroon.
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4 Case 1: Royal Dutch Oil Crisis in Nigeria

4.1. Introduction
This chapter is an analysis of the Shell oil crisis in the Niger Delta region of
Nigeria. To better situate the crisis within the context of the current research, the
characteristics of Niger Delta are discussed by looking at the history, governance, and
economic and social relations in the region. The chapter also provides a background for
Shell’s operations and its community relations in the Niger Delta. The overarching
purpose is to understand Shell’s corporate rhetoric in response by critically analyzing the
points of conflict in this crisis set within contextual complexities and exigencies,
situational contradictions, and tenacious histories. The chapter develops an assessment of
lessons learned from the company’s crisis communication response and a discussion of
what these lessons mean for organizational crisis rhetoric and communication practices
keeping in mind the political dynamics of postcolonial representation.

4.1. Niger Delta Region
The Niger Delta is located in Southern Nigeria and shares its eastern boundary
with Cameroon (Niger Delta Development Commission (NDCC), “Master Plan,” 2007).
The region has an estimated population of 32 million – that is, 22 percent of Nigeria’s
total population (Francis, Lain & Rossiasco, 2011). The region covers 112,110 square
kilometers or 43,286 square miles (NDDC, “Master Plan,” 2007). According to the
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) and Niger Delta Development Commission
(NDDC), there are 40 ethnic groups speaking some 250 languages and/or dialects (also
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see United Nations Development Program (UNDP) “Human Development Report,”
2006). Agriculture and fishing constitute 48 percent of primary occupations and sources
of livelihood (Francis et al., 2011).
The region’s colonial experience effectively began when the area was established
as a protectorate under British rule (Wikipedia, “Niger Delta”). In 1885 the region was
known as British Oil Rivers Protectorate until 1893 when it was expanded into the Niger
Coast Protectorate (Wikipedia, “Niger Delta”). In 1951, Niger Delta became part of the
Eastern Region of Nigeria – one of three and later four regions of the country.
Nigeria is the largest oil producing nation in Africa and the world’s fourth largest
crude oil exporter (United States Energy Information Administration, 2016) thanks to the
oil rich Niger Delta. The Niger Delta region originally comprised three states, namely,
Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers (Alagoa, 2004). However, the region was expanded to include
all nine of the petroleum oil and gas producing states (Nigeria has 36 states). The nine
states include Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and
Rivers. Several reasons explain this expansion. Some scholars dispute the current
geography of the Niger Delta on the grounds that what currently constitutes the region is
based on political mapping and not the historical location of the region (see UNDP, 2006;
Ibaba, 2005). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its 2006 “Niger
Delta Development Report” suggested the Nigerian government’s decision to include all
nine oil and gas producing states in the Niger Delta Region was for “administrative
convenience,” “political expedience,” and “development objectives” (p. 19). Shell
Petroleum Development Company is the largest oil company in Nigeria, alongside the
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Nigerian National Petroleum Company, Chevron/Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Total Fina, ELF
Aquitaine, and Agip (see Orogun, 2010).

4.2. The Niger Delta Question
Enshrined in the history of the Niger Delta is what scholars refer to as “the Niger
Delta question” (see Orugon, 2010). This question revolves around issues of ownership
of oil resources in the region and asks why the Niger Delta region is so rich in oil yet
communities live in abject poverty (Orugon, 2010; Alagoa, 2004). Control over oil
resources has been a major point of contention in the region. Orugon (2010) explains the
Niger Delta question as pointing to communities’ “claims of landownership as well as
mineral resources within their delineated territorial boundaries” (p. 466). The question
also entails the impact of oil production activities in the region including environmental
problems caused by oil spills and gas flaring (Orugon, 2010). The Niger Delta question
must be understood as well through the perspectives of some militant groups in region.
Militant groups, including the most prominent militia – Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) – charge “internal colonialism,” “political
marginalization,” and environmental neglect by both the oil companies and the host
government (Orogun, 2010). The deplorable situation in the Niger Delta is also captured
in a UNDP (2006) report which noted that the region is “suffering from administrative
neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social
deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict” (p. 9). Several
marginalized ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, particularly the Ogoni, Ijaw, Urhobo and
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Itsekiri, contest the role of multinational oil corporations in the region. Community
protests that have turned into deadly riots evidence the ongoing unrest in this region.
The Niger Delta question has haunted the Nigerian government and transnational
oil corporations operating in the region. Since the 1990s, the region has been engulfed in
unending violence resulting to the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic
militia groups and Nigerian military and police forces (Koos & Jan, 2015). Elite and local
politicians often fund competing militia groups to advance their economic and political
agendas including gaining access to oil and gas resources in the region. The government
of Nigeria regularly launches huge military crackdowns on militant groups as was the
case in 2008 and 2009 and the MEND militant group has been a major target for
government forces in the Niger Delta region (Fatade, 2009). The violence in this region
has led to thousands of people fleeing their villages while hundreds are reported dead
(Walker, 2009; IRIN Africa, 2009). The government of Nigeria has offered amnesty to
members of militant groups and in return, the militants are required to surrender their
weapons and undergo vocational training and rehabilitation sponsored by the Nigerian
government (BBC News, 2011). However, this has not completely deterred militant
violence in the region. The ongoing militant violence in the Niger Delta has been blamed
on marginalization of the region by the Nigerian government as well as on oil operation
activities of multinational corporations’ oil exploitation and relations with local
communities (see Orugon, 2010).
Oil companies are in the midst of the violence. Foreign oil workers including
sailors are regularly kidnaped and held by militant groups for ransom. A regular target for
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militants has been pipelines operated by multinational oil companies with Shell as the
largest foreign oil company operating in Nigeria being the most affected. In 2016, Shell
Petroleum company was a major target when militants launched a heavy attack on
pipelines run by the multinational. Oil production in Nigeria was reported to be down
300,000 barrels a day following a huge explosion on the pipelines (Uguru & Faul, 2016).
It was also in 2016 that a new militant group, the Niger Delta Avengers, announced its
creation (BBC News, 2016). This militant group attacked several pipelines and oil
facilities in the region; the attack resulted in a 20-year record low oil production for
Nigeria, dropping the country to the second largest oil producer in Africa after Angola.
The significance is that Nigeria has always been the largest oil producing country in
Africa and has frequently been ranked fourth largest producer of oil in the world
(Holodny, 2016; The Economist, 2016).
4.2.1. Governance
Nigeria has three-tier administrative structure: federal, state, and local. The
federal government level holds “exclusive powers” but sustains “concurrent powers” with
state governments (NDDC “Master Plan,” 2005, p. 52). At the same time, the state and
local government levels exercise “residual power” (NDDC “Master Plan,” 2007, p. 52).
This means that the federal government has the power to veto certain state government
decisions, and the same applies to the relationship between the state and local
governments. Key actors in the affairs of this region can be broadly described as local
communities, community leaders, local, state and federal offices and agencies, and
multinational oil corporations. The United Nations Development Program in a 2006 study
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conducted in the Niger Delta pointed to prevailing “inequalities in the allocation of
resources from oil and gas” (p. 19) and a heavy top-down administrative approach to
management in the country noting that “transparency,” “accountability,” and “integrity”
continue to elude governance in the region (p. 5). Scholars have argued that governance
in the Niger Delta is strongly influenced by multinational oil companies, who are
perceived as influencing policies and development programs in the region (Orugon, 2010;
also see Alagoa, 2004). Given the overlap between the host government’s authority and
the power of the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, inhabitants and scholars
alike blame protests, killings, widening gaps of economic inequalities, and environmental
problems plaguing the region, on both the government and the multinational oil
companies (see Ojefia, 2004).
4.2.2. Economic and Social relations
Turning to the local level, history and communality play a role in governance and
decision-making. As Alagoa (2004) observes, in the Niger Delta “[t]he past is . . .
manifestly a part of the present” (p. 63) as present actions or conduct are contextualized
within communities’ history (Alagoa, 2004). In fact, Alagoa argued that conflicts occur
in the region when “history” is not considered by parties involved. He pointed out that
“policymaking…has proved ineffective to contain the enormous problems of the Niger
Delta region…in part, the result of disagreements over historical interpretation within
communities, and the lack of a historical perspective or neglect of the historical factor by
government and oil corporations” (p. 64).
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The economic and social relations among the local people of Niger Delta are
generally described as “symbiotic” (Usuanlele, 2007, p. 484; also see Lloyd, 2007).
Tracing the nature of these relations among ethnic groups, Usuanlele (2007) and Lloyd
(2007) point to both group and communal structures as mutually beneficial to the people.
Communities continue to sustain a group decision-making process and communal
structures of power alongside government administration (see Amodu, 2013). These
communal structures include several decision-making bodies and participation by
families, women, and youth. A chief or traditional ruler along with a Council of Elders
heads local communities. The Council of Elders whose members are from families
constituting the community (Amodu, 2013) handles disputes at all levels of the
community. A Trustee Board usually serves as the body that implements decisions
(Amodu, 2013).
The struggle over who owns land and oil resources continues to deepen the
antagonisms that characterize the economic and social relations in the area. Orugon
(2010) noted that, “The issues of land ownership and proprietorship of crude oil resource
endowment have pitched the Nigerian federal government and the transnational oil
corporations against the feuding ethno-communities of the Niger Delta” (p. 469). These
issues and conflicts are strongly enshrined in articulations of the Niger Delta question.
Another aspect characterizing economic and social relations in the region is social
exclusion. The Niger Delta is the poorest oil-producing region in the world despite being
the fourth largest exporter of crude oil (see US Energy Information Administration,
2016). For decades, communities in this region have felt neglected in the development
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process in Nigeria, while some groups within the region have further been marginalized
(See UNDP “Human Development Report,” 2006; NDDC “Master Plan,” 2007). A case
often pointed to is the Ogoni people whose leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was executed by
hanging in 1995 for confronting the government and oil companies over exploiting oil
but doing very little for the economic and social development of Ogoniland. I will say
more about this case shortly.

4.3. Shell in Nigeria
Shell is a global group of energy and petrochemicals companies with about
93,000 employees in more than 90 countries and territories (“Shell Nigeria”). The Royal
Dutch Shell Group first established an oil venture with BP Plc in Nigeria in 1936 and two
years later, the company was issued an exploration license to prospect for oil throughout
Nigeria under the name Shell D’Arcy (“Shell in Nigeria”). The company first drilled an
oil well in Nigeria in January 1956; that same year, the company name was changed to
Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited. The first export of oil
from Nigeria by the company was in February 1958 (Shell Nigeria, “Our history”). In
1979, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) was created
incorporating assets of the older Shell-BP consortium (Reuters, “Timeline Shell in
Nigeria,” 2013).
Shell Petroleum Development Company produces 39 percent of the total oil in
Nigeria. Operations are in the shallow water and onshore in Niger Delta (“Shell Interests
in Nigeria,” 2012). The company holds a land lease contract of operation for an area of
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30,000 square kilometers and has a network of more than 9,000km of flowlines and
pipelines, 71 producing oil fields, nearly 1,000 oil producing wells, 87 flow stations, nine
gas plants and two big oil terminals for export (“Shell Interests in Nigeria,” 2012).
SPDC’s average production is over one million barrels of oil per day (“Shell Interests in
Nigeria,” 2012).

4.4. The Crisis
Shell’s operations and community relations in the Niger Delta region have been
disrupted by protests in many communities. Shell has been accused by communities of
environmental degradation including heavy pollution, poisoning of fishing grounds, and
destruction of farmlands by frequent oil spills and gas flaring. In addition, accusations of
exploitation, human rights abuse, corruption, and killings continue to trouble Shell in the
Niger Delta. This crisis can be understood by looking at the issues raised by local
communities and other stakeholders regarding Shell’s operations. Specifically, the
following discussion addresses oil spills and gas flaring from Shell’s operations in the
region; the protests plaguing Shell’s operations in Niger Delta communities; and the
lawsuits against Shell.
4.4.1. Oil Spills and Gas Flaring
According to company documents, oil spills occur year-round. Between 2011 and
2016, there have been spills every month with the monthly average just over 11 spills a
month in 2014 (“Shell Oil Spill Data”). A study published in 2010 by the Ecumenical
Council for Corporate Responsibility (ECCR) describes what it refers to as “systemic
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problems” (p. 44) as the major causes of oil spills including aging pipelines and delayed
spill response. Specifically, the study blames Shell for allowing oil to flow through 40year old pipelines. The study also pointed to delayed oil spill response by Shell, noting
that oil spill inspection can take 24 hours to several days, weeks or even months,
allowing much of the spill to disperse into widespread pollution and making the reported
spilled amount seem smaller than what has actually been lost (p. 42). In addition, Shell
contractors are accused of using topsoil transported from other localities to “mask
contaminated sites” (ECCR “Three Challenges Facing Shell,” 2010). The ECCR study
estimates that yearly oil spills in the Niger Delta region compare to the Exxon Valdese oil
spill disaster. A United Nations Report (2011) estimated that it would take three decades
to clean up oil spills in the Niger Delta at the cost of US $1billion (also see Mark, 2011).
An Amnesty International (2015) report accused Shell of making “false claims” (para 3)
about cleaning spills in the region. The report pointed to the impact of the spills: “By
inadequately cleaning up the pollution from its pipelines and wells, Shell is leaving
thousands of women, men and children exposed to contaminated land, water and air, in
some cases for years or even decades” (Amnesty International, 2015, para 3).
A 1993 newspaper report painted the picture of oil spills in the Niger Delta by
quoting a resident of one of the communities in the region who watched for weeks as a
“fine spray of petroleum coated the bamboo and palm trees around the Sasiga rivulet
until, mixed with acid rain and humid air, it gave the plants the milky brown sheen of a
chocolate forest” (McGreal, 1993, p. A8; also see Amanze-Nwachuku, 2011). The news
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report indicates that this was the result of a burst pipe from Shell’s pumping station at
Korokoro, another community in the region.
Strong demands for cleaning up spills, a share of oil profits, and a fairer
compensation for land are at the center of the crisis pitting communities against Shell. In
1995, just months before his execution, Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), summed up the situation of the oil spills in
Ogoniland: “Plants are now dying, land is flooded, fish are killed … our lives are
becoming unbearable … we have scratches on our body and rashes on our skin any time
we go into the water” (Vidal, 1995, p. T2). Shell pulled out of its Ogoni ground
operations in 1993, although its network of oil pipelines still run through Ogoniland.
Gas flaring is another important aspect in this crisis. The Nigerian National
Petroleum Company has reported that major oil companies in the country flared 23.5
billion cubic feet of gas in January of 2012 (see Reuter, 2012). Shell has been accused of
this practice. In the Niger Delta, a fisherman recounted the gas flaring ordeal: “Because
of the flares it is so hot, it is smoky, the air is thick and it is constantly daytime here”
(Mark, 2012, p. 7). The fisherman further stated: “Our rivers are black and the [acid] rain
eats our houses. Our bodies are covered in oil. You feel that if you live to old age here, it
is a miracle" (Mark, 2012, p. 7). The World Bank (as cited in the press release by Friends
of the Earth) pointed out that flaring in Nigeria contributes more greenhouse gas
emissions than all other sources in sub-Saharan Africa combined. The press release from
Friends of the Earth also states that “the cocktail of toxic substances which has been
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emitted in the flares for over 40 years, including benzene and particulates, has exposed
Niger Delta communities to severe health risks and property damage” (para 3).
4.4.2. Protests against Shell
Anger against Shell in the Niger Delta is endemic as communities have struggled
to cope with severe oil spills and gas flaring causing widespread pollution and other
forms of environmental degradation including contamination of fishing grounds,
farmlands, and destruction of the ecosystem (mangroves and forest products as well as
animals). Additional infrastructure issues such as lack of social amenities (including
water and electricity), roads, and overall underdevelopment are choking the Niger Delta
communities. There is also anger over the failure to fairly distribute oil royalties. These
layered complaints have for decades generated negative perceptions and little confidence
in Shell among local peoples, plaguing Shell’s operations (see Orugon, 2010).
Specific protests tell the story of Shell’s exploitation in the Niger Delta. In 1990,
the Etche people in the Niger Delta protested against Shell. Jonathan Steele of the
London-based newspaper, The Guardian, described the protest as “peaceful” but noted
that “Shell’s response was to call for police in case of further action” (p. 3). The outcome
was the massacre of 80 people and 495 homes destroyed (p. 3). According to the report,
local communities “held Shell accountable” for choosing to invite the police rather than
“negotiating” (Steele, 1995, p. 3). As protests spread against Shell, in the summer of
1992, the Mobile Police Force (MPF) was sent to quell a protest in the Gbaran oilfield
where 30 people were reported shot and 150 others beaten (Steele, 1995).

78

However, it was not until January 4, 1993, that Shell faced the largest protests in
its history of operations in the Niger Delta. Three hundred thousand Nigerians from
Ogoni communities held a mass protest (Reuters, “Timeline Shell in Nigeria,” 2013;
University of Maryland “Minorities at Risk,” 2016). The MPF is reported to have killed
2,000 Ogoni people, burnt down 27 villages and forced 80, 000 out of their homes
(Steele, 1995, p. 3). April 30, 1993, saw another protest against Shell by 10,000 Ogoni
people. The protests came following the destruction of a newly planted farmland by
construction work on a Shell pipeline. Soldiers are reported to have opened fire on
protesters leaving at least 10 wounded (University of Maryland “Minority at Risk,”
2016). The leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was
Ken Saro-Wiwa, who led protest movements first against Shell, then against the Nigerian
Government for the neglect of the oil-rich region. These protests brought considerable
national and international attention to the underdevelopment plaguing the people of
Ogoni and the Niger Delta in general. Together with eight other Ogoni people, SaroWiwa was sentenced to death by hanging on November 10, 1995. This provoked anger
and condemnation against Shell as communities accused the company of condoning the
executions. Jonathan Steele (1995) pointed out that Ken Saro-Wiwa was paying the price
for daring to “take action against the rape of their land, which left their soil and water
polluted and gave them nothing except a legacy of rusting pipelines, thousands of
unsightly wells and refineries, and no material benefits from the oil profits at all” (p. 3).
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP) vowed to continue
protesting any resumption of oil production in Ogoniland (Amanze-Nwachuku, 2011).
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As in earlier protests, Durban protesters accused the oil company of “summary
execution, crimes against humanity, torture, inhumane treatment as well as arbitrary
arrest and detention” (Umar, 2009, para 1). In June 2016, Shell’s pipelines in Forcados, a
local community in the Niger Delta, were attacked (BBC Monitoring Africa, June 4,
2016). Clearly, Shell’s crisis in the Niger Delta is prolonged and ongoing.
4.4.3. Lawsuits against Shell
NGO reports suggest the weak and corrupt judicial and legal system in Nigeria
has been unable to adequately hold Shell accountable, hence, cases against Shell are tried
in international courts (see Amnesty International, 2017). Shell was sued in a United
States federal court in Manhattan by relatives of the nine Ogoni activists executed in
1995 (see ccrjustice.org). The lawsuit was filed on November 8, 1996, by the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) and co-counsel EarthRight International on behalf of the
plaintiffs (ccrjustice.org). A statement on ccrjustice.org indicates that Shell was accused
of complicity in human rights abuses against the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta,
including summary executions, crimes against humanity, torture, inhumane treatment,
arbitrary arrests, wrongful death, assault and battery, and infliction of emotional distress
(CCR “Wiwa et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al.,” para 2; see Business Day, June 19,
2009). On June 8, 2009, the eve of the hearing, all parties in the case agreed to a
settlement for all three lawsuits. Shell agreed “to compensate the injuries and the deaths
of their family members, and also create a trust for the benefit of the Ogoni, as well as
pay [some of] the costs of litigations” (Business Day, June 19, 2009, para 1). According
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to the Center for Constitutional Rights, the settlement provided a total of US $15.5
million to be paid by Shell (ccrjustice.org).
In recent years, Shell has had to face several other lawsuits over its operations in
the Niger Delta in European nations’ courts. In January 2015, the company agreed to
settlement in a case in the UK by paying £55 million as compensation to the Niger Delta
community of Bodo for oil spills and other environmental damage (Alike, 2015). The
company, on December 18, 2015, was scheduled for a hearing in a Dutch Court of
Appeal for “its failure to stop and clean up decades of oil pollution” in the Niger Delta
(Alike, 2015, para 1). According to Amnesty International (as cited in Alike, 2015), the
case is a renewed attempt by the communities of Niger Delta “to hold Shell to account”
(para 2) for its operations in the region.

4.5. Shell’s crisis communication and management approach
Between 1993 and mid-2000s, Shell’s response to the crisis haunting its
operations in the Niger Delta very much contrasted with the approach it effectively
engaged with between 2006 and 2016. Shell refers to its response to the crisis in the
1990s to mid-2000s as “old” or the “previous” approach. The “new approach” for the
company’s crisis response was effectively implemented starting in 2006. This company
identified distinction aligns with my distinction between the apologia models of corporate
crisis rhetoric and the alternative renewal model, as I explain below.
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4.5.1. Old Approach to Crisis (1993-mid-2000s)
Shell has described its old approach to events in the Niger Delta as top-down,
which they now argue, was inefficient. Shell claims in the old approach, the company
assumed “direct responsibility for development” in the Niger Delta region; and that there
was “limited capacity building” for local communities (“Global Memorandum of
Understanding,” 2006). The company also noted that in the old approach, communities
were “relegated to passive a role” (“Global Memorandum of Understanding,” 2006).
This, according to Shell, resulted in “lack of trust” and “transparency” in their relations
with local communities.
This old approach was predominantly defensive (apologia) rhetoric (see, Benoit,
1995, 1997; Coombs, 2007; also see chapter 2 of this dissertation). Denial was the
principal strategy Shell used in public communication. Other strategies vividly applied
were scapegoating (blame) and attack the accuser. There were also several attempts to
position the company as a victim (see Coombs, 2007). It is worthy of note that these
crisis communication strategies were enacted by Shell leaders and spokespersons. The
following paragraphs present evidence of defensive (reactive) strategies. When coding
data to analyze Shell’s early communication, Apologia typologies (see Benoit, 1995,
1997) were frames of analysis. The unit of analysis was direct statements from company
leaders and spokespersons about the crisis. These strategies were identified by applying
the coding procedure described in chapter 3.
In 1995, the communities in the Niger Delta repeatedly accused Shell of
conniving with the Nigerian military (by paying them) to quell protests against its
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operations during which many deaths were often reported (see Viddal, 1995). Shell
officials “denied completely” the company’s involvement in the unrest in Ogoni,
describing the accusations as “distorted and inaccurate” and blaming protestors’ deaths
on ethnic conflict between communities and disputes over territory (Vidal, 1995, p. T2).
Responding to accusations of exploitation (which the people said had increased poverty)
and the lack of social amenities such as water, electricity, and roads in the Niger Delta,
Shell officials pointed to the Nigerian federal government as being responsible for
development and wealth-sharing (Vidal, 1995, p. T2).
Denial and scapegoating are two strategies used in this instance by Shell officials.
Shell International spokesperson, David Williams, used denial and attempts to scapegoat
in his response: “It is totally unjustified to suggest that Shell, by virtue of endeavoring to
carry out its legitimate business of oil exploration is in some way responsible for such
conflict or the level of the Nigerian government's response to them . . . private companies
have neither the right nor the competence to become involved” (Vidal, 1995, p. T2).
On accusations of the killings in Ogoniland, and the eventual hanging of KenSaro Wiwa, a statement on Shell Nigeria’s website denies the accusation. The statement
reads in part:
Although SPDC was not responsible for those tragic events, and SPDC – and
Shell International in London – had attempted to persuade the government to
grant clemency, the family of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others brought a court case
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against Shell. The allegations being made are false and without merit. (Shell,
“Ken Saro-Wiwa”)
However, newspaper reports cite what the press widely referred to as “secret documents”
–company memos, faxes, letters and witness statements which emerged from court cases
– as showing that “in the 1990s it [Shell] routinely worked with Nigeria’s military to
suppress resistance to its activities, often from Ogoniland, in the delta region, some of
them ending in deaths” (Oluwarotmi, 2011, para 1; also see Vidal, 2011).
Shell also used the denial strategy to respond to accusations that it was selling
some oil wells in communities that protested against their operations. A news report
quotes a Shell spokesperson as responding to this accusation, describing it as “false”
(Ahon, 2011, para 3). In the same report, the national president of the Niger Delta Youth
Movement, Godspower Ordenema, called on the Nigerian federal government and the
international community to “stop” Shell from selling the oil wells (Ahon, 2011, Para 1).
The Youth leader insisted “Shell had always acted in flagrant disregard to Nigerian laws
and universally accepted regulations guiding oil exploitation and exploration” (Ahon,
2011, para 7).
Shell, through its leaders and spokespersons also applied rhetorical strategies of
denial, blame, and scapegoating to address oil spills. The company has consistently
pointed to “sabotage” and “theft” as causes of “85 percent” of oil spills (“Shell Oil spill
data”). A company spokesperson stated that a “bulk” of the oil spills in the Niger Delta
were “deliberately caused for economic gain” (The Irish Times, 2005, p. 13). The
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spokesperson also pointed to raids by heavily-armed criminal gangs or “compensation
scams,” adding that in 2004, ninety-seven percent of spills in terms of volume was the
result of “willful damage” (The Irish Times, 2005, p. 13).
Company documents also show Shell’s communication focusing on attacking the
accuser. The company planned to “create coalitions, isolate the opposition and shift the
debate” (Lubbers & Rowell, 2010, p. 21). This strategy aimed to “challenge” the “basis”
on which opposing groups “continue their campaign against Shell in order to make it
more difficult for them to sustain it” (Lubbers & Rowell, 2010, p. 21). This is a glaring
example of Benoit’s attack the accuser strategy (1995, 1997; also see Coombs, 2007).
Summarily, Shell’s “old approach” to crisis management in the Niger Delta relied
on defensive strategies of apologia including denial, blame, and scapegoating and
attacking the accuser.
4.5.2. New Approach to Crisis (2006-2016)
An approach to the crisis emerged which focused on rebranding the company as
the “New Shell” and, as I will show, this approach strongly reflected the Discourse of
Renewal. In 2006 the company brought forth a Global Memorandum of Understanding
(GMoU) designed to improve its community relations. The GMoU is a written statement
of understanding between Shell and clusters of communities that detail roles of all parties
in the implementation of community development projects. Shell refers to this document
as a “new way of working with communities” (See Shell in Nigeria, “Global
Memorandum of Understanding,” 2012).
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According to Shell, “the GMoU represents an important shift in approach, placing
emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular communication with
the grassroots, sustainability and conflict prevention” (see Shell “GMoU,” 2012). Shell
explains this new approach as one which prioritizes upward flow of information and
decisions from communities to Shell and the government levels. Thus, the GMoU
presents Shell, the state, and local governments in Nigeria as actors who simply facilitate
the implementation of decisions made by communities. In concrete terms, Shell describes
its role in the GMoU as a “funding” and “capacity building” body (“GMoU”, para 1).
Shell explains that communities “take key decisions” and “drive” their own development
as they elect representatives to Community Development Boards (CDBs); these boards
decide on community developments (“GMoU,” para 2). Shell contends that this approach
has been successful, pointing to several benefits: (1) more representative and transparent
management; (2) promotes cohesion and cooperation; (3) increased local ownership and
accountability; (4) increased participation, including from women; (4) encourages
innovation and learning; (5) creates platform for other development actors (“GMoU”,
para 3). In the following section, I detail the elements of a Discourse of Renewal in
Shell’s “new approach.”

4.6. Shell’s Discourse of Renewal
As stated in Chapter 3, the four theoretical dimensions that inform the crisis
renewal model served as the frames of analysis. The unit of analysis was specific
statements made during and about the crisis drawn from data in the study (see Chapter 3
for detailed descriptions of data and procedures).
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4.6.1. Ethical Communication
Shell’s communication strategy to frequently evoke ethical standpoints aligns
with Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2011) argument that “organizations that institute
strong, positive value positions with key stakeholders, such as honesty, responsibility,
accountability, and trustworthiness” (p. 215) are able to attain renewal. The ethical
communication element of the Discourse of Renewal emerged as the company’s leaders
repeatedly pointed to virtues of accountability, transparency, and responsibility in their
communication. Company officials touted the new approach to managing the crisis as a
strategy that “seeks to increase transparency and accountability around project delivery
and give communities greater ownership of projects from their inception” (Nwachukwu,
2015, para 14). Following an oil spill in a local community called Bonga, Shell’s Country
Managing Director positioned the company as a responsible organization stating that, “as
a prudent corporate citizen, [Shell] will tackle all the oil its teams can see offshore or
which has come onshore in this area, including oil spilled by third parties” (Global Data
“SNEPCO Update on Bonga Oil Leak,” 2011). In another statement, the Country
Managing Director praised the company for being socially responsible, declaring that
“[t]his is one of the biggest corporate social responsibility portfolios operated by a private
company in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it shows that we care for the wellbeing of the
communities in which we do business” (Alike, 2011, para 5).
Company leaders and spokespersons frequently communicated Shell’s
“commitments” to working with communities (Oyadongha, 2011, para, 5) and would
frequently portray the company as an organization that fulfils promises and respects and
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implements agreements reached with clusters of communities and international bodies.
One such statement declares: “[Shell] has always been committed to contributing its
share of the environmental restoration fund” (Alike, 2015, para 60; also see Onukwugha,
2011; Chinwo, 2013). The ethical component of the Discourse of Renewal as enacted by
Shell also had company leaders identifying the company with principles of good
leadership by regularly pointing to the importance of “quality community leadership”
(Chinwo, 2013, para 6), and also noting that the company “believed in value-driven
partnership” with communities (Oyadongha, 2010, para 10).
Further positioning the company as a virtuous organization, Shell’s
communication frequently emphasized that the company promotes “capacity building”
and frequently mentioned the need for community projects to have “positive impact” on
the people as seen in statements by company officials (see Onah, 2010; Daily
Independent, November 10, 2014; Onukwugha, 2011). In another statement that directly
references virtuous behavior, an official of the company noted that “we will continue to
partner with communities that are well led by notable individuals” (Chinwo, 2013).
Finally, Shell’s Managing Director evoked a sense of respect and trust in a statement to
the recipient communities of development projects by pointing out that “communities
decide and drive their development programs while Shell provides the funding and
technical assistance to implement the programs” (Onukwugha, 2011, para 5).
4.6.2. Organizational Learning
Shell’s communication approach has consistently emphasized learning as a
significant outcome of the new crisis response approach. Sellnow and Seeger (2011)
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advise that organizational spokespeople “should illustrate how the organization is
learning from the crisis and what they are doing to ensure the crisis does not happen
again” (p. 215). In this light, the managing director of Shell in Nigeria is quoted in a 2011
news report that Shell has “improved upon how it engaged its host communities to
deliver projects and programs,” adding that the company “introduced the GMoU in 2006
as a novel way of working with communities” (Onukwugha, 2011, para 4).
This statement strongly suggests the element of organizational learning and
willingness to implement lessons learned for positive change. Earlier in 2010, another
company official evoked the fact that Shell has learned from previous failed management
approach saying “the overall purpose [of the GMOU] was to eliminate the inherent
weakness in previous social performance strategies and to involve communities in project
identification, implementation and management” (Onah, 2010, para 7). In a meeting in
2012 with then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, following his accusations that
Shell had not done enough to clean up oil spills and prevent further spills, Shell’s
outgoing Managing Director Brindel evoked lessons learned by pointing out that “they
[Shell] have come a long way which led to the fashioning of the Global Memorandum of
Understanding (GMoU)” and that the company had proactively begun to address the
issues (Ogbu, 2012, para 21). Statements from company officials also frequently pointed
to how they “continue to seek ways to improve” community relations (Gbemudu, 2010,
para 9). As might be seen from these statements, the company positioned itself such that
stakeholders perceive it as being proactive in addressing the mistakes of the past.
Proponents of the Discourse of Renewal suggest organizations that engage in
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communicating learning are able to move beyond defensive communication which
focuses reactively on issues of blame.
4.6.3. Prospective vs. Retrospective Vision
Shell’s communication also exhibits elements of prospective vision as opposed to
retrospective vision. Ulmer et al. (2011) explain prospective vision as a situation in which
organizational leaders focus their communication on a brighter future for both the
organization and stakeholders, stressing the need for leaders and spokespersons to look
beyond the crisis. In contrast organizations enact a retrospective vision during a crisis by
applying blame tactics, and spending more time on attributing responsibility over the
causes of the crisis. Seeger, et al., call on leaders and spokespersons to communicate in a
manner that emphasizes a bright future, as this could spur optimism and willingness for
stakeholders to collaborate with the organization to navigate the crisis.
In many press statements, Shell officials portrayed the company as being
proactive rather than defensive, focusing on the future. For example, the Managing
Director and Country Chair of Shell in a 2014 news report, promoted Shell’s community
development projects as indications of the “company’s commitment to a long-term future
for Nigeria” (Alike, 2014, para 5). On another occasion, the Director said, “Shell
remains in the forefront of converting Nigeria's oil and gas resources to more jobs and
opportunities for Nigerians” (Daily Independent, November 10, 2014, para 5). This
clearly takes away the focus of blame for a past crisis and instead directs people to
anticipate a bright future with the company. Describing the performance of the company
in the Niger Delta, the Country Director, speaking to communities at an award ceremony,
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explained that the development projects in Niger Delta communities “provided the best
road map towards ensuring that the communities achieved socio-economic empowerment
and improve standard of living” (Oduma, 2011, para 9). In another instance, the Director
assured that the company’s projects are “on course to significantly increasing Nigeria's
oil and gas production while at the same time, delivering great benefits to the host
communities” (Daily Independent, February 20, 2011, para 4). The Managing Director
told communities: “We remain committed to the sustainable development of the Niger
Delta” (Oyadongha, 2011, para 9). By continually evoking the terms “sustainable
development” and “sustainability,” Shell’s communication clearly tied the company to a
future that was greater than the failed past, as espoused in the Discourse of Renewal.
A Discourse of Renewal is also instantiated in the “provisional” management
practices characterizing Shell’s revised relations with local communities. For example,
Shell Nigeria’s Managing Director lauded a cluster of communities in Rivers State for
“thinking outside the box” (Chinwo, 2013, para 3) in achieving a major project, adding
that “this community thought outside the box and it is a unique thing” (Chinwo, 2013,
para 12). Praising a community for being provisional in their tasks aligns with the
emphasis on the need for organizational leaders and spokespersons to be provisional
(spontaneous) as much as possible. As could be noticed from statements by leaders and
spokespeople, Shell’s crisis rhetoric applied the ethical element of the Discourse of
Renewal.
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4.6.4. Effective Organizational Rhetoric
Proponents of the Discourse of Renewal call on organizational leaders to
effectively structure their crisis rhetoric such that organizational publics or stakeholders
can make informed decisions. The emphasis is for leaders and spokespersons to structure
reality in ways that allow stakeholders to see the bigger picture rather than focusing on
immediate causes of a crisis. But in doing so, leaders and spokespersons are advised to
“frame the crisis in a way that inspires, empowers and motivates” (Sellnow & Seeger,
2013, p. 98).
In almost every instance in which company officials communicated with
communities, there were explicit efforts to structure or construct public perceptions of the
crisis and ensuing events. Company officials accomplished this by giving a bigger picture
of Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta. For example, addressing some communities in
the Niger Delta during the launching of electricity generation power plants, Shell’s
General Manager for Sustainable Development and Community Relations told the
people: “We recognize that electricity is key to socio-economic development, and that is
why we have implemented these projects in addition to our interventions in economic
empowerment, health, agriculture and human capital development” (Vanguard, May 13,
2010, para 3). In this statement, local communities are invited to perceive a “bigger”
picture of Shell by looking beyond electricity which was actually the issue in question. In
another address to communities, the Managing Director stated that the company has “a
history of investing in social projects and programs in many communities in the [Niger
Delta] region” (Onukwugha, 2011, para 2). This statement proffers a “history” of Shell as
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invested in the welfare of communities. Another Shell official addressing local
communities said, “We will continue to invest in the wellbeing of our people as we do
business in the Niger Delta, and ask other stakeholders including communities
themselves to be part of this noble effort” (Alike, 2011, para 16). Officials promoted this
theme of caring for communities by using catch phrases such as “powering progress
together” (Alike, 2011, para 3).
This rhetoric seems designed to frame Shell in ways that organizational publics
are “inspired” and “motivated” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p. 98). Similarly, Shell’s
Nigeria Managing Director told communities that the company “shall remain in the
forefront of converting Nigeria’s oil and gas resources to more jobs and opportunities for
Nigerians” (Daily Independent, November 10, 2014, para 5). On another occasion, the
Country Director of Shell explained that a gas and oil project that was being newly
created was “good news for Nigeria” (“Shell First Oil Produced from SNEPCO”, 2014,
para 1) adding that being “a new source of oil revenue,” the project “strengthens
Nigeria’s deep-water expertise” (“Shell First Oil Produced from SNEPCO”, 2014, para
1), which the Director claimed is a “key driver of economic development” (Royal Dutch
Shell “First Oil Produced”, 2014, para 1). These are some instances of effective
organizational rhetoric that not only attempt to structure reality, but do so in a manner
that motivates. Thus, Shell’s rhetoric evinces this feature of the Discourse of Renewal.
Summarily, Shell’s discourse of renewal aimed at portraying the “New Shell” as
being more transparent, accountable, responsible, and trustworthy in its relationship with
local communities. This rhetoric also sought to show that the company was now engaging
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local communities in participatory processes, as emphasis was now being placed on
working with communities and allowing communities to “decide” and “drive”
development projects. The “New Shell” also portrayed itself as aligning with values of
“sustainability”; that is, achieving sustainable development in those communities and
sustaining peace among communities. Another feature of the New Shell rebrand was
portraying the company as having learned from its past crisis management approach and
showing how it was implementing lessons learned (which generally has been the outcome
of the Global Memorandum of Understanding). Thus, Shell’s crisis communication
following its official rebranding as New Shell enacted a Discourse of Renewal. The next
section discusses how communities in the Niger Delta responded to the New Shell’s
construction of the realities of Shell’s presence in the Delta.

4.7. Response to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal
This section discusses first, how local communities in the Niger Delta responded
to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal; and second, the response of international NGOs to
Shell’s “new approach.”
Some newspaper reports indicated that “New Shell” was “welcomed” in some of the
communities (see Chinwo, 2013; Onah, 2010; Gbemudu, 2010; Vanguard, “Why Delta
Partners with Oil Firms,” December 2, 2013). But this acceptance came primarily from
members of the Clusters Development Boards (CDBs) set up within the framework of the
new management approach adopted by Shell, individuals who directly benefited from the
company’s projects. For example, praising Shell for its new management approach, the
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traditional ruler of Nembe Kingdom described Shell’s Global Memorandum of
Understanding (GMoU) as highly successful, and suggested that the GMoU become the
gold standard for all Nigerian communities (Alike, 2011). It should be noted that for
members of the Cluster Development Boards (CDBs) success meant the number of socalled development projects implemented in communities by Shell (see Alike, 2011).
Shell was praised in 2011 by some members of the CDBs and individuals for executing
development projects such as roads, ICT center, printing presses, and guest houses
(Alike, 2011).
Members of the CDBs are in principle representatives of local communities.
However, evidence emerged that suggests wealthy elites, traditional rulers, as well as
local, state, and federal government partisanship often influenced the membership of
these boards and this often resulted in communities protesting against members of the
CDBs (see Uwugiaren, 2016; Amaize, 2016). Members were often viewed by the local
people as being puppets for Shell and the Nigerian government who, more often than not,
put their own personal interests and gains over those of the communities. Articulating
such perceptions, some 350 “shoreline communities” declared in a joint statement cited
in a Vanguard newspaper report, “We wish to inform the whole world that the GMoU
chairmen/members are not invested with any authority to discuss land acquisition and/or
oil spill compensation as well as convert compensation into infrastructure on behalf of
impacted communities” (Amaize, 2016). The communities wanted individuals they had
chosen themselves to represent their community interests according to the joint
statement: “[t]he accredited representative/attorney of all the shoreline communities
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remain Gbutse Property Limited and any negotiation without the presence and/or
signature of our attorney shall be deemed null and void, and of no effect whatsoever”
(Amaize, 2016).
Newspaper reports also show a disjuncture between local development needs and
what members of the CDBs eventually agreed on as development projects for
communities. Protests often arose over the choice for development projects, over who
was to determine what was best for local people, and how these projects were conceived
and eventually executed. Hence, persistent conflicts, disruptions, and general opposition
to Shell were evident despite the company’s adoption and implementation of a Discourse
of Renewal.
The notion of ownership over resources (oil, gas, land) emerged as a significant
aspect that rendered Shell’s discourse of renewal ineffective in the Niger Delta. A
majority of the protests that eventually turned into deadly riots involved local people
contesting ownership over resources. Following a 2011 riot that left three persons dead
and one hundred injured, the leader of one of the protesting communities asserted: “It is a
known fact that Uzere kingdom/land has been blessed with oil and gas” (para. 9). The
community leader also stated that it is common knowledge that “Shell took the advantage
to exploit these natural resources on our fatherland for the past 52 years” (Amaize, 2011,
para 9). Protesters from Koroama community also evoked ownership over resources
stating that “Shell is taking our oil” adding that “We were told that gas Shell is taking
from our land is the largest, our community being the largest natural gas reserve in West
Africa” (Yafugborhi, 2012, para 4). Protesters of Nembe community (whose leader had
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earlier praised Shell) held placards displaying messages such as “sale of our wealth by
Shell is theft against mankind” (James, 2015, para 4). Other protesters said the company
would “never operate in our land” (Folaranmi, 2015, para 8) if their community’s
demands were not met.
A related issue was the claim that ownership over land is “ancestral” (Iwori, 2014,
para 5). As mentioned in Chapter 2, ancestral claims over ownership of land are at the
heart of a conflictual situation in which host governments lease out lands to multinational
corporations and these corporations are confronted by oppositional struggles from local
communities who not only see the land as their inheritance, but also consider the
resources on these lands (such as forest products and crude oil) as belonging to the
communities. It should be noted that differential claims over land exist in parts of Nigeria
even when there is a legal body charged with the regulation of land ownership. Chapter 2
details the sources of these differential claims over land including pre-colonial
landownership practices, colonial administrative land reforms, and government
legislature.
Shell was also accused of not negotiating with local communities. As we shall see
later on, the notion of negotiation from local communities’ point of view created a
disjuncture in the relationship between Shell and these communities. Protestors argued
that “the company did not enter into any agreement with the people” and failed “to come
to [our village] to discuss” and “sign GMoU with [our] kingdom” (Amaize, 2011, para
12). Failure to negotiate was also an issue when another community justified their protest
action against Shell by asserting: “The protest and the shutdown of the two flow stations
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were due to the failure of the SPDC to respect the host communities” noting that “To our
greatest displeasure and dismay, we were made to understand through the media” that an
oil well “has been sold out, yet we are not in the picture” (James, 2015, para 7).
The element of negotiation is also related to another point of contention:
community representatives. Who should negotiate with the oil company is a critical issue
in the protests Shell faces in the Niger Delta. Protesting communities continue to contest
who should negotiate on their behalf and insist Shell’s companies in the Niger
“commence negotiation, with the proper authorized agents of the communities” (Dugbe,
2014, para 2). In one case, Shell was accused of inviting “unauthorized members of
affected communities” (Uwugiaren, 2016, para 6) and for getting “chairmen of 24
communities to sign nefarious agreements on behalf of the impacted communities”
(Uwugiaren, 2016, para 8). These affected communities warned that they “will definitely
file a separate claim against Shell in any court of law should Shell fails to commence
negotiation with our said representative/attorney” (para 18).
Local communities have mounted protests against executive members of Cluster
Development Boards as was the case with the Ughelli South Local Government Area in
which the Umolo-Olomu community requested that Shell should “disband” the executive
body of the CDB and allow an open process that will “bring in proper executives” –
individuals chosen by the Umolo-Olomu community to represent the interests of this
community (Ahon, 2011, para. 4). In a letter written by the Umolo community and cited
in a Vanguard newspaper report, the people of this community also said they “received
with great shock and strong sense of disregard, the purported inauguration of an illegal
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executive for Ughelli South 2 Cluster Development Board on Tuesday, June 7 2011
without any prior notice to Umolo Community” (Ahon, 2011, para. 5).
Issues of social justice and equity also undermine Shell’s new approach as
communities accuse the company of not ensuring “equity” in the execution of the
agreements including the GMoUs. Protesting communities clearly call on Shell “to
ensure that all sections of the community are fully represented in the GMoU” (Onah,
2011, para 4). Also, women and youth have protested over the “partiality in the
implementation of the understanding” (Onah, 2011, para 5). Women and youth want to
be part of the GMoU implementation process and have protested against their exclusion
(see Oyadongha, 2010; Oduma, 2014). Gender imbalance is a particularly important
factor as women continue to protest their exclusion from the implementing processes of
signed memoranda of understanding. Given that Shell initiated the GMoUs, the company
seems culpable on this aspect. Hundreds of women protested by disrupting operation
activities at an oil facility owned by Shell in Torugbene community. The women blamed
the oil company “over the alleged connivance between the male dominated leadership of
the community and Shell in the implementation of the GMoU” (Oyadongha, para 2). It is
the case that CDBs are dominated by men throughout the Niger Delta region.
Another issue undermining the tenets of a Discourse of Renewal in Shell’s new
approach was that oil spills and gas flaring continued to disrupt communities. Although
Shell blamed 85 percent of oil spills on theft and sabotage, local communities have
argued that it is the responsibility of the oil company to protect its network of pipelines,
clean up spilled oil, and tackle the considerable amount of gas flared more efficiently.
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Farmlands, fishing grounds, and the ecosystem in the Niger Delta continue to be affected
by oil spills and gas flaring. As one resident stated in a newspaper report, “The water we
drink here is from the Taylor Creek, contaminated with all the pollutants which make our
people sick” (Yafugborhi, 2012, para 4). Shell had also come under criticism from then
president, Goodluck Jonathan, who assigned responsibility to the corporation for clean-up
when he expressed “deep concern over environmental pollution in the Niger Delta owing
to oil exploration” (Ogbu, 2012, para 1) and requested that Shell “urgently take measures
to ensure integrity of pipelines” (Ogbu, 2012, para 1; also see Alike, 2015; Alike &
Oyedele, 2016). Thus, both the spills and flares in themselves as well as Shell’s failure to
adequately address them troubled the local communities and eroded the relationship
between the company and local communities.
Shell’s corporate social responsibility implementation approach has also been
questioned. Communities have protested and accused Shell of selective implementation
of community development projects – that is, executing projects in some communities
and not doing so in others; signing the GMoU with some communities and not doing so
with others; and abandoning and defaulting on implementation in some cases. A
community leader is quoted as saying “the protest was a warning signal to the
management of the SPDC to review their policy and honor existing agreements with the
communities” Segun, 2015, para 7); and upon failure to do so, the community “will shut
down” Shell’s operations (Onoyume, 2013, para. 5; also see Oyadongha, 2016; James,
2015; BBC “Monitoring Africa,” October 5, 2015).
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Meanwhile, in response to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal, international NGOs –
including human rights and environmental groups – accused the oil company of not being
transparent and accountable despite its “new approach.” An Amnesty International
(USA) report accused the company of not providing factual data on the amount of oil
spilled and underestimating the impact of oil spills in the Niger Delta. The report pointed
to the Bonga 2008 oil spill (two years after Shell’s new approach went into effect) that
devastated the Bodo community, noting that the “volume of oil spilt” surpassed “more
than 60 times the volume” the oil company stated was lost (Amnesty International, “New
Evidence Reveals”, p. 2, n.d.). The report also indicated that Shell was not being honest
when it stated that the oil spill at Bonga started on October 5, 2008, when community and
Nigerian regulators “confirmed” the oil spill began on August 28, 2008. Additionally,
“Shell repeatedly claims to its investors, customers and the media that the majority of the
oil spilt in the Niger Delta is caused by sabotage . . . Sabotage is a real and serious
problem in the Niger Delta, but Shell misuses the issue as a PR shield and makes claims
that simply don’t stand up to scrutiny” (Amnesty International, “New Evidence Reveals,”
p. 2, n.d.). In another report authored by Audrey Gaughran (n.d.), Amnesty International
further accused Shell of “not disclosing” important oil spill investigation information. As
a direct attack on what can be called the ethical elements of transparency and
accountability in Shell’s discourse of renewal, the report explains that “a secretly videoed
oil spill investigation” showed how the oil company unilaterally “changes” the cause
from “operational failure” to “sabotage” (p. 1). The report stated that this is done “with
no evidence” at the end of an “official investigation” (pp. 1-2).
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Another international NGO, EarthRights International, reported that similar
accusations were part of a complaint filed in the Dutch Parliament against Shell by
Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth. Jonathan Kaufman, a blogger with
EarthRights, stated that Shell remains under public scrutiny for “misleading the public by
misattributing the blame for oil spills in the Niger Delta to sabotage rather than its own
substandard practices” (2011, para. 10). Kaufman argued that Shell “consistently
publicized baseless figures about oil spill responsibility” (para. 12) wherein the company
claims “85% of all oil spills in the Delta were due to attacks by militants and sabotage by
Delta residents” (para. 12).
Finally, the international environmental group Greenpeace continued to accuse
Shell of failing to clean up past oil spills in the Niger Delta. A report published on
January 11, 2015, stated that “contamination from hundreds of past spills continues to
pollute water sources and land in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria” (Keates, 2015, para
1). The Guardian’s reporter Adam Vaughan on October 9, 2014, reported that
Greenpeace’s “sustained pressure” against Shell on the basis of environmental
contamination led the toymaker Lego to “not renew its marketing contract with Shell”
(para 2). Vaughan explained that this was precisely the outcome of a “viral video against
Arctic drilling” produced by Greenpeace. These accusations undermine Shell’s discourse
of renewal, particularly its ethical claims.
Shell’s new approach as a discourse of renewal was also undermined by
widespread public perceptions about corruption in the company. A news report (see ICIJ,
2016) indicated that “Entrepreneurs and corrupt officials across Africa have used shell
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companies to hide profits from the sale of natural resources and the bribes paid to gain
access to them” (Shane, 2016, para. 1). The news report, also asserted that “three oil
ministers, several employees of the national oil company and two former state governors
who were convicted of laundering ill-gotten money from the industry” are “owners of
hidden companies” whose “assets cycled through Shell” (paras. 2-3). The report stated
that some of the hidden assets were used to “buy yachts, private jets, Manhattan
penthouses and luxury homes in Beverly Hills, Calif.” (para. 3). Such stories of largescale corruption undercut Shell’s ethical claims in its communications.

4.8. Lessons Learned
What follows is a discussion of lessons learned in this case based on evidence that
Shell’s new approach and the responses it evoked from local communities can illuminate
shortcomings in the Discourse of Renewal model.
(1) The Discourse of Renewal assumes a corporatist representation of reality. The
organization as rhetor structures the discourse from the point of view of the corporation.
The ongoing politics of representation in the model summons a corporate vision that aims
at aligning affected communities to the realities constituted through corporate biases. In
this case, the realities advanced by Shell spokespeople were angrily and sometimes
violently contested by the local populace.
(2) Even though the model insists on a stakeholder-centered approach to crisis response,
the communities in this case are spoken for by the organization. This paternalistic
approach to crisis response resulted in silencing voices, community histories, and
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indigenous practices, thus effectively denying the lived realities of local stakeholders. For
example, for some local communities, ownership claims over land and oil are enshrined
in historical relations that do not recognize land ownership through legal instruments but
through ancestral claims. Ancestors may be dead, but for local communities, these
ancestors live on and are treated as members of the community. Shell failed to engage
with these divergent constructions of ownership and history.
(3) The element of “significant choice” discussed in the Discourse of Renewal model is
inadequate to the alternative logics-in-use in the arguments about land and oil made by
local communities. The very definition of “significant choice” as a rational determination
is situated in a neoliberal frame that limits the ability of corporate management to engage
with local stakeholders. Accordingly, when Shell shifted from apologia to a Discourse of
Renewal, the basis for organizational learning was merely a reproduction of entrenched
assumptions and arguments.
(4) Shell’s crisis shows that the past cannot be ignored in favor of a prospective vision.
Shell’s prospective vision was debilitated by obscuring or (mis)representing the
corporation’s past abuses, denying or ignoring the realities of local stakeholders, and
maintaining a position of economic, political, and material dominance that left little
option for villagers and other stakeholders other than subordination of their interests and
perspectives.
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Summary
The Shell crisis in the Niger Delta is a fitting example of organizational crises that
require attention to contested realities. It is also a cautionary lesson about the need for
multinational communication to avoid silencing histories and muting “voiceless” people.
If there is an overarching lesson learned in this crisis, it is one that can be framed in
response to Spivak’s question: In the Niger Delta, the subaltern cannot speak. I find that
this lesson highlights the limitations inherent to the Discourse of Renewal and the need
for an amendment that responds to the complexities of crises based in multinational
exploitation. The next chapter examines another such crisis occurring in a similarly vexed
and complex context in Cameroon.
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5 Case 2: Herakles Farms Palm Crisis in Cameroon

5.1 Introduction
The overarching purpose of this chapter is to critically analyze major points of
conflict to understand Herakles Farms’ corporate rhetoric in response to the crisis over
their palm oil plantation in Cameroon. The focus is to examine how contextual
complexities and exigencies, situational contradictions, and tenacious histories impacted
the outcomes of the multinational’s communication response to the crisis. I will offer an
assessment of lessons learned from the company’s crisis communication response, and
then, a discussion of what these lessons mean for organizational crisis rhetoric and
communication practices in relation to marginalized communities.
The chapter begins with pertinent aspects of the South-West region of Cameroon
where the Herakles Farms operations are located. The chapter also provides a background
on Herakles Farms’ establishment as a company in Cameroon and the oppositional
struggles against its plam plantations there.

5.2. South-West Region
Following is a description of the South-West region including history,
governance, social and economic relations, and indigenous modes of organizing.
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5.2.1 History
The country that is now Cameroon was constituted by joining two separate
colonial regions after their independence. French Cameroun gained independence from
France in 1960 and Southern Cameroons gained independence from Britain in 1961
following a plebiscite overseen by the United Nations. It is important to note that
according to the United Nations Resolution 1349, adopted at the UN General Assembly
on March 13, 1959, Southern Cameroons, then a Trust territory under Britain, was to
achieve independence by either voting to join the independent Federal Republic of
Nigeria or to join the independent Republic of Cameroun (UN General Assembly). An
independent Federal Republic of Cameroon was created following this plebiscite. In
1972, following a referendum, the Federal Republic was transformed into a unitary state.
The “unitary state” appellation was later changed to the Republic of Cameroon. These
regions had been previously united in the late nineteenth century when this area was
colonized by the Germans in 1884.
The country’s colonial history has complicated governance and economic and
social relations, particularly in regard to tensions between Anglophone and Francophone
Cameroon. For example, governance follows both the Common Legal System modeled
after British legal tradition and the Civil Legal System modeled after French legal
tradition and cases can be tried by using either national or customary law (Garcia, n.d.,
para. 9). Thus the legal system in Cameroon is mired in colonialist legacies and
complexities that can create tensions in litigations. It is important to note that
Anglophone lawyers in Cameroon have undertaken several protest actions calling for the
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effective separation of common law practice from the civil law system (see Mbunwe,
2015). There are strong sentiments within the Anglophone part of the country that its
people are being unfairly treated by the central Government dominated by Francophone
Cameroonians (Geschiere & Nyamjoh, 2000; also see Musoro, 2015). This has created a
lot of suspicion surrounding particular actions by the central government on aspects
affecting Anglophone Cameroon. Musoro (2015) has indicated that “[f]or decades since
the independence of Cameroon, the Anglophones have constantly been in a battle of
trying to negotiate their identity in the country” (para. 3). Musoro also asserted that
“[t]here has always been a call [from Anglophone Cameroonians] to denounce the
Frenchification of Anglophone Cameroon” (para. 3).
At the time of completing this chapter, there is an ongoing protest by teachers and
lawyers of English speaking expression in Cameroon over claims of the marginalization
of the English-speaking communities in the country (Andzongo, 2016). The protests have
turned into riots and riot police are reported to have shot dead four demonstrators (Okie,
2016). The protests have grown to include demands for the restoration of the former twostate federation while others call for the outright breakaway of Anglophone regions from
the Francophone regions (Okie, 2016, para. 2; also see BBC, “Bamenda Protests,” 2016).
Anglophone Cameroonians have persistently raised what is now known as the
“Anglophone Problem, a question of how to address the marginalization of the
Anglophone portion of the country by the central government heavily dominated by
Francophone Cameroonians. These tensions and history cannot be neglected when
addressing crisis situations involving governmental actions in this region. Herakles Farms
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palm oil plantation sites are all located in the South-West Region, one of two regions that
constitute the Anglophone portion of the country. The project is seen by local
communities as an imposition (on their land) by the central government working in
collaboration with the multinational.
5.2.2. Political Geography of Plantation Sites
The colonial experience in the British and French parts of the country was enacted
through two different systems: indirect rule for the British and assimilation for the
French (as previously discussed). However, the people of both sections of the country
sustain social relations that, though not entirely similar in all aspects, are generally
reflective of the country’s ethnic group arrangements. Traditional institutions such as
customary law, clan heads, chiefs, and communal organizing continue to organize ways
of life of the people, even if the influence of these institutions and modes of organizing
are being weakened by both endogenous and exogenous forces (Lockhart, 1994). There
are about 250 ethnic groups in Cameroon, and close to 270 indigenous dialects (Gale,
2007). The country has 18 national parks and protected forest areas estimated to cover 2
million hectares (6 million acres) (Gale, 2007).
The South-West region currently comprises six administrative divisions, namely,
Fako, Meme, Ndian, Kupe-Muanenguba, Lebialem, and Manyu. The estimated
population of South-West region is nearly 1.5 million according to the 2013 population
estimate (see “Regions of Cameroon”; Gwillim, 2005). The Herakles palm oil plantation
sites are located in two of the six administrative Divisions of the South-West region,
namely, Ndian, and Kupe-Muanenguba. Land tracts demarcated for the project are in
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Toko and Mundemba districts (also called subdivisions) in Ndian Division, and Nguti
district (subdivision) in Kupe-Muanenguba Division. Appendix B shows the map of this
region.
Toko district is estimated to have a population of 66,000 according to a village
population survey conducted in 2011 (“Communal Development Plan Toko,” 2012).
Although another village study (cited in “Communal Development Plan Toko,” 2012)
puts the population at 14,045, this figure is contested by local government representatives
who insist the population stands at 66,000 on grounds that this was the total count
following a survey conducted through Village Development Associations (p. 6). There
are 49 villages in this district. Toko district has a total land mass of 103,413 hectares and
much of this land is covered by forest reserves among which are Kurup National Park
with a land mass of 49,105 hectares; the Rumpi Hills (5,445 hectares), and the Christian
Philanthropic Community Forest (4,928) (p. 7). Herakles Farms, according to a report by
the Toko Council, had requested 13,303 hectares of land – this would account for 70
percent of the total land mass – leaving the communities in these areas with 30 percent of
the land for farming and hunting (“Communal Development Plan Toko,” 2012).
Mundemba, a neighboring district to Toko, is estimated to have a land mass of
1.557 km2 and comprises 50 communities (“Mundemba Communal Development Plan,”
2012). The area has vast forest reserves including the Korup National Park, Rumpi Hills
forest reserve, and a council or community forest reserve, as well as wide rivers including
River Ndian (“Mundemba Communal Development Plan”; also see Herakles “ESIA
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report,” 2011). The population of the area according to a field survey (as cited in
“Mundemba Communal Development Plan”) is estimated to be 30,044.
Nguti district has an estimated population slightly above 20,000, and a land mass
of 204,852 hectares (Rainforest Foundation, “Nguti Council,” 2016). There are 54
villages in this district. The area is covered by a council forest, three community forests,
and two protected forest reserves, namely, Mbayang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary, and
Bakossi National Park (Rainforest Foundation). The Rainforest Foundation report
published in September 2016 noted that local communities rely heavily on land and
surrounding forests for “livelihoods” (p. 7). Communities also mostly rely on streams as
sources for water supply, and as the Rainforest Foundation report put it, “poor water
quality and insufficient water lines” are the immediate outcome of agro-industrial
activities being undertaken in surrounding forests (p. 11).
5.2.3. Governance
Cameroon has a strong central government even though a semi-autonomous local
government structure exists. Traditional institutions continue to play a noticeable role in
local governance (Gale, 2007). The chiefs, for example, are considered as auxiliaries to
the administration and coordinate with village development associations and cultural and
social groups to facilitate the administration of villages or local communities. The
following sub-section expands on the role of traditional institutions and associations in
local communities.
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5.2.4. Economic and Social Relations
An important aspect of economic and social relations in Cameroon remains the
significant role which community associations play in local, regional, and national life of
the people in terms of economic, social, and political organizing (Yenshu, 2008). In an
ethnographic study conducted on “association life” across Cameroon, it was found that
association life “pervades all facets of national life” (Yenshu, p. 95) and that there
continue to be a “proliferation of ethnic-based associations in the urban areas” (p. 96).
These associations include regional development, village development, cultural, youth
and women associations and typically identify with an ethnicity, village, or homeland.
They are dominant actors in community, village, and regional development claiming to
represent the peoples’ interests (p. 96). Yenshu noted that “…more than a century of
Christian missionary activity, colonial repression and attempts at obliteration by the postcolonial state have not succeeded in putting out the flame of association life at either the
local or regional level” (p. 96). As such, Yenshu argues in the ethnographic study that “it
is still worthwhile examining the value of local forces in building viable social projects if
we still have to live within the pluralistic world that the imperatives of current nationstate system and the globalization process place on the diversity of peoples” (p. 97). Such
associations have proliferated throughout South-West region of Cameroon including the
South-West Elite Development Association (SWELA) which Yenshu studied.
Typically, governance in associations having a national spread, occur at several
levels, namely, Executive committee, General Assembly, Advisory Council or Council of
Elders, and Nationwide branches (Yenshu, 2008). Such associations, according to
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Yenshu, arrive at decisions by way of “consensus” or “open ballot” as “proposals for
decisions” on major issues are brought before the General Assembly (p. 109).
The people of these areas are heavily involved in communal organizing practices.
For example, villages have a “Palaver House” locally called “Etane” (“Communal
Development Plan Toko”, 2012, p. 15). Etane is a community hall used “for conflict
resolution and other social gatherings” (p. 15; see also “Mundemba Communal
Development Plan”, 2012). During these gatherings, discussions on community values,
vision, and development prospects are discussed. There is a strong attachment to
community or group organizing as these groups are enshrined in the social and economic
relations of these communities. Community leaders and local government representatives
rely on group associations for task accomplishment. An example of the important role
these groups play in a community’s operations was seen when local government
representatives in these areas contested a village survey’s findings that had reported the
total population to be 14,045. Instead, they supported another survey conducted through
village development associations that set the population at 66,000 (“Communal
Development Plan Toko”, 2012).
Nguti district is not particularly different from Mundemba and Toko. Village
development associations, family groups, quarter associations, including youth and
women meeting groups, play an important role in the social life of communities. While
associations play a significant role in community organizing, key decisions affecting the
wellbeing of the community are arrived at following consultations with various
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representatives of associations, before the decisions are sanctioned by the traditional
council headed by the Chief.
The relationship between the people and their traditional rulers during a crisis that
pits the community against the government or multinational depends on which side the
chief decides to stand. A rift quickly builds between the people and their leaders if they
suspect personal interests are taking center stage on the part of these leaders.

5.3. Land ownership
Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 1974, sets general land tenure rules and regulates
ownership of land in Cameroon. Another ordinance tied to this law is Ordinance No. 74-2
of July 6, 1974, which specifically relates to the management of state land (USAID,
2010). These laws allow for individual, communal, or state ownership of land.
Communal land must be registered and titled to separate it from state or national land. All
unregistered land, including unoccupied land and land held under customary law is
government property (USAID, 2010). A 1976 law ordinance allowed government to lease
and share rents off national lands. In principle, the state receives 40% of the rent, the
local Council in whose jurisdiction the land is situated gets 40%, and 20% goes to the
village community where the leased land is located (Assembe-Mvondo, Brockhaus, &
Lescuyer, 2013).
Within this customary law framework, “land rights are heritable” (USAID, 2010,
p. 6; see Joko, 2006; Fombad, 2009). Formal courts adjudicating land matters are
required to apply customary laws as applicable in Anglophone regions of the country,
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while in the Francophone regions, the jurisdiction of customary laws is to handle civil
matters considered to be outside the jurisdiction of formal courts (USAID, 2010).
The land registration process can be cumbersome and expensive; this explains
why only 125,000 certificates of title had been registered by 2008, and only about 3
percent of rural land had been registered (USAID, 2010; World Bank, 2009b). It takes 93
days and 18 percent of the value of land to get land registered in Cameroon, while in subSaharan Africa as a whole, it takes about 81 days on average and 10 percent of the value
of the land to get land registered and titled (USAID, 2010). Communities wanting to
register land must apply to Land Consultation Boards to reclassify the land as private,
failure of which such land is considered public or national with the state as administrator.
The Land Consultation Boards were created as a means to decentralize land tenure in the
country. Members of the board include: the district officer, a representative of the Lands
Service, a representative of the Land Surveying Service, a representative of the Town
Planning Service (in the case of an urban project), a representative of the Ministry
concerned with the project, the chief and two leading members of the village or the
community where the land is situated (Center for Environment and Development, 2013,
p. 2).
Despite the existence of these legal frameworks for land tenure in Cameroon,
several studies have suggested that individual and community land rights are endangered.
The USAID (2010) report noted that “only a relatively small percentage of Cameroonians
have registered their land rights” adding that “most continue to claim rights based on
diverse customary laws, at times in direct conflict with the government, which seeks to
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use statutory law to enforce its own access to unregistered land” (p. 1). Rural
communities, smallholders, pastoralists, and marginalized ethnic groups, as well as
occupants of informal settlements “lack secure rights to land” (p. 2). These conflicts
become manifest when the government leases land to multinational corporations who in
turn, face oppositional struggles with local communities who claim ownership over land
based on ancestral rights (Rainforest Foundation, 2016). This is the case with the
Herakles Farms palm oil plantations.

5.4. Herakles Farms in Cameroon
Herakles Farms began as an American multinational corporation according to an
Environmental Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) report by the corporation published in
February 2011. Other sources describe Herakles Farms (HF) either as affiliated or fully
owned by Herakles Capital, headquartered in New York, United States of America
(“Zoom Company Information,” 2016; US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24,
2014). The company targets telecommunications, energy, infrastructure, mining and
agro-industrial projects in Africa (Oakland Institute “Understanding Land Investment
Deals,” 2012). During its initial foray into Cameroon, the Chairman and Executive
Director of Herakles Capital was also the head of All for Africa, a transnational
organization focusing on development in Africa (Oakland Institute “Understanding Land
Investment Deals”, 2012).
Herakles Farms is developing long-term large-scale palm oil production on more
than 200,000 acres in West and Central Africa (“Zoom Company Information”, 2016).
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When fully developed, the palm oil plantation project “will be one of the largest
commercial palm oil operations in Africa” (“Zoom Company Information”, 2016, para
1). The company was originally identified as a member of the Roundtable of Sustainable
Palm Oil (RSPO), an international organization created in 2004 to promote sustainable
practices in palm oil production including among others, environmental protection and
inclusion of local stakeholders in the palm oil sector (see RSPO “Factsheet”, 2016).
Subsequently, the company left the Roundtable over its plantation plans in Cameroon.
This study will use “SGSOC,” “Herakles,” “Herakles Farms” or simply “HF” when
referring to the company.
5.4.1. Bruce Wrobel: Benevolent Capitalist?
The original CEO of Herakles Farms, the American investment capitalist Bruce
Wrobel, articulated the presence of the company and other subsidiaries across Africa with
representations that seemed to paraphrase Spivak’s criticism of the white salvation ethos
(see Spivak, 1988). In a tersely worded open letter to both local and international publics
responding to accusations of wrongdoing by Oakland institute, Wrobel represented
himself, his family, and colleagues as benevolent people, philanthropists who are
interested in salvaging the people of Cameroon and the African continent from poverty,
diseases, and unemployment as well as protecting young women and offering education
and housing to Cameroon’s and Africa’s poor. He explained how his family “endured
malaria, gastrointestinal illnesses, strange infections and bites from a wide range of
insects and reptiles” in order to establish the palm oil project (“Open Letter,” 2012,
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para.10). Here is Herakles Farms’ CEO describing his mission to save Africa’s
‘marginalized’:
I witnessed first-hand the extreme poverty caused in part by the serious conflicts
in West Africa at the time. In the wake of this trip, I gathered some of the
brightest and most idealistic managers and engineers I had worked with over my
career, and together we made a commitment to the identification and development
of specific opportunities designed to generate sustainable economic growth on a
regional or national level … We seek to identify a barrier to economic growth
within a country or region, and then we design a solution which, if implemented,
would eliminate the barrier and facilitate further economic activity always with
the goal of building a sustainable middle class. (“Open Letter, 2012, para. 11-12)
Here we see a CEO envisioning a corporate salvation of African peoples through
neoliberal economics and AngloAmerican hubris.
As CEO of the philanthropy “All for Africa,” Wrobel further articulated the
vision of the company through representations that aligned the beneficence of
multinational capitalism with the “implementation of philanthropic projects,” noting how
“Herakles Farms embraced this as a great social initiative and a way to spread the
benefits of our project across a much wider geography” including “everything from a
school for disadvantaged girls in the Democratic Republic of Congo to a women’s
vocational training center in Monrovia, Liberia” (“Open Letter,” 2012, para. 40). These
representations of Herakles Farms as “benevolent capitalism” were strongly contested by
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the marginalized villagers in the plantation regions in Cameroon. Wrobel died on
December 10, 2013, but the rhetoric of benevolent capitalism continued to characterize
the corporate crisis rhetoric of Herakles Farms. As I will show, the association of such a
project with the ambitions of Cameroon’s Vision 2035 is a disturbing example of how the
fate of local communities is reframed in ways that reproduce the subordination and
exploitation of those very communities.

5.5 The Palm Oil Plantation Project
Herakles Farms set out plans for a large-scale palm oil plantation and processing
mills project in Cameroon in 2008 when a senior Herakles Farms’ representative met
with then Cameroonian Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables,
March 24, 2014). This meeting came after the company had “hired” a Cameroonian
consultant to prospect land for the project (US Embassy Diplomatic Cable, B5). On
September 17, 2009, Herakles Farms was established in Cameroon following the signing
of an “Establishment Convention” (see “Establishment Convention”, 2009; also see US
Embassy Diplomatic Cable, March 24, 2014).
Herakles Farms reported in its 2011 ESIA report that the company had acquired
80,506 hectares of land in Mundemba, Toko, and Nguti in the South-West region of
Cameroon. Of the 80,506 hectares, the company noted that 70,000 would be used for
plantations while the remaining 10,506 hectares would be used for the company’s
infrastructure including factories (Herakles, “ESIA report,” 2011). Of the total number of
hectares acquired, 42,886 were in Nguti district, and 38,020 hectares were located in
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Mundemba and Toko districts. Herakles projected it would invest US$760 million on the
project: $295 million on plantations and the remaining amount to be used for other
operations over a 20 to 25 year-period (Herakles, “ESIA report,” 2011). Herakles Farms
also estimated that by 2020, the company would have developed 90,000 hectares of
nurseries, implying the company would acquire more land (Herakles, “ESIA report”,
2011). The Establishment Convention signed was to expire after 99 years (Achobang,
2013; also see Reuters, November 26, 2013). It also stipulated that the company would
pay US$0.50 per undeveloped hectare and US$1.00 per producing hectare (Oakland
Institute, 2016).
It is important to mention here that following oppositional struggles the company
faced with local communities, government officials, and local and international
environmentalist groups and organizations, the size of the land for the plantation was
drastically reduced to 19,843 hectares (this marked a major point in the crisis). This was
the outcome of an executive order by the president on November 25, 2013, after nearly
three years of the company’s operations. The executive order also readjusted land rents.
Herakles Farms would now pay approximately US$7.00 per hectare of land (Oakland
Institute, 2016). This decision will be discussed at length in this chapter. The new lease
according to the executive order is probationary and subject to renewal with the first
expiration date being November 2016 (Oakland Institute, 2016). Herakles Farms began
full operations in Cameroon in 2010, clearing forests and developing three palm oil
nurseries (Oakland Institute “Understanding Land Investment Deals,” 2012).
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5.5.1. The Plantation Project Sites
The project sites have provoked considerable contestation. Even though Herakles
Farms indicated that 14,000 people would be affected by the project in these localities, a
petition by Save the Wildlife Conservation Fund states that there are 38 villages within
the demarcated land area where the company operates; and an estimated 45,000 people
would be impacted in these areas (“Stop the palm oil plantation in Cameroon”). Further,
large-scale palm oil operations disrupt the primary occupations of the people, which
include subsistence farming, hunting, fishing, and collecting forest products, as well as
the production of common crops like millet, cocoa, cassava, beans, rice, and fruits
(Mousseau, 2012, p. 2). There are also conservation issues at these sites. The sites for the
palm oil plantations are connected to protected forest reserves and parks including Korup
National Park, Bakossi National Park, Banyang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary, Nta Ali Forest
Reserve and Rumpi Hills Forest reserve (Mousseau, 2012). According to Mousseau,
these sites are “biodiversity hotspots” (p. 5). It is estimated that 80 percent of the World’s
remaining Drills are in Cameroon and the sites of the plantations are considered
important habitats for this species (Greenpeace, “License to Launder,” 2014, p. 3). In
addition, certain areas within the demarcated areas are classified as High Conservation
Value Forest (HCVF), according to Mousseau. Finally, many sacred sites (shrines)
venerated by local people are located in these forests areas.
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5.6 Herakles Farms Crisis
Similar to the Shell case in Nigeria, Herakles Farms in Cameroon is facing an
ongoing crisis of confidence and a breakdown in organizational operations. These crises
disrupt organizational routines and pose heavy threats to the survival of the organization.
And just as in the Shell case, Benoit’s (1995, 1997) two conditions in determining
whether or not an organization is in a crisis hold true in the Herakles Farms situation:
first, Herakles is accused and held responsible for actions or occurrences; and second,
these actions or occurrences are considered offensive by Herakles’ stakeholders (see
Benoit, 1997, p. 178).
The crisis confronting Herakles in Cameroon has two phases/periods. The first
period dates back to the early years of its operations in Cameroon (2009-2013). This
period covers the company’s early struggles with government officials concerning the
legalization of the company’s operations. This period was also marked by oppositional
struggles with villagers and environmentalists (local and international NGOs). The
second period of the crisis runs from 2014-2016. During this period, oppositional
struggles with villagers and environmentalists (local and international NGOs) intensified.
To better situate the complexities and situational exigencies in this crisis, these two
periods of the crisis are discussed separately.
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5.6.1 Crisis Phase I (2009-2013)
Three actors – the host government, the villagers, and the environmentalists (local
and international NGOs) – vigorously opposed Herakles Farms’ palm oil plantation
project during this period.
5.6.2 Government Opposition to Herakles Farms
Government opposition came particularly from the Presidency of the Republic;
the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife; and the Ministry of Agriculture, Planning and
Rural Development. These institutions must be involved in “development” projects in the
forestry and agriculture sector that cover vast forestland in the country.
In May 2011, the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, “rejected” a land title
application from Herakles Farms on the grounds that the land title application needed
“additional review” (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 2014). Officials in the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development stated that the “primary problems” with
the Herakles’ project had to do with the “size and location” which is “adjacent to several
national parks and protected areas” (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 2014,
B6).
By this time, the company had already begun developing the forestland for the
project. The Ministry of Forests issued a stoppage order against the clearing of forestland
by the company on February 1, 2012 until the company provided “supporting documents
that empower” the company “to proceed with the clearing” (Regional Delegation of
Forestry, February 1, 2012). The Forestry official’s correspondence also highlighted the
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need for a map that clearly identified the area to be cleared. Herakles was also accused of
extending 1 km (1.6 miles) outside the land prospected for the project. The Ministry of
Forestry also accused the company of unlawfully felling trees (Regional Delegation,
2012). The Ministry issued a subpoena for the company to appear before an investigating
committee on April 25, 2012.
Another charge against Herakles by the Ministry of Forestry was that the
company’s palm oil project was directly competing with the livelihood of the local
population. The Ministry also stated that “the loss of opportunities offered by forest
resources” is huge compared to a “few precarious employments in the plantation”
(Ministry of Forestry, “Fact Finding Mission Report”, 2013, para 1).
On April 22, 2013, Cameroon’s Ministry of Forestry issued an order stopping
Herakles Farms operations in the country. The US embassy in Yaoundé, in diplomatic
cables released on March 24, 2014, quotes an “independent forest observer” recruited by
the Government of Cameroon who justified the stoppage order: “SGSOC conducted tree
felling without authorization inside the permanent forest estate” (B7(A)). The forest
observer added that “SGSOC did not follow the procedures and legal terms guiding the
alienation of permanent forest estate” (B7(A)). The diplomatic cables also quoted the
forest observer as saying “the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the
Ministry of Forests and Wildlife were not associated to the implementation of the […]
project in the area requested, according to the regulations in force” (B7(A)). The
stoppage order from the Ministry of Forestry carried a US$50,000 fine as penalty, and
“condemned the tree-cutting as illegal” (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24,
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2014, B7(A)). The order also “required HF to renegotiate its Establishment Convention”
(US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 2014, B7(A)). On May 18, 2013, Herakles
Farms announced in a press release that it was suspending its operations in Cameroon and
laying off 690 workers (Musa, 2013; Hinshaw & Tumanjong, 2013; Makia, 2013; Viban,
2013).
5.6.3. Community Opposition to Herakles Farms
Early opposition to Herakles farms by villagers emerged in 2009. The first
recorded community opposition came from the Batanga community in Ndian (Mundemba
and Toko Districts) division. This community opposed the issuance of a land certificate
to Herakles “on all lands presently owned and occupied by the Batanga” (para 1). The
communities raised worries over the destruction of their forests should a land title be
issued to Herakles Farms. The local communities also pointed to problems of
environmental degradation and stated that “we find this current move to deforest our
lands by Sithe Global Sustainable Oils contrary to the preservation of the biosphere”
(Mbile, 2009, para 3).
As community opposition grew against the company, between 2010 and 2012,
there were 26 recorded petitions in which villages sought to or effectively did stall the
operations of Herakles Farms. Issues raised in these petitions revolved around the loss of
farmlands (a major source of livelihood), “abusive invasion” of sacred shrines, and
destruction of forest products (another source of livelihood) (see Ngoe, 2010; Fabe,
2011a; 2011b; Masaka, 2012; Bita, 2012). Besides the issue of land loss, local
communities stalled the company’s operations for “developing land without the consent
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of the communities that surround and depend on it” (Cannon, 2016, para 1). In 2012,
villages in the surrounding operations area of the palm oil plantation project accused
Herakles of “grabbing communal land” and land which they said was inherited from their
ancestors (Opio, 2012, para 7).
5.6.4. Oppositional Struggles by Local and International NGOs
Local and international environmental organizations including SEFE, Oakland
Institute, and Greenpeace charged the Herakles project for non-compliance with
guidelines on environmental protection. Baboon populations in the region as well as
water rights issues were reported to be at stake. Notably, the Herakles Farms
environmental and social impact assessment report indicated the potential danger to the
quality of groundwater as a result of the chemicals and fertilizers and pesticides that
would be used in the plantations sites (see Mousseau, 2012, p. 2).
The Oakland Institute, an environmental conservation agency based in California,
published a report in 2012 detailing the impact of Herakles palm oil plantation and
calling the project a “deceit” of local communities. The NGO noted that the Herakles
palm oil plantation project would lead to “irreversible environmental impact” since the
area of the company’s operations is “an important area for high biodiversity” (para 15).
The Oakland institute report also pointed to the displacement of village populations as a
major potential impact of the project. The organization accused the company of “the
destruction of livelihoods for thousands of Cameroonians” (para. 8) and stated that
because the primary occupations in these villages are farming, hunting, fishing, and
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collection of forest products (e.g., wild food, medicinal plants, and fuel wood), Herakles
Farms palm oil plantation project would result in loss of livelihood (para. 8).
Greenpeace, in a press release of February 19, 2013, accused Herakles Farms of
undertaking a project that would result in “massive carbon emissions and the destruction
of habitats critical to threatened animal species” (para. 1), and stated the company must
be “stopped” (para. 1). The Greenpeace press release also quotes a local Cameroonian
environmentalist, Nasako Besingi, Director of Struggle to Economize Future
Environment (SEFE), a local NGO, who stated that “the proposed plantation is located
between five protected areas and any attempt to open it up will have catastrophic effects
on the environment” (para. 5). Greenpeace and Oakland Institute also reiterated
accusations of land grabbing which communities had already raised.
Along with environmental concerns and stripping local communities of land,
there were accusations of corruption and intimidation of villagers who opposed the
plantation project. On corruption allegations, Greenpeace, in a report published on
September 6, 2016, pointed to allegations that Herakles Farms “used bribery” and the
“promise of future benefits to certain individuals to obtain support from local
communities and administrative authorities” (“Herakles Farms chaotic history,” p. 5).
Greenpeace also cited another study conducted by the Ministry of Forestry in 2013 which
found that land negotiations were done “with [a] lot of intimidation and bribery, targeting
the chiefs and some few influential decision-making members of the communities” (p. 5).
The Greenpeace report also cited a French newspaper, Le Monde, in which the Director
of Operations for Herakles’ subsidiary (SGSOC) at the time “promised to secure
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employment for family members of a high-level employee” (p. 5) who worked with
Cameroon’s Ministry of lands. According to US Embassy cables there were accusations
that suggested Herakles Farms “may have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”
(B6).
Regarding accusations of intimidation, the company came under criticism for
arresting and putting into detention villagers who protested its operations. Greenpeace, in
a report on May 3, 2013, stated: “When residents protested against the plantation … they
met with intimidation and arrests” (p. 5). The Greenpeace report also noted that in
November 2012, when members of the local environmental NGO SEFE and their leader
prepared “a peaceful demonstration” they were “arrested” at the NGO’s main office and
“held without charge” (p. 5).
However, on November 25, 2013, Cameroon President, Paul Biya, signed a
decree allowing Herakles to carry on its operations on 19,843 hectares (49,033 acres),
down from the initial 73,086 hectares the company had already prospected. The decree
described the nearly 20,000 hectares as a “temporal concession” to the company
(Achobang, 2013, para 1). A Reuters news report of November 26, 2013 stated that the
decree required that Herakles pay US$408,600 as land tax (Djoyum & Bate, 2013).
Herakles memos had earlier stated that the government of Cameroon agreed to a 99-year
land lease with the company (also see Hinshaw & Tumanjong, 2013).
Summarily, the major accusations Herakles faced in the first phase of the crisis in
Cameroon revolved around disrespect of Cameroonian law, land grabbing (including loss
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of livelihood for communities who rely on farmlands and forest products to survive),
destruction of forest reserves and biodiversity, particularly endangered animal species
(e.g., baboons, drills), corruption, and intimidation and arrest of protesters.
5.6.5. Crisis Phase II (2014-2016)
Once Herakles Farms obtained its authorization from the Cameroon President,
oppositional struggles came primarily from local communities and environmental groups.
But because the company’s community relations had severely been damaged, operations
were stalled. Herakles Farms in this period gradually shifted attention to timber logging
and exporting to foreign markets including China (Greenpeace, “License to Launder”,
2014).
Environmental activists accused Herakles of illegal logging on grounds that the
company was not registered as a timber company. Their reports also cited the
“Establishment Convention” in which it is suggested that all trees felled during the
clearing of forests would be handed over to the government of Cameroon. One
Greenpeace report quotes a Herakles official who in 2012 said, “As we are not
commercial loggers, we will cut it, trim it and stack it for the government” (“License to
Launder,” 2014, p. 7). Yet in 2014, Greenpeace reported that Herakles was facing
“financial difficulty” and was turning to illegal logging (“License to Launder,” 2014).
On May 29, 2015, Herakles Farms abandoned “all operations” in Mundemba and
Toko in Ndian division according to a press release by the local NGO SEFE published on
the website of Forest Peoples’ Program (“Herakles Abandons All Operations,” 2015;
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also see Ndi, 2015). The release quoted a spokesperson of the company who blamed
management for “prioritizing timber extraction over planting of palms” (para. 2). An
environmental reporter in Cameroon, Manka Grace, confirmed that Herakles Farms “no
longer have an office” in the location (personal communication, July 20, 2015). Manka
added that the signboard of the company “together with office properties” had been
moved (personal communication, July 20, 2015).
Evidence of a Herakles reorganization was reported by Greenpeace on September
15, 2016. Herakles reported new investors and a new Chairman and General Manager,
Jonathan Johnson-Watts, who was installed in November 2015. The Greenpeace report
also mentioned that “Herakles Farms is confirmed to have sold SGSOC to new investors”
(p. 9). Johnson-Watt and his business associate James Stevenson-Hamilton are
shareholders of several UK registered companies. It is important to note that they are
both also directors of Volta Red Ghana. Volta Red Ghana is the new company that has
taken over Herakles Farms palm oil plantation project in Ghana following similar
community oppositional struggles (see “Herakles Farms’ Failed Venture Ghana,” 2014).
Oppositional struggles against the company continue. Some 244 farmers in
Cameroon, on September 27, 2016, filed complaints against the company for
“trespassing” (“244 Cameroonian farmers,” para. 1; also see Ngalame, 2016). The
complaints filed in the Court of First Instance in Bangem (Nguti), one of the
administrative districts hosting Herakles Farms operations, accused the company of
failing to “respect a 5km buffer zone around their farmlands” (“244 Cameroonian
Farmers,” 2016, para. 2). Greenpeace claimed that the initial land demarcated by
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Herakles “encroaches on many farms in the forest areas” (“244 Cameroonian Farmers,”
para. 2).
Summarily, this second phase of the corporate crisis faced by Herakles Farms in
Cameroon entailed principally accusations about illegal logging and land grabbing.

5.7. Herakles Farms Crisis Management and Communication
Approach
The discussion in this section focuses on the communication process with which
Herakles sought to engage stakeholders in addressing the oppositional struggles they
encountered.
5.7.1. Phase I Crisis Communication Response
During Phase I of the crisis, the company responded to accusations and
confrontations with rhetorical strategies that denied the legitimacy of the claims levied by
opposing government officials, local communities, and international environmental
organizations. However, while the denial strategy dominated the company’s
communication, other strategies used by company leaders included: transcendence,
bolstering, differentiation, and ingratiation. These strategies emerged during the coding
process described in Chapter 3. I elaborate on these strategies in the following
paragraphs.
Company leaders denied accusations that they were operating illegally and in
disrespect of Cameroonian laws. In two Open Letter webpage entries addressed first to
the public in September 2012 and then to investors in March 2013, then CEO Bruce
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Wrobel stated, “Herakles Farms has a long-term agreement with the government of
Cameroon [and had acquired] all necessary consents, approvals and permits required to
operate legally within the country” (“Investment Opportunity,” p. 3). Company
executives also denied allegations that the company was facing opposition from the
government. Herakles told investors that the project has “Strong government support and
commitment,” which they explained, “is a result of the Cameroon Plantation providing an
economically underdeveloped region of Cameroon with decades of large scale
employment and needed infrastructure including roads, schools and hospitals”
(“Investment Opportunity,” 2013, p. 3).
In response to accusations that the company was grabbing land and stripping
locals of their land rights, hence taking away the source of livelihood for village
communities, the company denied these allegations. Instead, in another response
published on March 20, 2012, it was stated that the company is committed to “not
planting on land where villages and farms currently exist, leaving land for their future
generations’ expansion, as well as buffer zones to ensure plantation operations do not
impact them” (“Response to Inquiries,” p. 4). The company also stated that “in the few
cases in which villages have wished to be excluded from the plantation area, we have
accommodated these requests by removing the land from our leased area” (“Response to
Inquiries,” 2012, p. 5). Yet in 2011, an Environmental Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)
study conducted on behalf of the company pointed out that “traditional livelihood
activities inside the Concession such as subsistence agriculture, gathering and use of
NTFPs [non timber forests products], and hunting will be adversely impacted by the
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Project due primarily to the loss of land available for these activities” (ESIA, 2011, p.
xxvii).
Addressing accusations of environmental (biodiversity) destruction, Herakles
Farms denied these allegations and clearly stated in an Open Letter in September 2012
that “none of the distribution maps showing important areas of birds, mammals, reptiles,
amphibians and plants showed the project site as an important biodiversity conservation
site” (Herakles Farms, 2012). The company not only denied the allegations but also
shifted blame to local communities’ farming methods, stating that “we recognize the
value of the environment which surrounds us, its importance to the local people and to
the global community” (“Herakles Exposed,” 2013, p. 6); further, “activities that have
contributed to the area’s reduced biodiversity include [past] logging in some places, and
small scale farming in others” (p. 6). The company said “slash-and-burn small-scale
agriculture and other unsustainable practices have enhanced land degradation” (“Herakles
Exposed,” 2013, p. 6). The company explained that the location for project sites was
chosen, among other criteria, because the land “had been previously logged and is not
covered by any existing ecological protections, thereby enabling SGSOC to build-out a
sustainable oil palm operation” (ESIA, 2011, p. xiii).
A rhetoric of denial was also applied to the corruption charges made against the
company. The company cited the anti-corruption policy of the organization, asserting
“Corrupt business practices will never be tolerated at Herakles Farms” (Anti-Corruption
Policy, cited in “Herakles Exposed,” 2013, p. 2). In another response, the company
stated:
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Herakles Capital and SGSOC take corruption very seriously. All of our
employees, contractors and subcontractors are required to sign a document committing to
compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and as an American
company that utilizes multilateral financing, we cannot afford to engage in or be
associated with any corruption (nor do we wish to partake in such activity) (“A Response
to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 6).
The Company responded to accusations of illegal logging by denying it was
involved in logging: “We surrendered the timber to the government … We are not
commercial loggers. We will cut it, trim it and stack it for the government” (“Open
Letter,” 2012, as cited in “Herakles Exposed,” 2013, p. 1). There was a subtle shift in the
company’s response to the allegation of illegal logging in 2013. The company stated:
“We would also like to clarify that our company only has rights to the area’s timber and
natural resources as needed for the plantation’s development. Therefore, any timber that
we fell beyond that amount is for the government’s use and sale” (“Herakles Exposed,”
2013, p. 1).
The company also used the strategy bolstering. This strategy was used in
statements pointing to other sectors of the African economy where the company was
doing well. Other statements pointed to the good characteristics of the company and its
CEO; yet, other statements reminded and even praised stakeholders for standing with the
company (see Coombs 2007). For example, the creation of the company was depicted as
beneficial and sustainable for Africa: “Inspired by a desire to ‘do something’ for Africa
after a visit to war-torn West Africa in 1999, our CEO, Bruce Wrobel, quit his job to start
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Herakles Capital with a commitment to using his skills in large-scale project development
for the benefit of sustainable economic development in Africa” (“Response to Inquiries,”
2012, p. 1). The company presented its successes in other sectors: “Herakles Capital has
helped found several award-winning projects across the continent, bringing numerous
benefits to the corresponding regions…and we are developing our latest project, SGSOC,
in the same spirit” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 1). This is also an example of what
Coombs calls the bolstering sub-strategy of “reminder” (2007, p. 170). Thus, there is
evidence of rhetorical strategies seeking to enhance the company’s public reputation.
The company praised some stakeholders in order to advance a social
responsibility image. For example, Herakles Farms praised the government of Cameroon
for its Free Trade Zone program stating that “such incentives are important to attract
foreign investment to supplement the fragile investments the state is capable of making,”
adding that “the region in which we operate has very little cash in the economy, as most
of the population lives subsistence lifestyles” (“Response to Inquiries, 2012, p. 4). The
company also stated that “the government alone cannot develop markets in the area, and
taxing these people is nearly impossible when they operate in an informal economy with
very little cash income” (p. 4). In another statement, Herakles Farms praised the women
in a village community called Fabe. While the village had opposed its operations, the
company’s website applauded a Women’s Day ceremony acknowledging SGSOC. The
company stated: “For International Women’s Day this year, we were honored that the
women of Fabe in Mundemba district demonstrated their appreciation for SGSOC’s
presence with a ceremony” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 5). Coombs (2007) has
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referred to this kind of crisis communication strategy as “ingratiation” (p. 170) which is a
sub-strategy of bolstering.
The company also used a strategy called differentiation (see Benoit, 1995, 1997;
Harlow et al., 2011, p. 81). In this strategy, organizational leaders and spokespersons talk
about the differences between the company’s actions as compared to similar acts that
might have occurred in other sectors or with other companies especially competitors. For
example, in a statement to stakeholders, the company stated:
Unfortunately, we launched this project at a time when there have been an
increasing number of speculative investors seeking land in African countries.
Given some examples that have been set by others, we understand that the
investment incentives we have been awarded have attracted the attention of
critics” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, pp. 3-4).
This statement clearly sought to separate Herakles Farms operations from other
companies in the same sector.
Another strategy the company used in its crisis communication is transcendence.
According to Benoit (1995, 1997; also see Harlow et al., 2011), companies use this
strategy when they position the act in a different context. Company leaders tell
stakeholders to focus on a broader context within which the act occurred. In the case of
Herakles Farms, the company attempted to situate the palm oil project in a bigger context
so that communities might clearly see the benefits of the project. For example, the
company stated that “through its work in Africa, Herakles Capital has identified food
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security as one of the major issues, and responding to the interest of the Government of
Cameroon in being self-sufficient in basic food staples, Herakles Capital launched the
SGSOC project in 2009” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 3). In this statement, the
company situated the company within the context of “food security,” an issue of local,
national, and global importance.
It should be noted that bolstering, transcendence, differentiation, and ingratiation
are strategies used to “reduce the offensiveness” of the crisis as perceived by
organizational publics/stakeholders (Benoit, 1995, 1997). In other words, Herakles Farms
used rhetorical strategies aimed at reducing perceptions of corporate wrongdoing and
promoting an image of social responsibility and beneficence.
5.7.2. Phase II Crisis Communication Response
In Phase II, the company made a major shift in its approach to communication
and crisis management. The approach emphasized elements in the Discourse of Renewal
model as discussed in the next section.

5.8. Herakles Farm’s Discourse of Renewal
5.8.1. Ethical Communication
Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2011) stated that “organizations that institute strong,
positive value positions with key stakeholders, such as honesty, responsibility,
accountability, and trustworthiness” (p. 215) are able to attain renewal. This ethical
element of the Discourse of Renewal is evident in recent communications by Herakles
Farms’ leaders and other spokespersons. Speaking to the press following a joint
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governmental ministerial commission to assess the operations of the company in the
project sites, a Herakles Farms’ executive evoked such positive value positions by
indicating that the company would be transparent in its relationship with local
communities. The company executives stated that the company will “work with
cooperatives societies and allow small scale holders to fully participate in the project”
(Mvogo, 2016c). Cooperative societies as seen in this quote are “small scale holders,”
that is, local palm oil and other agriculture product producers in these communities.
These “small scale holders” are the backbone of community organizing in these
communities. Communicating openly with these groups strongly suggests that the
company was aiming at positioning itself as a transparent organization. The company
executive also sought to align the company with being socially responsible, noting that
Herakles would “train” small scale holders, “give certain privileges and amenities” to
communities and undertake “timely salary payment” of workers from the surrounding
communities (Mvogo, 2016c). In 2012, then CEO, Bruce Wrobel hinted at this ethical
component in a news report published on June 12, but that discourse was eclipsed by
increasingly defensive communication strategies which the company strongly adopted.
For example, in the June 2012 news report, Wrobel stated: “Herakles Farms is committed
to listening to the concerns of all stakeholders and modifying our practices where
necessary. We want to be a responsible leader in developing sustainable agriculture that
prioritizes community development” (Rothenberg, para. 6). Wrobel also stated, “Going
forward, we want to foster greater openness, transparency and collaboration in our
activities” (Rothenberg, para 6).
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5.8.2 Prospective vs. Retrospective Vision
The Discourse of Renewal suggests that organizational leaders and spokespersons
communicate by focusing on a brighter future, a future that is more promising than
looking back on the past. Leaders should not engage in defensive communication; they
should avoid blame tactics, and instead show stakeholders that a more important future is
achievable, that the crisis is actually an opportunity for growth and renewal. A company
spokesperson stated in a news report that “in the future we plan to spend about 29 billion”
(Mvogo, 2016d) and also told stakeholders that the company was now fully focusing its
efforts on developing the plantations in a sustainable manner (Mvogo, 2016b). Another
spokesperson in another news report stated that “there are new shareholders who have
joined the company” (Mvogo, 2016b). This further communicated the notion of renewal
through a prospective focus.
5.8.3 Organizational Learning
The Discourse of Renewal model prescribes that leaders “should illustrate how
the organization is learning from the crisis and what they are doing to ensure the crisis
does not happen again” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2011, p. 215). In this regard, it is significant
that Herakles’ new communication approach was framed as a “revamped impetus”
(Mvogo, 2016b). The company officials acknowledged that the problems of the past were
a result of the company not having “duly respected” norms of forest exploitation, and
also asserted that if further clearing of the forest for plantation land was to be undertaken,
this would be done “reasonably” (Mvogo, 2016a). This clearly suggests that the company
had learned from the crisis about forest clearing and environmental protection.
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To show how the company was willing to enact changes to rectify and avoid
future problems, a Herakles Farms executive stated that “environmental considerations
are now given due attention to right the wrongs of the past” (Mvogo, 2016a). The
company executive also stated that “we have two environmentalists who are with us right
now in the country and he [sic] is really tackling that particular area” (Mvogo, 2016a).
Further, addressing one of the most contentious aspects in the crisis, the company official
mentioned that “about 30 percent of the concession area would be preserved” to ensure
that biodiversity is protected (Mvogo, 2016a).
5.8.4 Effective Organizational Rhetoric
The Discourse of Renewal suggests that organizational leaders effectively
structure crisis rhetoric such that organizational publics or stakeholders can make
informed decisions. Leaders and spokespersons are advised to “frame the crisis in a way
that inspires, empowers and motivates” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p. 98). The new crisis
rhetoric that Herakles Farms adopted was more measured compared to previous crisis
rhetoric. There were visible attempts to contextualize the crisis in ways that indicated the
company was moving beyond the crisis. Company officials sought to communicate a
“bigger picture” for events surrounding the crisis. For example, one of the company’s
executives framed the palm oil project as a community project stating that the company is
“encouraging small scale holders to develop individual farms to become an integral part
of the palm project” (Mvogo, 2016c).
Summarily, the Discourse of Renewal endorsed by Herakles Farms was a clear
contrast with its previous crisis rhetoric that was both defensive and reactive. The new
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communication approach aimed at rebranding the company in ways that suggested to
stakeholders that the company was adopting a more ethical stance to management and
that the company had learned and was willing to implement lessons to prevent future
crises. The company’s rhetoric was more optimistic and future oriented. The ethical
dimension of the discourse sought to effectively align the company with important
community values including transparency. The following section is a discussion of how
local communities and international environmental organizations responded to Herakles
Farms’ Discourse of Renewal.

5.9. Communities’ Response to Herakles Farms’ Discourse of
Renewal
Herakles Farms’ Discourse of Renewal failed to convince local communities and
international environmental organizations. In public venues, Herakles Farms adopted a
new communication approach beginning in January 2016. By September 27, 2016, some
244 local farmers filed “two collective complaints” against the company (Greenpeace,
“244 Cameroonian Farmers,” 2016, para 2). The farmers argued that negotiation did not
occur between local communities and the company before lands were given to the
company. A villager stated: “One day, I came to my farm and I found that they had
bulldozed everything. I knew I was going to develop this place to earn my living and
when I die, my children would remain there, but today, I have no place. We are all crying
here, and we don’t know how we can be rescued” (Greenpeace, “244 Cameroonian
Farmers,” 2016, para. 4). Cannon (2016) quotes a former local government official in
Mundemba who pointed out that the company started work on the lands “without local
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communities’ knowledge” (para 20). At issue is how negotiation is understood within
these local communities.
In the same report by Greenpeace (2016), Sylvie Djacbou, a Cameroonian
environmental activist, reiterated charges earlier raised against the company: “SGSOC
violated the law many times and didn’t fulfill the numerous promises they made to the
communities, such as the building of roads and schools, so one can’t think how they
could improve” (para. 8). Djacbou also emphasized “always protecting local communities
and the great biodiversity that surrounds them,” characterizing the company as “a
destructive project” which “must end” (para. 8). She also pointed to earlier accusations
made against the company: “SGSOC activities are tainted with illegalities: not only does
their establishment convention with the Cameroonian government violate the law, but
they also cleared the forest without a permit, intimidated several traditional chiefs and
used bribery and promises which are yet to be realized to obtain local authorities’ favor”
(para. 7). Thus, despite the company’s attempts at renewal, activists and community
members remained disaffected by the company’s rhetoric.
In another report published on April 7, 2016, author John Cannon quotes a French
agronomist-geographer, Laurène Feintrenie who had worked in Cameroon with CIRAD,
the French agriculture and development research organization. Feintrenie stated that
“informed consent of local communities” was not sought “at all” (“Lessons from
Herakles,” para. 6). The French agronomist is quoted praising community actions, noting
that it was a good thing that local communities stood up to “the abuses of the government
and the company” (para. 8).
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Meanwhile Greenpeace stated in its October 4, 2016 report that, together with a
coalition of NGOs, it has launched a petition in Cameroon and outside the country calling
on the government of Cameroon “not to extend nor to renew” the provisional land lease
issued to Herakles Farms through a presidential decree (“244 Cameroonian Farmer,”
2016, para. 7). Clearly, the Discourse of Renewal enacted by Herakles Farms in Phase II
of the crisis did not resonate with local communities. Oppositional struggles continue as
seen in the suit filed against the company by 244 farmers from communities within the
operation areas of the company barely months after the company executives and
spokespersons emerged with a Discourse of Renewal.

5.10. Lessons Learned
What follows is a discussion of lessons learned in this case and the limitations of
the Renewal model.
(1) Herakles’ Discourse of Renewal failed to address the socio-cultural, communal modes
of organizing characteristic of communities within which the company’s operations
occurred. Communication failed to reflect the important role of traditional communal
institutions that bond these communities.
(2) The company’s focus on community titular leadership failed to acknowledge how
communities themselves identified leaders. There is need to attend to the situationality of
leadership, what it means to be a leader in these communities, and how leadership is
represented or constituted.
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(3) The company’s prospective vision failed to address the past (history) of these
communities. Oppositional struggles over land ownership are situated within an ancestral
past that justifies community land rights based on ancestral ties irrespective of the
existence of legal instruments regulating ownership of these resources.
(4) The Discourse of Renewal was overly organization-centric. The organization
as rhetor structures the discourse from the point of view of the corporation. The ongoing
politics of representation in the model summons a corporate vision that aims at aligning
affected communities to the realities constituted by corporate systems of representation.
(5) The belief system of a people is an indispensable variable in an effective
communication approach that aims to address situated exigencies. Communities accused
the company of disregarding their ancestors by demarcating forestland that cuts across
ancestral shrines. Ancestors are considered part of the community.
Summary
Contestations over land ownership by communities, land grabs, destruction of
livelihood, manipulated negotiation, environmental degradation, illegal logging, and
intimidation, unlawful arrest and detention and accusations of disrespecting Cameroonian
law were at the center of the crisis. The company generally denied accusations from local
and international stakeholders. A change in communication strategy and crisis
management that, whether intentionally or not, endorsed a Discourse of Renewal, did not
remedy the situation. The lessons evince the limitations of the model. In the next chapter,
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a philosophy of Africentric communication and its principles is reviewed in order to
consider whether such a perspective might usefully amend the Discourse of Renewal.
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6 African Communication Concepts

6.1 Introduction
This chapter conducts a review and critique of concepts drawn from African
communication philosophy. The overarching goal is to address the second research
question: which elements of Afri-centric communicative principles are most salient to a
multinational crisis renewal response? The case analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 showed that
the crisis renewal model is not universal and must address both crises and communicative
relations more responsively. The larger significance is rethinking the Discourse of
Renewal through multiple frames of knowledge, history, ethics, and power in order to
develop a more contextually and situationally responsive model. This chapter therefore
introduces African communication philosophy and considers how the principles of such a
perspective apply to the corporate crisis response.

6.2. Review of African Communication Concepts
African communication scholars generally agree that communicative practices are
situated geopolitically, culturally, and historically and they advocate for a paradigm that
reflects the structure and relations of African communities. Faniran (2008), for example,
thinks communication education in Africa “remains largely an import from Western
Europe and North America” (p. 146). For Faniran, Africa needs a communication
framework that can be said to be “homegrown” (p. 146). It is against this backdrop that
African communication scholars propose an “indigenous paradigm” which
conceptualizes communalism as paradigmatic to communication in Africa (Faniran, 2008,
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p. 146; also see Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, 2005; Tarawalie, 2008; Wilson, 2008; Langmia,
2013).
This conceptualization posits that communication is “primarily concerned with
confirming, solidifying, and promoting the communal social order, while its secondary
purpose is to maintain or improve interpersonal relationships” (Faniran, 2008, p. 152).
Thus, communication exists as “human interrelationships that build up the community”
(p. 153). For Faniran, communication cannot be separated from communalism as there is
a “consensus” among African scholars that “the powerful, taken-for-granted framework
of understanding or the root paradigm of these [African] cultures remains communalism”
(p. 150; also see Ikuenobe, 2006; Famakinwa, 2010; Oyeshile, 2004). As such African
cultural communalism is seen as the “template for African communication” (Faniran,
2008, p. 149). Ansu-Kyeremeh (1997, 2005) also argues for the communalistic nature of
communication by explicitly calling for a return to small group, interpersonal,
community-oriented communication structures. To paraphrase Ansu-Kyeremeh,
communal communication basically is small group-oriented, rooted in the local culture,
dialogical, interpersonal, instantaneously produced, interactive, and “utilizing
concurrently the senses of sight and sound in face-to-face encounters” (p. 20).
Other scholars who support communalism with an emphasis on its participatory
character include those who have vigorously called for the revalorization of indigenous
knowledge systems in communicative practices (e.g. Mogweku, 2013; Awotiya, 2013;
Langmia, 2013).
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Scholars advancing the communal paradigm insist relations in African cultures
are tied to duties that emphasize the moral supremacy of the community, such as respect
for community values, sensitivity to the plights of community members, and respect for
the elderly (Gyekye, 1997, 2003; Famakinwa, 2010; Ikuenobe, 2006). Hence,
communication’s primary purpose is to foster these humanistic duties. These duties are
enshrined in community values that emphasize the common good of the community and
include mutual aid, caring for others, selflessness, interdependence, solidarity, reciprocal
obligations, social harmony and mutual trust (Oyeshile, 2004, pp. 294-295). Oyeshile
explains the importance of these communal values noting that “it is these values that
define and guide the social relationship in the form of attitude and behavior that should
exist between individuals living together in a community” (p. 294). Oyeshile is explicit in
his call for a return to these communal values if Africa is to overcome its slow
development.
However, it is important to note the differential perspectives underpinning the
practice of communalism in cultures across Africa. For example, while African
communication scholars and African philosophical thoughts agree on the communal
character of African communities, there are also disagreements on the nature or
manifestation of communalism. For instance, even though African philosophy scholars
agree on the moral supremacy of the community, and communication scholars push for
communalistic frameworks capable of adequately addressing these communal relations,
there is disagreement on which factors promote the moral supremacy of the community.
Gyekye (1997) argues that the individual is morally obligated to the community by virtue
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of the individual’s natural community membership; that duties such as respect for
community values, sensitivity to the plights of others, and respect for the elderly are
accomplished by virtue of the individual’s natural membership in the community; and
that even though the individual holds certain rights as an independent human being, in the
case where those rights clash with community values, the primacy of the community
must prevail. For Gyekye such individual rights must “enhance the cultural development
and success of the community” (p. 64). Gyekye (2003) also argues that communalism
“cannot make a fetish of rights … priority will not be given to [individual] rights if doing
so will stand in the way of attaining a more highly ranked value or a more preferable goal
of the community” (p. 308). But whereas Famakinwa (2010) agrees on the moral
supremacy of the community and that individuals owe obligations to the community for
duties (such as respect for community values, sensitivity to the plights of community
members, and respect for old age), he contends that such duties are not accomplished by
virtue of the individual’s membership to the community. For Famakinwa, belonging to a
cultural community does not justify the performance of those duties by the individual;
other factors such as poor health of an elderly relative (for respect of old age, for
example) might justify why an individual renders the duty, not because she or he is a
member of that community.
I am bringing up these conflicting views on the practice of communalism in
African cultures to suggest that while communalism is advanced as a paradigm for
African communication, and while African philosophers agree that communalism defines
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relations in African cultures, there is need to critically examine the specificities of this
framework.

6.3. Key Concepts of African Communication
Scholars explaining communication in Africa have suggested a conceptualization
of communication that brings the following themes together: indigenization of
communicative practices, grassroots participation (e.g., Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, 2005),
the valorization of indigenous knowledge (e.g., Mogekwu, 2013; Awotiya, 2013;
Langmia, 2013), blending or hybridization (e.g., Faniran, 2008), and structural
overhauling of communication processes from centrifugal to centripetal (e.g., AnsuKyeremeh, 1997).
6.3.1. Indigenization
The concept of indigenization of communication is explained by Ansu Kyeremeh
(1997) as the transformation of external or exogenous communication practices into what
appears to be uniquely native. The purpose is to valorize native practices such that any
communicative practice (including the use of symbols) that does not reflect native norms
is converted into what is customary in native practices. Emphasis is on how external or
exogenous experiences are transformed such that they reflect or reproduce local norms,
values, traditions, and beliefs systems characterizing the indigenous community.
In its most basic form, indigenization is making something (e.g., idea, approach,
or device) to suit the local practices of the community. In contemporary Africa, for
example, it is not uncommon to notice how African artists are transforming American
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hip-hop music into native traditional music by giving this brand of music traditional
rhythms and even ways of dancing that appears to be unique to the native people. The
sounds and rhythms produced that appear uniquely native are achieved using traditional
instruments such as nzan, ficaw, nkor, makak, mbem, muyang, egyuk, kwi fon, disam,
kala, (Blench, 2009). Mbufong (2013) uses the expressions “Cameroonization” and
“nativization” to explain how indigenization has affected the speaking of English. He
states that “mixing words, phrases, clauses, and idioms from [local] Cameroonian
languages” or “switching from one language identity [French, English] into another
Cameroonian language is becoming a means through which Cameroonians express their
identity and a ‘linguistic belonging’ to a geographical location called Cameroon” (p.
476). Such forms of indigenization according to Mbufong also occur for the sake of
“convenience” (p. 479). Nsamenang (2013) concurs and insists that “the domesticated
patterns of the external cultures have become inescapable components of the African
experience” (p. 42).
Ansu-Kyeremeh (2005) sustained his exploration of indigenous communication
and maintained,
“Any form of exogenous communicative system, which by virtue of its origin
from, and integration into a specific culture, serves as a channel for messages in a
way and manner that requires the utilization of the values, symbols, institutions,
and ethos of the host culture through its unique qualities and attributes. (pp. 1617)
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He holds that “communication does not occur in a cultural vacuum”; rather, “it is a
derivative from the sociocultural context in which it takes place” (p. 19).
6.3.2. Grassroots Participation
The emphasis on grassroots participation as a communicative principle and
practice in African communication philosophy is on how to address the legacy of
colonialist communication structures. This principle as articulated is not about “how
people in local communities communicate among themselves to solve local problems but
how people at the grassroots level can articulate their views, needs and interests up to the
district, regional and national level” (White, 2008, p. 7). Working on a project on
development communication launched by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
in Southern Africa, Mefalopulos presents results that suggest participation at all levels by
the primary stakeholders was critical for the identification and appropriate
implementation of policies to fight poverty. He pointed out the need for an inclusive
approach in which “primary stakeholders” initiate, design, implement and evaluate or “at
least they would need to be involved in a significant way”; the point is that they cannot
be excluded from the process (para. 6). This form of communication is particularly
preferred in Africa on grounds that most communities rely on their group actions and
organizing to survive (Langmia, 2013; Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, 2005). But the concept of
participation is more complicated than these simple structures of how communication
should flow and the involvement of primary stakeholders.
Grassroots participation as a salient communicative principle and practice must be
attentive to issues of power – empowerment, agency, legitimizing marginalized and or
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muted voices (Penderis, 2012). Participation becomes ineffective for the marginalized
communities if it is all about corporate entities engaging, consulting, and involving the
local people: there is the danger that corporations and state governments may
“appropriate” participation by using it as a “manipulative tool” to legitimize their actions
and promote their neoliberal agenda (Penderis, 2012). Power relations must be
considered if issues of inequality, social justice, empowerment, and grassroots agency are
to remain the pillars of effective participation (see Escobar, 2011; Cornwall, 2004; White,
1996).
To ensure that participation is not appropriated, a thorough analysis of power
relations in these communities is necessary. By analyzing power relations, we can
delineate the “spaces” within which participation occurs and determine the degree or
level of agency that emanates from such spaces. 1 While Cornwall (2004b) explains that
these spaces within which participation occurs are permeable and never static, it is
important to note that these spaces are venues for power struggles, created for particular
motives by different power structures, with specific “terms of engagement” (Penderis,
2012, p. 11). Unless a participatory approach that builds on grassroots agency is enacted,
participation remains a “legitimizing device” (Penderis, 2012, p. 3) for corporations and
state governments; participation becomes, in short, a way to promote social exclusion. In
the communication process, grassroots participants must have agency, be architects, and

Participatory spaces have been categorized as institutionalized and non-institutionalized (see Penderis,
2012). Institutionalized spaces are portrayed as ‘close’, ‘well-behaved’, ‘patronizing’, ‘summoned’,
‘invited’ and ‘provided’. Non-institutionalized spaces or popular spaces are explained to be ‘contested’,
‘claimed’, ‘captured’, ‘invented’, ‘resisted’ and ‘conquered’ sites of interaction (see Aiya, 2010; Escobar,
2011; Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall, 2002a, 2002b).
1
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act proactively, and not reactively if marginalized voices are to be emancipated and
legitimized.
Recall the tensions that ensued over community representatives working in the
GMOU framework in the Shell case in Niger Delta. Villagers contested the legitimacy of
people sent to ‘negotiate’ with local communities and insisted their own chosen
representatives talk with the oil company. In the Herakles Farms case, villagers
vehemently contested the role of local leaders and chiefs whom they rejected as speaking
for them. These people wanted to speak for themselves through their traditional
communal structures and practices, insisting that if any negotiations were to occur, the
multinationals should come to their land and talk with them in ways that respected these
existing processes.
6.3.3. Sankofa or Renaissance
Sankofa is a call for the rejuvenation of what is African yet with a willingness to
incorporate what will work within communities. Sankofa emphasizes the need for
“finding answers from within” (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, p. 79). In this sense, sankofa
could be seen as being complementary to hybrid experiences. The concept originates
from the Akan language in Ghana and was coined into communication studies by AnsuKyeremeh (1997). In the Akan tradition, sankofa means “go back and get it”: San - to
return; ko - to go; fa - to fetch, to seek and take (“Sankofa,” 2016). The concept was
introduced into African communication studies as an invitation to scholars to return to
their African roots and re-ignite traditional African values and knowledge systems in
theorizing communication. Sankofa “seeks to achieve the recognition of the capacities
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and attributes of indigenous communication systems as the basis for exploring other
forms of communication” (p. 80). Contemporary use of the concept is an invitation for
Africans to go back and reclaim their past so they can move forward and also understand
why and how they came to be who they are today.
Other interpretations of the concept hold that no matter how far away one travels
they must always return home. The basic underpinning of sankofa is that one’s past is an
important aspect of one’s future; that is, in order to make the best of one’s future, one
must visit one’s past. This concept is depicted in the Akan tradition in the symbol of a
bird whose head is faced in the opposite direction of its body emphasizing the fact that
even though the bird is advancing, it periodically makes it a point to examine or return to
its past for a better future (Armwood, 2012). While this principle was found to be salient
in a multinational crisis response in these contexts, the principle also risks repeating the
silencing of marginalized communities. Scholars should therefore be cautious in how the
principle is articulated such that it does not become another occasion for speaking for and
about the marginalized.
That said, there is very strong evidence that villagers in the Nigerian and
Cameroonian case lay claims on land and oil ownership based on their ancestral past. The
past in the two cases was constitutive of the present. The legal instruments regulating
ownership of these resources were not sufficient to deter ancestral claims. Thus, the
Discourse of Renewal tenet that a prospective rather than a retrospective vision should
characterize corporate crisis rhetoric must consider what is meant by prospective and
retrospective if understood through sankofa.
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6.3.4. Hybridity
While proposing communalism as paradigmatic to communication in Africa,
scholars acknowledge the need to hybridize communicative practices in African cultures.
Nsamenang (2013) explains the social and cultural situation in Cameroon arguing that the
social reality in the country (just like in other parts of contemporary Africa) “is
characterized by an uneasy co-existence of endogenous and exogenous value systems and
hybrid generation of Cameroonians” (p. 42). The social status quo in Cameroon and
Africa in general is seen as being characterized by the “triple existence” (p. 41) of
African heritage cultures, Eastern traditions, and Western legacies. Hybridization
becomes inescapable for survival within the social and cultural spaces in the continent.
The “hybrid generation of Cameroonians” referred to by Nsamenang, is understood in the
Cameroonian context to define three groups of people: those who lived through
colonialism, those born in the postcolonial era, and those with extensive Western
interaction by virtue of their education, career and living experiences abroad. Thus,
hybridization is socially and culturally multi-layered and multidimensional, not a simple
additive process combining different elements.
It is important to notice that African communication scholars are unanimous that
hybridization is an important component for any communication paradigm that aims at
effectively addressing complexities and exigencies in African communities. In his call for
a return to African communal values to enhance Africa’s stagnating development,
Oyeshile (2004) suggested the need to “adopt new values and ideas such as will promote
future development” in Africa (p. 291). Oyeshile contends that “it is no longer possible to
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maintain cultural isolation” noting that “any attempts to postulate a ‘unique African
personality’ involving African ways of knowing, thinking and acting … would be
spurious” (p. 300). For Mogekwu (2013), African indigenous knowledge “adopts from,
and adapts to, the world around it” (p. 62). However, while hybridization is another
salient communicative principle and practice for the cases analyzed in this dissertation,
such calls for hybridity must also be situated within the tensions that characterize
differential power relations and ongoing politics of representations. I will have more to
say about power and representation in my discussion of hybridization as an element in the
amendment proposed in Chapter 7.
6.3.5. A Shift from Centrifugal to Centripetal Structures
For communication to be meaningful in African communities, scholars have also
suggested a shift from centrifugalism to centripetalism (Wilson, 2008; Tarawelie, 2008;
Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997). It is argued that centrifugal and centripetal structures organize
power struggles, with the former seeking to appropriate the source of power, and the
latter seeking to decentralize the source of power in communication. In centrifugal
communication “power radiates from the center with ripple effect, in centripetal power at
the center depends on the collective co-operation of peripheral units” (Ansu-Kyeremeh,
1997, p. 92). These scholars champion centripetal communication flow, if the grassroots
are to be part of the power structure for a participatory path towards development in
African nations. The focus is a transformation of centrifugal structures of
communication.

157

Ansu-Kyeremeh sees centrifugal communication as the direct outcome of
colonialism in African colonies. He explains that when newly independent nations
emerged, the elites who had been trained within the colonial administration inherited and
fortified centrifugal communicative practices through the central government structures.
For Ansu-Kyeremeh, the centrifugal structure of communication is not only
“authoritative” but is also a “unidirectional approach to knowledge transmission” (p. 92)
(emphasis in original) which marginalizes community participation and deprives the local
people from having a voice in the communication process. In the Shell crisis, the
GMOUs exemplify this kind of centrifugal flow that on one hand seems to empower local
communities and on the other hand nullifies that empowerment through a paternalistic
execution of the agreements.

6.4. Lessons Learned for Multinational Crisis Communication
Following are two critical lessons learned for multinational crisis communication
in relation to the discussion and case application of salient Afri-centric communicative
principles and practices to the Discourse of Renewal.
(1) Multinationals need to reconsider the notion and application of ethical
responsibility. The two case analyses indicate that ethics as conceived in the
Discourse of Renewal model does not have to be a universal application of the
principles of “doing good” for the greater majority of people (utilitarian
principle) and being “open” and “honest” during crises (transparency
principle). Clearly utilitarianism and transparency are often commendable
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stances but their limitations as universal principles must be acknowledged
rather than ignored through claims of moral leadership. The dangers of
paternalistic ethos and imperialism under the guise of moral rectitude require
vigilance. Ethics must be responsive to the specific geopolitical, moralreligious, and sociohistorical relations wherein the multinational is operating.
(2) There is also the lesson of significant choice articulated in the Discourse of
Renewal principally as rationality. This conception of “significant choice”
impels the need for organizational leadership to communicate about “what is
best for the stakeholders” (p. 217), a requirement to disseminate complete
information that allows stakeholders to make rational choices in their
decision-making processes. However, the idea that all stakeholders will
employ rational criteria in decision-making, that epistemological transparency
and completeness can be realized, or that actualizing such ideals is simply a
matter of corporate transmission is in itself flawed. In the context of
multinational crises in West Africa, the assumptions about western logic
and/or rationality do not acknowledge such alternative sensemaking logics as
the ancestral claims over land and oil ownership in Nigeria and Cameroon.
(3) Crisis communication by the multinationals addressed contextual issues as
problems that locals could resolve (as in the GMOUs),
administrative/regulative issues to be managed (as in Herakles’ assumption
about government permits) or obstacles to be removed (as in
Shell/government crackdowns). Yet, my analyses pointed to the complexities
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of indigenous organizing practices, existing interest conflicts such as those
among local people, traditional rulers, and wealthy elites, and relations among
multiple, often fluid interests including governing authorities, NGOs, tribal
groups, even language traditions.
The lessons learned point to the need for a model of renewal that engages with
indigenous practices and principles in addressing a crisis affecting subaltern groups. Yet
principles of Africentric communication philosophy are abstract. They are ideals rather
than working practices. In the following section, I offer reminders of the situational
complications that characterize multinational operations in the Sub-Saharan countries. In
particular, these complications trouble the ethical mandate at the core of the Discourse of
Renewal. Specifically, I consider the prevalence of bribery and corruption as taken-forgranted practices of governance and social life. In engaging such realities, are the moral
commitments of a Discourse of Renewal merely forms of imperialism that require
denigrating and disciplining Others? Or does complicity with such practices as the “cost
of doing business” render such commitments moot? Or do ethical commitments become
strategies of manipulation in themselves?

6.1 6.5. MNCs and Capitalistic Corruption
Issues of bribery complicate relations between MNCs, host governments, and
local communities because even though bribery is arguably a ritual in governmental
structures in both Cameroon and Nigeria, bribery is a nuanced term (in practice) when
situated within global relations. According to Lambsdorff (2010), bribery is contextual
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and therefore no universal notion of bribery can capture the concept in a holistic manner.
In a study on the perception of bribery tapping 70,000 households in 66 countries
(including Nigeria), Lambsdorff noted that a victim’s perception of bribery differs from
the person who benefits from the act. Lambsdorff’s argument that perceptions of bribery
might be embedded in specific social relations is an important consideration in
understanding what constitutes bribery as an unethical practice. Lambsdorff’s research
suggested that “bribes are not globally condemned to an equal extent” (p. 18). He argued
for moral relativism, urging attention to specific contexts in order to clearly ascertain
notions that explain bribery as an unethical phenomenon.
But critics of moral relativism argue that such an approach to ethics/morality
“perpetuated the rule of geographical morality by allowing multinational corporations to
hide behind ‘culture’ as the reason for their participation in corrupt business transactions
in Africa, Asia and Latin America” (Ala’i, 2000). For these critics, “geographical
morality” – a concept introduced by Edmund Burke (See Ala’i, 2000) suggesting the nonuniversal nature of moral principles – needs to be eliminated by “requiring uniform
standards of conduct by private and public officials, irrespective of geography” (Ala’i, p.
877). These struggles between the universal/particular binary in conceptions of ethics
have not succeeded in dissipating support for geographical morality as the notion
continues to inform contemporary anti-corruption movements.
Inconsistencies between laws and morality-in-practice in Cameroon is another
relevant complication. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) whose members are principally developed countries explains a “facilitating
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payment” as not constituting bribery, but rather as “a payment done to speed up an
administrative process where the outcome is already pre-determined” (Walters, 2006).
According to United States federal legislation, a “facilitating payment” or “grease
payment” as defined by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act amended in 1988, is a payment
to a foreign official, political party or party official for ‘routine governmental action’
such as processing papers, issuing permits, and other actions of an official, in order to
expedite performance of duties of non-discretionary nature, i.e., which they are already
bound to perform. (Deming, 2005, p. 15). Such payment is explained as “not intended to
influence the outcome of the official’s action, only its timing” (Deming, 2005, p. 15).
Consequently, facilitation payments are exempted from US federal anti-bribery law
(Deming, 2005).
But these definitions of “facilitating payments” or “grease payments” as explained
by the OECD and US law appear to be incongruous with specific national-cultural
contexts. For example, in Cameroon, public officials’ approach to routine tasks is often
discretionary; and when these tasks are being performed, it is with some form of inertia.
Further, public officials more often than not do not feel they owe an obligation to the
public when discharging their duties; their allegiance is to the government authority who
appointed them to that position. Given such circumstances, defining “facilitating
payment” or “grease payment” as bribery becomes more complex. Yet this Cameroonian
situation creates difficulties for an American multinational especially in the process of
obtaining permits or other licenses to operate in the country, and also when responding to
charges of bribery from local stakeholders. What constitutes bribery in the American and
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European contexts appears to conflict with how bribery manifests within social,
economic, and political relations in Cameroon. Indeed, local appellations are used in
specific Cameroonian contexts by various actors to “water down” the “pejorative
meaning attached to bribery” (Fomumdam, 2011, p. 1). These include: “choko”, “Kola
nut”, “myjar”, “petrol”, “chokuchoku” (Fomumdam, 2011, p. 1); and I will add “mimbo.”
Bribery is “informally” accepted in the Cameroonian context.
Even though bribery is an offence punishable by law in Cameroon, Justice Mbah
Rose Acha Fomumdam who is currently in charge of the Supreme State Control (a
government body whose responsibility is principally to purge the Cameroonian
government of corruption) asserts that bribery is almost an accepted norm in the
economic, social, and political relations in the country. In a 2016 “most corrupt
countries” ranking by the NGO business monitor Transparency International, Cameroon
and Nigeria ranked among the countries perceived to be most highly corrupt. Cameroon’s
corruption perception index is 27 and Nigeria’s is 26 so both countries fall within the
category of “highly corrupt” zones in the world (Transparency International 2016; also
see U.S. Department of State, 2010; Fominyen, 2010). A Reuter’s report has described
the corruption phenomenon in Cameroon as a “worst-kept secret” (Fominyen, 2010)
because although citizens are aware of the phenomenon, and acknowledge it in daily
conversation, no one has the courage to take corrupt practitioners to court. The judiciary,
penitentiary, the police, business, and all sectors of governmental structures in Cameroon
are implicated in this phenomenon. The country’s government officials do not see it as
strange to accept or push for bribery while performing state functions and public services.
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Not surprisingly, a recent drive to purge the country of corruption has led to the arrest
and imprisonment of dozens of persons, many of whom are former government ministers,
on charges of embezzlement/misappropriation of public funds.
Nigeria has been described as a powerhouse of corruption. In a recent BBC news
report, previous British Prime Minister David Cameron described Nigeria as being
“fantastically corrupt” (BBC News; The New York Times). Transparency International
noted in its 2016 corruption report that Nigeria has consistently maintained its ranking as
one of the most corrupt nations. The report notes that while the fight against corruption is
one of current President Muhammadu Buhari’s priorities, corruption was “rampant”
under the previous administration headed by Goodluck Jonathan. For example, the
former petroleum minister of Nigeria is currently seeking refuge in the UK from
corruption charges during her term under the former government. The Transparency
International 2016 report also notes that “more than US$157 billion has left the country
illicitly” (p. 1); and “corruption hits hardest at the poor in Nigeria who make up more
than 40 per cent of the 179 million people” (p. 1). Corruption, the report states, is
“everywhere” in Nigeria with all sectors of the government indebted to the phenomenon.
Otusanya, Lauwo, and Adeyeye (2012) in their study of multinational companies’ anticorruption policies in Nigeria found that MNCs are heavily involved in bribery and
money laundering contrary to their mandates for so-called “responsible social conduct”
(p. 1). Otusanya, et al., argued that “MNCs have used the political elite in developing
countries to seek to advance their global earnings and competitive advantages by offering
bribes and other inducements to secure government contracts in Nigeria” (p. 1).
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The point here is that ethical ideals and universal moral principles are not only
differently articulated across cultures but that these ideals and principles are unhelpful as
operating practices in a crisis communication model. There is need to understand how
context affects conceptions and practices of corruption:
(1) Notions of corruption (as in bribery) in some Western contexts appear to be
incongruous with notions of bribery in some non-Western contexts.
(2) How corruption manifests itself in relations within some non-Western contexts
reframes the ethical, legal, political, and economic implications of such acts and cannot
be judged by Western laws or standards.
(3) At the same time, the level of corruption in countries like Cameroon and Nigeria
renders social and legal protections for those most affected by MNC exploitation
ineffectual without recourse to international courts operating under transnational legal
systems.
(4) The impact or offensiveness of the act of bribery attenuates within specific social,
economic, and political contexts in Cameroon and Nigeria.
I have described the complications of bribery and corruption at length to
demonstrate the need for more responsive strategies of renewal that might engage more
effectually in local situations that do not accord with the assumptions underlying the
dimensions of the model. A Discourse of Renewal must include not a prescribed ethical
stance but reflexivity and vigilance in response to such contextual complexities.
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Summary
An emerging African communication philosophy offers communicative principles
and practices salient to multinational crisis renewal response while at the same time
espousing ideals that evoke tensions of their own. The lessons learned are takeaways that
inform the amendment I offer. The discussion of capitalistic corruption through the lenses
of moral relativity and geographical morality pointed to complex contexts that unsettle
the moral rectitude underlying the Discourse of Renewal model. The amendment I offer
in the next chapter must be seen as adding to the current Discourse of Renewal so that a
responsive approach to crisis communication between multinationals and local
communities may be established.
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7 Discourse of Renewal: Amendments

7.1. Introduction
The lessons learned in the cases analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5 and the discussion
of African communication principles and practices in Chapter 6 are important resources
for amending the Discourse of Renewal and this is the principal focus of the current
chapter. First, I begin with a review of what went wrong in the multinationals’ crisis
communication approaches taken by Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria and Herakles Farms in
Cameroon.

7.2. Communication Issues
Issues emerged based on assumptions about communicative relations and the
operationalization of communicative processes in the cases analyzed. These issues point
to important power inequities and limitations that inform the proposed amendment.
7.2.1. Organization as Rhetor
A major issue that created conflicts in the entire communication process between
the companies and local communities was that communication emerged predominantly
from the corporate standpoint. The Discourse of Renewal enacted by Shell and Herakles
Farms positioned the corporation as the rhetor and defined “renewal” from the corporate
perspective. Even though Shell championed transparency, accountability, and open
communication with local communities as the backbone of its new community relations,
evidence from documents analyzed show the multinational was only transparent in what
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the company wanted the public to know and how the company chose to represent
information. For example, information about the volume and impact of oil spills was
restricted to what the company decided to share. Amnesty International insisted that Shell
manipulated data from an investigation by underestimating the actual volume of oil spills,
the duration, and the impact. As such, transparency and accountability, important ethical
elements in the Discourse of Renewal, were determined from the corporate standpoint.
Further, it was actually the corporation that conceived, designed, and determined how to
communicate and eventually implement the Global Memorandum of Understanding.
Community relations were largely managed from the corporate standpoint. Even though
the company explained that the GMOU arrangement allows local communities to
“decide” and “drive” their development, evidence emerged that indicated Shell was at the
center of the entire process. The organizational rhetors (company leaders and
spokespersons) ensured that the corporate interests and goals of the company were
protected. It is possible to see that in this crisis, “renewal” for Shell was to create an
enabling environment to do business at any cost.
Similarly, a major problem with the communication approach adopted by
Herakles Farms was that the company itself emerged as the primary communicator after
the death of the CEO Bruce Wrobel. This entitization of the company meant that all
communication was to be conceived, designed, and disseminated by leaders,
spokespersons and other decision makers in the organization; this, even as Herakles
Farms’ Discourse of Renewal claimed the company was engaging in an open relationship
with stakeholders. Thus, suspicions about the company’s lack of transparency could not
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be resolved. By remaining at the center of communication, a corporate-centric discourse
emerged that disregarded communities’ norms, practices and modes of organizing.
Additionally, the corporate-centered approach to communication is heavily topdown. This largely affected how stakeholders and the companies’ publics perceived,
related to, and sought to engage with the organizations. Social justice, stakeholder
protection, accountability, and open dialogue were clearly subordinated to corporate
interests even in the case of Herakles’ part in All for Africa’s grand visions for “saving
Africa.” Further, speaking for the Other was apparent in both cases as corporate
representatives articulated community needs and interests for jobs, housing, and
education (Herakles) and community development and infrastructure projects (Shell); or
denigrated locals as destructive and lawless. This pattern exhibits an implicit sense of
superiority/inferiority that warrants ignoring indigenous modes of deliberation and
communality. It reproduces the colonialist legacy in the assumption that the corporate
rhetor is the only one with something worth saying (or a way of saying it that is
worthwhile). The colonialist representation of self vs. the “Other” is characteristic of the
rhetor in these complex relations between MNCs and local populations. As postcolonial
theory tells us, the Other can only be recognized in these relations (of the colonizer and
the colonized) through oppositions of superior/inferior as well as a “diminished” version
of the dominant self (cite here—Fanon? Bhaba?). This requires mimicry – in which the
Other mimics the representations of the corporation such as going along with the GMoU
(in the case in Nigeria) or repeating the promises of Herakles Farms (in the case in
Cameroon)(cite here—again, Bhaba?).
169

7.2.2. Communication as Transmission
Another significant communication issue compromising the Discourse of
Renewal is the transmission approach to communication. Here I want to make a
distinction between the idea of a transmission model based in the classic Shannon and
Weaver frame and transmission as a manipulation within a social construction model of
communication. The Discourse of Renewal model itself is premised on a constructionist
conception of communication in which the corporate rhetor becomes ethically
responsible for disseminating (and enacting) a prospective vision capable of altering the
view of reality for stakeholders. However, as evidenced in the case of Shell in Nigeria,
communication became a transmission tool prioritizing dissemination of corporate
messages while rendering the company’s public as passive receivers. In the crises in
Nigeria and Cameroon, local communities complained they were not consulted nor
engaged in negotiations. Even though both multinationals revised their communication
strategies to incorporate what can be recognized as aspects of the Discourse of Renewal,
both retained the prerogative of the corporate rhetor to define realities about the
enterprise from a corporate perspective as they sought to rebrand and market the new
Shell and the revived Herakles as renewed corporations.
7.2.3. Participatory Communication from Above
It would be misleading to think that Shell never attempted to engage local
stakeholders in its communication process. But the issue is the manner in which the
company enacted participation. Communication continues to flow from top to bottom
with company officials firmly determining the process. When some half-nude women
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protested against Shell, accusing the company of not implementing the GMoU, in
response, a company spokesperson is quoted in a telephone interview saying the
company has a channel through which the women should transmit their grievances (Eze,
2014). The implication was that unless the protesting women used the company’s
existing channels for their grievances, the company would do little or nothing to engage
them in dialogue. But perhaps most revealing was that the half-nude (sexuality) protest
not only called out the linear, hierarchical structure of Shell’s community relations but
the paternalistic nature of these relations as well. Shell, it should be recalled, described its
new approach to confronting the lingering crisis in the Niger Delta as participatory, with
communities deciding and driving their own development while the company serves as
funding and capacity building partner. However, local communities protested they are
unilaterally clustered into the GMOU framework without consultations. 2
Communication by Herakles Farms in Phase II of that crisis emphasized that the
company was effectively engaging local communities in the palm oil project. As noted
earlier, a company executive clearly stated that Herakles Farms “plans to revamp
community participation by encouraging small holders to develop individual farms to
become an integral part of the palm project” (Mvogo, 2016). The company official also
stated that the company would “work with cooperative societies” which are an important
economic and social mode of organizing within these communities. Yet cooperative
societies in local communities are heavily autonomous community groups whose modes

Recall from Chapter 4 that some states were added to the regions’ map for “administrative convenience”
and “political expediency” (UNDP, 2006; Ibaba, 2005).

2
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of organizing entail dialogue, deliberations, contestations, and eventual agreement by
consensus. A top-down communication flow from the corporation to these societies
disregards this process. Participation within local cooperative societies does not simply
require a show of hands to arrive at decisions. These cooperatives function as community
meeting groups and members are bound by community values.
7.2.4. Renewal
The last major issue in the communication process adopted by Shell and Herakles
Farms revolves around the notion or concept of “renewal” which is a key concept that
informs the Discourse of Renewal model. Renewal as described in this model requires
organizational leaders and spokespersons to look beyond the crisis and focus on the
future by exploiting the opportunities for growth and changes in an organization
following a crisis. This requires a prospective and optimistic focus and not a retrospective
and strategic focus. Yet even though the Discourse of Renewal encourages organizational
leaders to be proactive rather than defensive and reactive, the notion of renewal largely
remains corporate-centric.
Unsurprisingly, then, local communities still accuse Shell of applying “divide and
rule tactics” in managing the crisis, pitting communities and segments of the population
against each other by working with “friendlier” communities and isolating communities
perceived to be “hostile” to the company (Amaize, 2012). Local communities accused
Shell of creating “antagonism between members of the [Cluster Development Board] and
the community development committees” (Amaize, 2012, para 6) by wanting to work
instead with members of the development committees in the management of the oil spill
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rather than work with the CDB as enshrined in the GMoU. The same accusations were
made by 300 communities who “accused the oil multinational of using divide and rule
tactics against the people” according to Vanguard’s July 11, 2016 edition (Amaize, 2016,
para 1). The accusation was that the company was “sidetracking” the agency chosen by
communities to negotiate. Similar accusations of “divide and rule” tactics have been
raised by other communities (see Uwugiaren, 2016; Dugbe, 2014; Onah, 2011; Eze,
2014). My point is that “renewal” was enacted by Shell as a ploy to manage community
resistance. Build within a paternalistic framework, Shell’s discourse of renewal sustained
‘benevolent’ relationships that failed to address the logics-in-use in these contexts.

7.3. Summary Comparison
The crises analyzed in this study occurred in two different countries and in
different economic or industrial sectors. In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the crisis
was in the extractive industry (crude oil) while in the case in Southwest region of
Cameroon, the crisis occurred in the Agro-industry (agricultural sector). The cases differ
in terms of duration, violence, MNC size, value of the products, intra- and inter-tribal
relations, environmental contamination and destruction, the role of the state, and industry
and investor tolerance. However, it is clear that both multinationals struggled against
local opposition apart from the intricacies of state corruption and complicity as well as
international investment, regulation, and market discipline. In both cases, major points of
conflict revolved around ancestral ownership of resources. In the Niger Delta region of
Nigeria, local communities laid claims over crude oil and land; in the Southwest region
of Cameroon, communities made similar claims over land and forest resources. Other
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major issues raised by local communities in the crises in both cases were on issues of
negotiation, participation, disrespect of traditional institutions, marginalization, and
exploitation. The multinationals responded to these claims by attempting corrective
measures; however, these measures failed to situate the multinationals’ efforts within
community practices, modes of organizing and sociocultural, economic and even political
relations that define the lives of the region’s inhabitants.
Crisis communication by the multinationals addressed contextual issues as
problems that locals could resolve (as in the GMOUs), administrative/regulative issues to
be managed (as in Herakles’ assumption about government permits) or obstacles to be
removed (as in Shell/government crackdowns). Instead, the analyses pointed to the
complexities of indigenous organizing practices, existing interest conflicts such as those
among local people, traditional rulers, and wealthy elites, and relations among multiple,
often fluid interests including governing authorities, NGOs, tribal groups, even language
traditions.
Evidence from the analyses also pointed to important communication issues in the
crisis responses of Shell (Nigeria) and Herakles Farms (Cameroon). In both cases,
evidence pointed to limitations in the conceptualization of communication inherent to the
Discourse of Renewal model of crisis communication. The first is the overarching role of
the organization as the rhetor in the communication process. Communication emerged
from the corporate standpoint with little attention to local exigencies. The second major
problem is the distortion of the social constructionist premises of the model by practices
of transmission. Communication in these cases became a tool to transport and
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disseminate information while anticipating an intended impact on an audience arguably
perceived to be passive, docile, inferior, and gullible. The third major issue that emerged
is the self-serving corporate definition of participation as complicity. Participatory
communication was orchestrated from above, that is, under the guidance of the
corporations. The fourth significant issue is the conceptualization of “renewal” itself. The
Discourse of Renewal model conceptualizes renewal as serving the interests of the
corporation even while the impulse may be benevolent. Thus in the case of mulinationals
operating in postcolonial arenas, renewal reproduces colonialist legacies that disregard,
denigrate, and suppress indigenous alternatives in favor of corporatization and
neoliberalism as organizing principles.
Taking into consideration these significant issues, I argue on the basis of the two
cases that an adequate model of corporate crisis communication must acknowledge the
colonial and neocolonial experiences and residual tensions drawn on the histories of these
communities and relevant contexts critical to multinational relations with local
communities.

7.4. Amending the Discourse of Renewal
The amendment I offer to the Discourse of Renewal advances a concept I call
responsive hybridity. This notion of hybridity is informed by African communication
philosophy. Adding this tenet (responsive hybridity) to the Discourse of Renewal is
intended to make the model more culturally responsive and expands on the ethical
component already included in the Discourse of Renewal. Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger
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(2011) argue that crisis situations inherently involve ethical issues and dilemmas given
that blame, responsibility, fairness, justice, and rights are inherent to such exigencies. Yet
they recognize that moral frameworks differ from one group, one corporation, or one
culture to another and that there are differing values and definitions framing ethical
conduct. Sellnow and Seeger (2016) argue that “Organizations are part of a larger social
context and thus should adhere to the larger norms and values that govern that context”
(p. 222). At the same time, they advance what appear to be transcultural ethical criteria:
--responsibility/blame, significant choice based in transparency, and the open and free
flow of information (“open, truthful, honest and immediate,” p. 227);
--care for the well-being of others (to “’hear, understand, and be responsive to the
subjective voices, experiences, and contexts of community members rather than operate
on assumed knowledge of members’ (Simola, 2003, p. 358)”);
--virtuous conduct by leaders; and
-- adherence to standards of justice, equity, and fairness (with particular regard for the
benefit of the least advantaged members of society).
The Discourse of Renewal builds on ethical relationships with stakeholders that
Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2011) describe in equally transcultural terms:
“Organizations that institute strong, positive value positions with key organizational
stakeholders, such as openness, honesty, responsibility, accountability, and
trustworthiness, before a crisis happens are best able to create renewal following the
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crisis” (p. 215). The model assumes that corporations have crystallized such core values
to guide their decision-making and communication in crisis situations.
Even though they recognize that cultures differ, the Ulmer, et al. Discourse of
Renewal model promotes a normative conception of ethics and implies that there are
transcultural ethical standards that obligate MNCs. However, there are both differing
values and differing definitions of seemingly shared values across cultures, places,
histories, and situations. Thus, while corporations and their leaders may design ethical
statements and codes of conduct applicable to the corporation’s operations and
expectations, there is need for a less prescriptive ethical approach in the design and
delivery of communication with local stakeholders. Hence, my amendment is for
“responsive hybridity” – this suggests that renewal will create hybrid forms,
relationships, practices guided by self-reflexivity and ethical vigilance. To be selfreflexive is to pay “careful consideration of the ways in which [‘our’] past experiences,
points of view, and roles impact [‘our’ very own] interactions with, and interpretations of,
the research scene” (Tracy, 2013, p. 2). That means to be self-reflexive in crisis situations
is to be continually sensitive to the ways that personal, organizational, community, or in
more general terms, cultural contexts affect perspectives, possibilities, and actions. The
ethical vigilance which my amendment summons is conveyed through the African
communicative concept of sankofa which I argue, calls for ongoing monitoring of our
being and that affects how we relate within the crisis context.
This means that renewal as a creative process of cultural hybridity entails ongoing
monitoring of both corporate and community standards and values in order to address the
177

inevitable gaps and differences between cultures (geonational, cultural,
corporate/community, etc.). For example, definitional differences and conflicts can derail
efforts to renew commitments with stakeholders or to recover a positive image. For
example, the GMoU in the case of Shell in Nigeria allowed company executives to
prescribe to communities what the company perceived as good leadership: “we will
continue to engineer development and partner with communities that are well led by
notable individuals,” a spokesperson for Shell told members of the Romourianwo
community during the inauguration of the community town hall (Chinwo, 2013, para. 7).
The spokesperson also prescribed the ability for community leaders to “think outside the
box” (Chinwo, 2013, para. 3). But these prescriptions and the underlying characterization
of what constitutes leadership clashed with communities, and these communities often
protested this approach to leadership noting that these so-called community leaders did
not represent the aspirations and interests of their communities but the self-interests of
these leaders as well as the multinationals.
In another example, the quandary of bribery and corruption as taken-for-granted
modes of doing business in both Cameroon and Nigeria is of interest to my argument in
support of responsive hybridity. American and European definitions of “facilitating
payments” or “grease payments” as propounded by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and United States law appear to be incongruous
across specific cultural contexts. In Cameroon, public officials’ approach to routine tasks
is often discretionary; and when these tasks are being performed, it is with some form of
inertia. In this context, defining “facilitating payment” or “grease payment” as bribery
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becomes more complex. What constitutes bribery in the American and European contexts
appears to conflict with how bribery manifests within social, economic, and political
relations in Cameroon.
In both of these examples, a Discourse of Renewal that is amended to include
ethical self-reflexivity and vigilance would engage more effectively with local cultures
and practices. So, hybridity might mean that MNCs and local communities seek out
alternative definitions of what is in crisis; they include local knowledge about the crisis,
its causes, and responses; they work through local decision-making structures; they
remain open to hybrid projects that reconstruct relationships, infrastructures, and build
new opportunities. All of this would be subject to vigilance about ethical issues and
dilemmas and responsive to differences in values and moral codes.
My conceptual approach to responsive hybridity draws from a postcolonial
theorization critical of the concept of hybridity (Kraidy, 2005, 2002). The underlying
theoretical explication of hybridity from Kraidy’s argument is that hybridity is never
neutral; it carries with it ideologies of particular contexts. Hybridity is a “risky notion”
when taken as a simple “association of ideas, concepts, and themes” (Kraidy, 2005, p. vi).
The “emptiness” of the concept is even more vivid when given a universal frame that
ignores or fails to acknowledge the complexities of situational tensions. This explains
why Kraidy argued for the need “to situate every analysis of hybridity in a specific
context where the conditions that shape hybridity are addressed” (p. vi). Kraidy’s
framework of critical transculturalism primarily deconstructs uncritical discourses and
conceptions of hybridity which he argues generally promote “ideologies of integration
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and control – not pluralism and empowerment” (p. vii). Thus, for failing to show how
issues of power and control play out in processes of hybridity, the concept becomes
“strategic rhetoric” that “facilitates a broader negation of power” (pp. vii-viii) and
“frames hybridity as natural, commonplace, and desirable in intercultural relations, and
therefore noncontentious” (Kraidy, 2005, pp. vii-viii). Further describing an uncritical
approach to hybridity as “hegemonic,” Kraidy (2002) argued that seeing hybridity as a
simple “mixture” in global cultural relations fails to explain the concept as a
“communicative practice constitutive of, and constituted by, sociopolitical and economic
arrangements” (p. 319); and this blurs the tensions within the contexts in which the
concept is applied. Kraidy (2005) maintains that while issues of inequality are not
adequately addressed by this simplistic conception of hybridity, “when hybridity is
posited as a naturally occurring and globally desirable condition in public discourse, it
reproduces the prevailing global order” (p. 152) and in this light becomes the “cultural
logic of globalization” (p. 148). This has provided the impetus for corporations including
foreign media to use the concept of hybridity as “transcultural wedges” (p. 148) for their
activities in local communities.
Frello (2005) also evoked the need to consider contexts and power in hybridity
processes in her discussion of what she termed “transgression concepts” (i.e., hybridity,
creolization, transculturalization, syncretism) noting that forms of cultural mixture occur
in environments “that are always marked by unequal relations of power (p. 5). Frello has
argued that hybridity must be seen from a critical dimension “since the celebration of
hybridity sometimes works in favor of hiding unequal power relations” (p. 4). There is
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always the need to pay attention to the interests which hybridity serves in public
discourses. Frello also evoked the element of context noting,
Hybridity can be articulated in many different ways, depending on the context and
on who defines the situation: It can be seen as a threatening contamination of a much
valued purity; it can be seen as a creative mixture of disparate cultural elements; it can be
seen as a subversive insistence on equality through difference – displacing the
‘givenness’ of the centered perspective; and it can be seen as yet another strategy for
upholding existing power relations. (p. 5)
At one point, hybridity could be seen as erasing binaries in a world in which “we
no longer have the secure capacity to draw the line between us and them” (Ang, 2003, p.
141), yet hybridity could be seen as reinforcing these binaries as in “pure” and “impure”
cultures. The argument is that if there is never a pure culture, there would be no need for
a mixture. In contrast, Jonathan Friedman and Modood (1997; also see Werbner, 1997)
think all cultures are always already hybrid.
Silliman (2015) draws from these arguments to insist that hybridity must not just mean
“simply mixture nor should it refer simply to cultural encounters in ‘zones of difference’”
and should not just be another “window dressing” (p. 282) for theoretical frameworks. To
reduce hybridity to a synonym of “mixture,” “fusion,” or “intercultural encounters” (p.
282) neutralizes the interpretation of these encounters which hybridity must be able to
“unpack” (p. 283). As such there is the risk for binaries to emerge, as well as the danger
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of marginalizing rather than empowering disempowered communities when hybridization
occurs within the framework of simplistic mixtures or fusion (Silliman, 2015).
Discussing the multinational corporation as a hybrid space, Frenkel (2008) has
noted that “the transfer of management knowledge and practice within the MNC is
increasingly a matter of relations between dominating and dominated societies” (p. 925).
Thus, hybridization does not often occur on a “level ground of equality” even as some
scholars see it this way (Smith, 2004, in Frenkel, 2008, p. 927). The conception of
hybridity in the proposed amendment is sensitive to these issues of power and difference.
In the following section, I discuss how responsive hybridity might affect the existing
dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal model.

7.5. Reframing the Discourse of Renewal
7.5.1. Ethical Leadership
Beyond the fact that leadership in the crisis renewal model is heavily
individualistic and paternalistic as seen in the role of the corporate rhetor, there is also the
neocolonialist assumption of white men and capital saving Africa. This is clearly
illustrated in Chapter 5 in discussions of Herakles’ CEO Bruce Wrobel’s narrative about
his company’s investments in Cameroon and Africa. Because neoliberalism expands
opportunities for profitable capital accumulation (Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili & Hayden,
2006) multinationals tend to avoid forms of inclusivity that appear to constrain this open
market and profiteering approach to management. As the analysis of Shell’s GMoUs in
Nigeria suggests, communities dependent on or subject to the operations of
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multinationals are only marginally included with little or no power to affect the
parameters of their relationships. This calls for a more radical approach to the notion of
inclusivity.
Mumby’s (2013) critical communication perspective of leadership not only points
to disempowering approaches in communication, but argues that leadership should be
thought of as a “socially constructed phenomenon” (p. 256), noting that social, economic,
and political conditions interact to frame our perceptions of what leadership entails.
Mumby warns against the framing of “leadership” by “a discourse” emerging from
centers of power, and calls for the need to problematize what we think we understand to
be “leadership” by exploring the concept of leadership as “complex, ambiguous, and
uncertain” (p. 257). The critical communicative perspective offers a different view on
leadership by disrupting the commonplace organization-centric explication of leadership.
In Mumby’s words, leadership is clearly “coproduced among organizational
members”; and emphasizes the notion that “leadership is [a]socially constructed process
in which social actors interdependently create what leadership means in specific
organizational contexts” (Mumby, 2013, p. 270; see Fairhurst, 2007; Fairhurst & Grant,
2010). Communication is “central to the ways leadership is socially constructed.” By
analyzing talk or texts, for example, it is possible to see how leadership is socially
constructed. The critical communication perspective “decenters” the “great man” as
leader. Instead, leadership is seen as being distributed throughout the organization and
occurring through interactions. Another major focus of the critical communication
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perspective sees leadership as entangled with issues of power and control (see Zoller &
Fairhurst, 2007; Conrad & Poole, 2012).
There is evidence that supports this idea from the data analyzed in this study. In
both the Nigerian and Cameroonian cases, oppositional struggles between local
communities and the companies exposed the disjuncture created by a community
perspective of leadership and what the companies constructed leadership to be. For the
companies, leadership is more about the organization – achieving efficiency and attaining
organizational goals. This placed the multinationals in disparate power relations with the
multinationals operating from a paternalistic standpoint; that is, organizational leaders
determined action as in a father-child-relationship. The GMoU in the case of Nigeria
allowed company executives to prescribe to communities what the company perceived as
good leadership: “we will continue to engineer development and partner with
communities that are well led by notable individuals,” a spokesperson for Shell told
members of the Romourianwo community during the inauguration of the community
town hall (Chinwo, 2013, para. 7). The spokesperson also prescribed the ability for
community leaders to “think outside the box” (Chinwo, 2013, para. 3). But these
prescriptions and the underlying characterization of what constitutes leadership clashed
with communities, and these communities often protested this approach to leadership
noting that these so-called community leaders did not represent the aspirations and
interests of their communities but the self-interests of these leaders as well as the
multinationals.
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African communication philosophy points to the need for inclusivity in
communication practices. White (2008) for instance noted that participation in
communicative action should be about “how people in local communities communicate
among themselves to solve local problems [and] how people at the grassroots level can
articulate their views, needs and interests up to the district, regional and national level”
(p. 7). Mefalopulos (2003) from a similar perspective insisted on a participatory
approach in which “primary stakeholders” are able to initiate, design, implement and
evaluate or “at least they would need to be involved in a significant way” (para. 6). Even
these conceptualizations of participation or inclusivity appear to be too simplistic and
fragile for marginalized communities in their relations with multinationals. In fact, this is
the same form of participation which the leaders of Royal Dutch Shell touted in their
GMoU with Niger Delta communities. Shell claimed communities conceive, design and
implement their development projects while the company provides funding. But the
relationship is such that communities rely on the benevolence of the company to secure
funding for their projects. The “divide and rule” tactic which many communities decried
in their relations with the company was partly the result of the perception that Shell was
working with communities that aligned with the terms and values set down by the
company while neglecting those that did not fully collaborate with the company (Amaize,
2016; Uwugiaren, 2016; Amaize, 2012). This form of participation constrains community
empowerment and continually mutes already muted voices – e.g., muted histories.
In the Niger Delta case, issues of the appropriation of the negotiation process by
Shell (Amaize, 2011; James, 2015), poor community representation (Uwugiaren, 2016;
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BBC Monitoring Africa, 2012; Oyadongha, 2016), and even the clustering of
communities into Community Development Boards are examples of how a corporate
paternalistic approach to participation impacts marginalized communities (see Amaize,
2011; James, 2015). Royal Dutch Shell exerted a lot of power in its community relations.
Some communities accused the multinational of unilaterally deciding to “dissolve the
board [a CDB] against the provisions of the Global Memorandum of Understanding
entered into by both parties” (Amaize, 2013). Other aspects in the Nigerian case that
point to the need for a more critical conceptualization of participation include the
accusations against the multinational concerning issues of selectively implementing or
defaulting on the implementation of signed agreements with communities (BBC
Monitoring Africa, 2012; James, 2015), and accusations of abandoned projects
(Onoyume, 2013). Such inequitable power relations should be considered if issues of
inequality, social justice, empowerment, and grassroots agency are to remain the pillars
of effective participation (see Escobar, 2011; Cornwall, 2004; White, 1996). Reframed by
responsive hybridity, the element of inclusivity ascribes to possibilities of responsive
empowerment – communal empowering, communal agency, legitimizing marginalized
and or muted voices – which as Penderis (2012) has argued cannot be neglected if the
grassroots must become architects in the participatory process. This conceptualization of
inclusivity challenges a simplistic approach to participation in which multinationals use
participation as a “legitimizing device” (Penderis, 2012, p. 3). Participation for these
companies thus becomes a means to portray the company as being socially responsible in
order to fully establish its operations in these communities.
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7.5.2. Prospective versus Retrospective Vision
The Discourse of Renewal theorizes the importance of a prospective vision and
cautions against a retrospective vision. That is, organizational leaders should focus on the
future and avoid issues of blame which often is the result of looking into the past
following with the intention to deny or scapegoat. Reframed through responsive
hybridity, this component of the model entails a more collective vision and the need for
respecting the role of the past – that is the past as constitutive of the present. The past
constitutive of the present is also informed by the concept of ‘sankofa’ – a way of being
that is responsive to your roots. Evidence from the crises in Nigeria and Cameroon
suggests that in the existing Discourse of Renewal, “prospective vision” is largely flawed
given the model’s inability to theorize the present. The communities’ claims over
ownership of land and crude oil in the two cases analyzed clearly summoned the present.
Further, these claims were based on communities’ attachment to their ancestral past. In
the Niger Delta, communities claimed the oil belongs to them because it was produced on
land they claimed was owned by their ancestors and passed down to the current
generation. Similarly, the claims of land ownership and accusations of land grabs against
Herakles Farms emerged from the history of communities’ reverence for their ancestral
past as well as long-held practices of subsistence agriculture and resource use. In both
cases, there is a reverence of the past that conditions the present and the future.
Communication must be able to address this complexity of time.
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7.5.3. Organizational Learning
While the Discourse of Renewal holds that it is important to communicate and
implement organizational learning following a crisis, I argue that learning cannot happen
outside the contexts of organizational action and change. So, the power dynamics of a
postcolonial encounter have to be engaged. Learning should not simply be the
organization implementing and communicating lessons learned from the crisis to
stakeholders (whether these lessons be mandated by regulatory agencies or simply
implemented proactively by the organization). There is another kind of learning that is
just as critical: the need for MNCs to move beyond the dominance/subjugation dynamics
of the MNC/African encounter. MNCs must learn to reject the inherent sense of
superiority that warrants ignoring indigenous modes of deliberation and communality –
treating these modes/practices as inferior or less worthy in these encounters.
Multinationals mustbe willing to learn from local norms and locally lived experiences.
But the relationships that define the learning process must not be superior/inferior –
learning must occur in relations of equity, not paternalism. The outcome of such learning
processes can become culturally responsive.
7.5.4. Ethics
Much has already been discussed about ethics but the focus at this point is to
show how ethical applications must be responsive rather than prescriptive. I do this by
looking at the aspect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
CSR is relevant to my amendment to the Discourse of Renewal because this
model entails an ethical component that expands on the idea of “social responsibility”
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beyond the profit motive. While MNCs are profit-making endeavors, both the Discourse
of Renewal and CSR are conceptions of corporations as subject to obligations beyond
those imposed legally or through the market. CSR need not be counter to the profit
motive; indeed, Hilson (2012) observes that it is generally accepted that “there are
incentives for business to proactively embrace environmental and community
development concerns” (p. 132). However, many multinationals take advantage of CSR
activities to promote their profit-agenda, considering CSR to be good business strategy,
not necessarily an obligation which the multinational must undertake. Multinationals’
CSR activities are not “goodwill” but carried out in order to ensure smooth operations
within communities. As such, for multinationals, CSR is “good business” and “good for
business.” Both CSR as a business strategy and the corruption of CSR for profits have
particular ramifications for MNCs in developing countries. I turn first to a discussion of
the profit incentive for CSR and then to the case of CSR by MNCs in the developing
world.
According to Knox and Maklan (2004), five incentives drive CSR: (1) consumer
preferences will increasingly favor products and services from socially responsible,
transparent and trustworthy firms; (2) investors will increasingly favor responsible
companies and irresponsible companies will find their cost of borrowing rises; (3)
potential employees will be attracted to more responsible companies; (4) engaging with
stakeholders encourages innovation; and (5) being trusted by stakeholders and pursuing
socially responsible policies reduces risks arising from safety issues, potential boycotts
and deteriorated corporate reputation (p. 506). Yet apart from these incentives, CSR
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properly managed is not solely about marketing or profit but must become integral to
corporate policies and practices. Cash (2012) indicates that there has been a failure on the
part of many MNCs to “integrate social responsibility policies within company
frameworks … [for] corporate accountability” (p. 132). Perceptions even become bleaker
if the notions of avoiding regulation are evoked in this discussion of MNCs’ corporate
social responsibilities.
El-Ojeili and Hayden (2006) indicate that MNCs show very little social
responsibility in the less developed world. While the presence of MNCs in Sub-Saharan
Africa – and the African continent in general – was integral to the colonial governments
in Africa, MNCs’ influence became a dominant force in Africa in the 1970s when
neoliberalists advanced the open-market doctrine. To gain easy access into African
economies, MNCs used, among other strategies, promises of services and infrastructure
provision and by the 1980s, the “obvious financial benefits” of CSR provoked a profitdriven agenda (Hilson, 2012, p. 132). The “development agendas” of MNCs portrayed
corporate social responsibility as being significant to economic and social growth of
African nations where there were huge potentials in the extractive industries especially in
countries like Nigeria and Angola, and for agricultural products including cocoa, banana,
and palm plantations in Cameroon and the Ivory Coast. Fonjong (2014), for example,
points to the optimism that galvanized large-scale land acquisition in Cameroon
following promises made by multinationals to create employment on and off farms, pay
royalties and taxes, improve rural infrastructure including road, water, health posts,
schools, and access to technologies. Yet without explicitly incorporating CSR into their
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policies and frameworks that govern their operations in overseas territories – such that
CSR becomes a corporate obligation (see Cash, 2011) – CSR remains solely and
cynically a marketing and profit strategy. MNCs tie their CSR to corporate benefits that
will accrue as a result of undertaking such social responsibility.
At the same time, incorporating CSR as a market ploy into corporate structures
and policies is not only unethical but damaging to communities and environments. For
example, Hönke and Thauer (2014) criticize MNCs in South Africa for “commercial
priorities” that limit CSR to the immediate vicinity where corporate operations are
located, resulting in an “unequal distribution of collective goods” (p. 711). In SubSaharan Africa, MNCs have resisted “proactive CSR” (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012) as they
failed to invest socially, environmentally, and economically in communities other than
what is required by law or regulation. As Chapters 4 and 5 indicated, the lack of socially
responsible operations can have devastating consequences. For example, in the case of
the Niger Delta, local communities have seen the “economic exploitation of the region’s
vast crude oil reserves by multinationals … and the specter of environmental devastation,
excruciating poverty, and recurrent rule of impunity” (Orogun, 2010, p. 460). Thus,
Hilson (2012) argues that crediting MNCs with CSR in developing nations—where for
decades they have been involved, for instance, in the extractive industry, in shipping
billions of tons of crude oil to markets across the Atlantic Ocean, polluting communities,
grabbing lands, and engaging in corruption—is nothing but a “delusional assessment” (p.
132). Thus, there is need for a critical assessment of CSR by MNCs in developing
countries.
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Clearly, this discussion of MNCs’ distorted CSR is intended to show how
complicated it is to want to use the current Discourse of Renewal to address crises
involving MNCs entangled in differential relational complications. All components of the
current model might contribute to the rhetoric of an MNC intent on protecting their
profit-driven agenda. For example, a prospective vision might be geared to the need to
protect corporate profits leaving key community concerns unaddressed. Organizational
leaders might reframe reality during a crisis to favor corporate intentions. Using effective
organizational rhetoric could mean the organization manipulating communities by
minimizing issues that could affect corporate profits. In addition, the ability for
organizations to “learn” from a crisis vis-à-vis local communities is not certain, after all,
MNCs are in stronger power positions in their relations with local communities. For
example, in discussing organizational learning as a component in the current Discourse of
Renewal, Ulmer et al., mentioned three kinds of learning (systemic, paradigmatic, and
behavioral) and suggested that organizations should aim for systemic learning – that is,
organizations should show evidence of proactively or preemptively avoiding the
reoccurrence of a crisis. I argue that with little or at least very weak obligation on the part
of MNCs to justify their actions in relations with local communities, and with a focus on
profits, this component could be problematic in the manner in which “learning” has been
enacted in the current Discourse of Renewal.
A more critical sense of Corporate Social Responsibility in the contexts of the
Discourse of Renewal’s application to the cases analyzed is that CSR is in collusion with
the Renewal model; both emerging from a corporate-centric standpoint and relating to
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local communities in strongly paternalistic ways that repeat the silencing of these
communities. Reframed by the responsive hybridity amendment, the ethics of CSR must
be responsive to the contexts within which the corporation operates in the world. The
Herakles Farms crisis in Cameroon and the oppositional struggles Shell faced in the
Niger Delta of Nigeria could well be examined from the point of view of these
companies’ failure to ethically situate their operations in terms of communal ethicalness.
In Cameroon, Herakles Farms was perceived not to be interested in enhancing harmony
and the overall good of these communities. Besides, signing the establishment convention
with the government of Cameroon was not enough reason for communities to accept the
Herakles Farms’ operations, partly because the establishment convention failed to
consider a historical past that the people remained attached to in the claims they made.
Similarly, in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, oil spills (delayed cleanups), gas flaring, and the
death of community activist Ken Saro Wiwa all contributed to exacerbating Shell
community relations and these are not incidents that show Shell cared for the community.
A communal approach to ethics goes beyond communicating a company’s intentions or
desires to be honest, transparent, and accountable – even if the company is perceived to
be conforming to these ethical principles (which was not necessarily the case in Nigeria
and Cameroon).
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Table 5. Amended model: Responsive Hybridity as addition
Dimension 1

Dimension 2

Dimension 3

Dimension 4

Dimension
5

Ethical
Prospective
Effective
Organizational Responsive
Communication vs.
Organizational Learning
Hybridity
Retrospective Rhetoric
Vision

7.6. Implications for Current Crisis Renewal Model
The two cases analyzed in this dissertation allow me to delineate some
implications on the Discourse of Renewal, Multinational Communication, and crisis
communication scholarship and practice.
The first implication is that the focus on “renewal” in this model may be too
optimistic as a strategy of crisis response. There are crisis conditions that are simply
beyond an optimistic focus--or beyond corporate crisis rhetoric in general–whether
renewal or apologia. For example, in the case of Nigeria, decades of impoverishment of
the people of the Niger Delta region, decades of corruption and environmental
destruction, and the spiraling of intra- and inter-tribal conflicts in this region are truly
conditions that cannot be addressed mainly through corporate crisis rhetoric. In addition,
Shell’s perceived complicity in the violence that has literally gotten out of hand in the
Niger Delta region – militant groups competing with each other – as well as the
company’s disregard of suffering masses renders a Renewal Discourse quite insufficient.
The second implication is that if non-crisis conditions are such that ethical
practice and Corporate Social Responsibility cannot operate without distortion and
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corruption, crisis communication responses become inadequate. The cases in Cameroon
and Nigeria indicated that corruption has seemingly been normalized even though there
are legal instruments regulating corrupt practices. When non-crisis conditions are such
that ethical practice cannot thrive during crises, a corporate discourse in this regard
becomes insufficient. The Herakles’ case in Cameroon indicated how the multinational
bribed government officials as well as tribal chiefs to have their operations established in
the country negating effective participatory governance as well.
The third implication is that if multinationals cannot be held accountable by
African governments, the power of the multinational will remain unchecked during crises
– hence these multinationals will have little “obligation” to address the situation.
Amnesty International (2017) noted that “Shell’s US law firm is refusing to hand over
more than 100,000 internal documents crucial to a legal case in the Netherlands which is
alleging the oil giant’s complicity in the unlawful arrest, detention and execution of nine
men in Nigeria in the 1990s” (para. 1). This is the case concerning the “Ogoni 9”
murdered by the military regime among whom was Ken Saro Wiwa. The widow to Wiwa
was among those who filed the case in Netherlands after 20 years of fruitless legal battle
in Nigeria.
This chapter has detailed the responsive hybridity amendment to the Crisis Renewal
Model and discussed the way all dimensions of the model are affected by this
amendment. In chapter 8 I return to the research questions that motivated the dissertation
to summarize my findings and arguments. I also discuss limitations of this research and
directions for future research.
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8 Conclusion

8.1. Summary
Chapters 6 and 7 addressed the research questions that motivated the case
analyses and the amendments in this dissertation. I begin this chapter by summarizing the
findings in response to the research questions. The research questions are as follows:
RQ1: What are the limitations of the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating
in West African countries?
RQ2: How can this model be amended based on African communication principles?
8.1.1. Summarizing Research Questions
RQ1: My analyses indicated several limitations to the renewal model applied to
crises faced by multinationals operating in West Africa. The failure of companies to
recognize the complexities of the crises they faced or to respond ethically to the
consequences of corporate exploitation as well as the resistance of local communities in
Nigeria and Cameroon indicated that the renewal model fails to adequately engage the
agency of marginalized stakeholders. Local norms, exigencies, and the complex
relationships that are part and parcel of communities’ lived experiences cannot be
disregarded by multinationals as they craft a crisis response. While an amended renewal
model cannot fix the corruption, politics, and the complex relationships between the
multinationals and local communities in Nigeria and Cameroon, the purpose has been to
rethink the concept of “renewal.”
196

The lessons learned indicated that there is need for a reframing of the conception
of “renewal” in order to go beyond renewed ties between stakeholders and the corporate
rhetor (as the model suggests). Rather, this dissertation argues for “renewal” as an
emergent and ethically vigilant hybridization of local and multinational organizing
practices rather than a corporate-centric paternalistic approach. This means that renewal
as a creative process of cultural hybridity entails ongoing monitoring of both corporate
and community standards and values in order to address the inevitable gaps and
differences between multinationals’ and communities’ ways of organizing. In addition,
renewal entails a co-constructed version of the realities of the present and the presence of
the past. Rather than guilt and blame, the presence of the past involves respect for
traditions and histories and an acknowledgment of corporate and community differences
in values, knowledges, and realities. A responsive hybridity remains vigilant in the
acknowledgment that extant inequities deny the subaltern the power of self-representation
and that entrenched inequities and self-disciplining forces undermine corporate ethics.
Amending the renewal model with responsive hybridity has ramifications for all of the
dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal.
(1) Prospective versus retrospective vision: Data analyzed indicated that
organizational leaders cannot focus on moving forward, and remaining optimistic
about the future (prospective vision) thereby not focusing on issues of blame
(retrospective vision) and be responsive to the in situ communicative demands of
a non-Western crisis context. In the Nigerian and Cameroonian cases, the theme
of ancestral land rights and oil ownership pointed to the fact that communication
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must be able to address non-rational decisional criteria. The ancestral claims made
by local people also entail sankofa or the renewal of past in present and this as
well refigures the conception of retrospective vision beyond concerns over
corporate reputation and relationships.
(2) Organizational learning: In applying this component of the Crisis Renewal Model,
MNCs must learn to beat the inherent sense of superiority that warrants ignoring
indigenous modes of deliberation and communality – treating these
modes/practices as inferior or less worthy in these encounters. Organizational
learning must be responsive to local norms and locally lived experiences. More
importantly, the relationships that define the learning process must not be
superior/inferior; learning must occur in relations of equity not paternalistic
dependencies.
(3) Ethical leadership: When applying the renewal model, MNCs must be cautious
about relying on titular leadership as a sufficient proxy for local communities. In
addition, MNCs must be vigilant against reinscribing neocolonialist and
neoliberal assumptions of white men and capital saving Africa. For example, in
the Nigerian case, Shell’s GMoUs allowed company executives to prescribe to
communities what the company perceived as good leadership: “We will continue
to engineer development and partner with communities that are well led by
notable individuals,” a spokesperson for Shell told members of Romourianwo
community during the inauguration of the community town hall (Chinwo, 2013,
para. 7). Communities often protested this approach to leadership noting that
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these so-called community leaders did not represent the aspirations and interests
of their communities but the self-interests of these leaders as well as the
multinationals.
(4) Effective organizational rhetoric: Ethical communication must be responsive
rather than prescriptive. As discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 7, the model’s
concept of “significant choice” is important, mandating both beneficence and
transparency. That is, organizational leaders and spokespeople are exhorted to
construct realities that are not skewed by corporate interests alone and to provide
all necessary available information to stakeholders so they can make independent
decisions. Yet there are such complicated extenuating circumstances in any crisis
situation but particularly those involving deeply entrenched power differentials
and alternative epistemological frames that these mandates are rendered
implacable. This dissertation suggests that ethical communication must be
focused on bettering communities rather than on bettering corporate stakeholder
relationships and must be responsive to the intricate complications of histories,
knowledges, ethics, and power enacted in local contexts in order to do so. This
therefore, means, locally lived experiences and perspectives should be
empowered in constructing realities during and following a crisis.
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RQ2: How can this model be amended based on African communication principles?
Having analyzed the Nigerian and Cameroonian cases, evidence emerged that showed the
following are important African communication concepts with critical implications for
enacting the renewal model in a multinational crisis response.
(1) Sankofa
This concept emphasizes the importance of how the present and the future are influenced
by looking back in order to be conscious of who we are, where we come from, what our
roots are. In the cases in Nigeria and Cameroon, the ancestral claims over land and oil
could be interpreted as a function of the concept of sankofa. A multinational Discourse of
Renewal must be responsive to differing cultural significances in relations among past,
present, and future and find ways of integrating this into its renewal discourse.
(2) Indigenization
In its most basic understanding, this means transforming something, e.g., communication,
an idea, or an approach to suit the local practices of communities. A renewal discourse
(as seen through the GMOU in Nigeria) should be responsive to communities’ practices
and norms. While this may seem obvious, the discussion of corruption and bribery as
indigenous practices suggests the complications that MNCs must address in global
operations.
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(3) Hybridity
I have argued against a commonplace conception of hybridity as simply the melding or
combination of endoganous and exoganous elememts. In addition, I have warned against
an instrumental conception of hybridity that lends itself to corporate strategic rhetoric.
Instead, I have argued for hybridity as a “transgressive” concept that compels
responsiveness to inherent power inequities, implicit binaries, and superficial relations.
By responsiveness, I mean both self-reflexivity and a deconstructive stance toward takenfor-granted meanings, relations, and practices in encounters between MNCs and local
communities. I have argued that renewal can involve creating hybrid forms by seeking
out alternative definitions of what is in crisis; including local knowledge about the crisis,
its causes, and responses; working through local decision-making structures; and taking a
risk on new relationships, infrastructures, and opportunities emerging from hybridization.

8.2. Reflections
In this section, I reflect on the limitations and future directions of my research.
Perhaps more importantly, I discuss what I consider a critical argument for praxis in
crisis communication.
8.2.1. Limitations
In part, the limitations of this research are inherent to the conventional
methodology of crisis communication studies, that is, the use of publicly available data
and case studies. I address each of these in turn. First, second-order data from
newspapers, radio texts, and NGO reports can be considered a limitation of this research.
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These are, of course, not neutral sources. From my journalism background, I am aware
that personal, organizational, political, economic, and market forces (e.g., advertising
money) can have a huge impact on how stories get reported. At the same time, such
publicly available texts clearly shape the meanings and trajectories of crisis situations as
well as the lives and possibilities of those affected.
The use of case studies is a limitation in crisis communication research that has
been acknowledged (Coombs). The specificities of a case study make this approach
useful in understanding the complexities of crisis situations. At the same time, this very
advantage makes generalizing from case studies difficult. Yin (2009, 2004) has argued
that the potential to generalize research results using a case study approach is a rigorous
process since the purpose in a case analysis is not always to generalize results to an entire
population, but rather to theoretical propositions. However, and as Yin agrees, while
multiple case analyses are appropriate for replicating results, a single case that critically
challenges existing theoretical frameworks is sufficient for generalizing research
findings. Nonetheless, I am sensitive to the limits of case analysis in forwarding an
amendment to the renewal model.
8.2.2 Proactive Renewal Studies as Engaged Scholarship
A troubling limitation in the crisis communication literature that has become
apparent to me is that while the renewal model advances a positive communication
approach for recreating mutually beneficial stakeholder relationships, there remains a
lack of critical reflection and engaged scholarship aimed at transforming oppressive
conditions. I recognize that proposing an engaged role changes the nature of crisis
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communication research by foregrounding a critical political commitment that I argue is
implicit in the proactive renewal model.
This dissertation set out to offer an amendment to the Crisis Renewal Model of
crisis communication developed by Ulmer, et al. (2007). While there are other crisis
communication models, this Renewal model was chosen specifically because of its
proactive approach to crisis response, an approach that avoids reducing crisis
communication to an image/reputation management practice. But even with this promise
to avoid making reputation its central focus, the model remains tied to a classical
rhetorical tradition that values the role of the corporate rhetor and the ethics of corporate
leadership and falls short for not providing a global purview to the central tenets that
constitute the model. My amendment, the outcome of lessons learned from cases
analyzed on multinational corporate crises in Nigeria and Cameroon and informed by a
review of African communication principles and concepts, sought a more complex
conceptualization of the rhetorical strategies that comprise the model. The dissertation
argues for renewal as an emergent and ethically vigilant hybridization of local and
multinational organizing practices. Ethical vigilance is a call to be responsive to the
logics-in-use in different contexts, and to engage in a constant monitoring of
corporate/local stakeholder assumptions, meanings, practices, and power relations within
crisis contexts. This emergent and ethically vigilant hybridization of local and
multinational organizing practices and perspectives is supported by African
communicative concepts including indigenization, hybridity, and sankofa.
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In doing this research I have come to realize a larger responsibility for scholars in
this area. I realized that in crisis communication studies, it is not imperative for scholars
to take a more critical and engaged role. Yet in cases of MNCs operating in the African
continent, blending the activist and scholarly role may be more ethically imperative. I am
in concurrence with observations by Manuh (2007) who pointed out:
I think that in Ghana and the Third World generally, researchers do not
have the luxury to cleanly demarcate the separations [between activism
and research]. If the person is genuinely concerned about justice and
change then s/he will, whether activist or researcher, merge the two…Also
because Third World intellectuals are still very much free to confront and
struggle for all kinds of democratic and political changes, they/we are
compelled to act. (p. 138).
In other words, the role of a public intellectual is significant in these contexts. In
order to realize this role, the amendment I have developed must be refigured as an
invitation to engaged scholarship. While conventional crisis communication scholarship
is posed as case-driven and adopts the distanced stance of the researcher examining post
hoc crisis data, engaged scholarship seeks to develop collaborative relationships with
stakeholders in a crisis case in order to develop co-constructed understandings and
promote transformations in oppressive conditions and relationships.
Putnam and Dempsey define engaged scholarship as “research that highlights
practical problems, develops reflexive bridge between scholars and practitioners, and co-
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develops knowledge among stakeholders” (2015, p. 11). They identify five “faces” of
applied scholarship: applied communication research; collaborative learning; activism
and social justice; practical theory; and public scholarship (p. 13). Of these, my
amendment to the Discourse of Renewal might most readily facilitate an applied
communication research approach involving adapting principles of the renewal model
modified by responsive hybridity to address community-identified problems and
interventions that mediate corporate interests and community needs. However, I am
drawn to the face of practical theory focused “on three activities: mapping, engaged
reflection, and transformative practice” (p. 16). Adopting this approach would require
refiguring the crisis case approach “as generative and as working reflexively with the
tensions between theory and practice” (p. 16).
In such a refiguring, the engaged activity of mapping might entail in situ dialogue
as a mode of data collection and organizing the detailed descriptions of a case around the
practical implications of struggle against oppressive conditions. The activity of engaged
reflection can be addressed by my argument for self-reflexivity and ethical vigilance as
components of responsive hybridity. As engaged scholarship, such reflexivity would be
part of a collaborative scholarly inquiry into the contradictions between corporate and
community “norms or standards for evaluating practice” in a crisis situation. The goal is
to eschew “a normative logic of technical moves designed to address problems” in favor
of a grounded practice of responsive hybridity. Finally, the third engaged activity of
transformative practice would take the renewal model as a mode of transformation
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bridging theory and practice together in the particular situation in order to “transform
experiences through co-producing knowledge in conversations with practitioners” (p. 16).
While I have posed the lack of a practical scholarship orientation as a limitation, it
is also a direction for future research and one that I am determined to explore. There are
other trajectories that would contribute to the development of an amended model of
renewal as well.

8.4. Future research
Future research is need to develop both the amendment I have proposed and its
implications for the renewal model. I suggest activities such as conducting additional
case studies and developing ethnographic studies of crisis renewal and responsive
hybridity.
First, additional case studies should be conducted in order to enhance the value of
the amendment and to consider its modifications in other situations. For example, there
are certainly more MNC crises in Africa that would provide opportunities for further
application of the amended model. Such cases might include the sweet potato project in
Senegal by an Italian company, land rights crises in Ghana (Babator, Okumaning, and
Brewaniase communities). Another important direction for future research is to apply the
amended crisis renewal model to non-Western MNCs. While both of the corporations I
studied were based in Western countries, there are Chinese MNCs operating on the
African continent whose operations would provide an alternative context for considering
crisis renewal.
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In this vein, another direction for future research would involve considering the
appropriateness of the African communication concepts I have based my amendment on
in corporate crises affecting marginalized populations beyond the African continent. For
example, the recent stand-offs by Native American tribes against the Transcontinental
Pipeline from Canada offers a case that might stretch such Afri-centric concepts as
sankofa. At the same time, responsive hybridity is meant to offer possibilities for in situ
adaptations. Hence, applying it to cases in which relationships between corporations and
marginalized populations raise Spivak’s question of “Can the subaltern speak?” seem
critical.
A second direction for future research is to refocus corporate renewal by
conducting ethnographic studies and qualitative interviews. Here again there are
implications of this suggestion that do not accord with the conventions of crisis
communication research. Specifically, the foregrounding of corporate reputation,
leadership, and rhetoric would be displaced. Instead, doing ethnographic work would
emphasize the lived experiences of corporate crises, both for those in the corporation and
those in affected stakeholder groups. There is an extant literature detailing such cases; for
example, the many studies of stakeholder experiences and the reputational crisis of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) following Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Sandy in the US. However, an ethnographic approach would have particular
value in the crisis cases I have examined in this dissertation. For example, the lived
struggle among those in the Cameroon forest who find their ways of life threatened by
the MNC palm projects cannot be adequately conveyed through an examination of
207

corporate apologia and renewal alone. Further, my own understanding of how Africentric concepts play out in actual interaction among stakeholders and the MNC would
benefit greatly from ethnographic observation and immersion.
Finally, a third direction for future research might involve doing a focused study
about corporate renewal discourse from the perspective of those charged with
communication strategies in a MNC like Herakles Farms or SPDC in the Niger Delta.
While the renewal model was initially developed on the basis of cases that focused on
exemplary corporate leaders, it is clear that corporate spokespeople often create and
disseminate corporate crisis responses. This role is one where the political struggles,
ethical quandaries, and cultural clashes between a non-African MNC and local tribes and
communities might come to the fore. This might happen because such spokespeople are
themselves caught in double-binds and paradoxes in the effort to craft reputationsalvaging images and respond to demands and anger from stakeholders; or because such
spokespeople become caught up in the complexities of MNC operations involving not
only layers of company requirements and actors but the demands of industry, regulatory,
and media entities. In any case, exploring crisis renewal and responsive hybridity from
such a perspective would contribute to the development of the amended crisis renewal
model.
In closing, there is a growing need to examine corporate crisis rhetoric on the
African continent given the growing presence of multinational corporations incentivized
by the need to exploit resources, labor, and land and entangled in complex
interdependencies with local, state and international actors. This condition has resulted in
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a plethora of oppositional struggles with local communities. Issues of land rights and oil
ownership point to the concerns about survival in this complex mix. These antagonisms
invite corporate crisis rhetoric to not only engage in post hoc analyses, but to be
responsive to the logics-in-use. Not only the success and profitability of multinational
projects but the wellbeing and indeed the very survival of local communities in the
African continent may depend on the responsiveness of crisis rhetoric.
Acknowledging the complexities of postcolonialism and global neoliberalism, the
analyses in this dissertation sought to situate crisis rhetoric within the local experiences
of multinational operations in order to critically confront relations of power that confound
the crisis renewal model’s goals of equity, transparency, and ethicality. A critical analysis
of both apologia and renewal strategies in multinational crisis communication and the
responses of local stakeholders precipitated lessons learned that informed an amendment
to the Discourse of Renewal. Drawing on concepts of sankofa, indigenization, and
hybridization, responsive hybridity mandates more responsive local engagements that
integrate ethical vigilance, self-reflexivity, and creative hybridity into corporate crisis
strategies. This amendment reframes the dimensions of the renewal model and sets the
determination of renewal itself as contingent on the engagements of responsive hybridity.
Reframing the renewal model in this way encourages a reframing of studies of corporate
crisis rhetoric as engaged scholarship.
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